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I. INTRODUCTION
am not a philosopher. I am not a political scientist. I am a judge -
a judge in the highest court of my country's legal system. So I ask
myself a question that many supreme court judges - and, in fact, all
judges on all courts in modern democracies' - ask themselves: what
is my role as a judge? Certainly it is my role - and the role of every
judge - to decide the dispute before me. Certainly it is my role, as a
member of my nation's highest court, to determine the law by which
the dispute before me should be decided. Certainly it is my role to de-
cide cases according to the law of my legal system. But is that all that
can be said about my role? Are there criteria for assessing the quality
of my work as a judge? Certainly no such assessment should be based
on the aesthetic quality of my writing. 2 Nor should the criterion be
the number of sources I cite in my decisions. But then what would be
a meaningful criterion? What is my role, and do I even have a "role"
* President of the Supreme Court of Israel. This Foreword could not have been completed
without the generous help of a number of individuals who provided thought-provoking and con-
structive comments on very short notice. Their ideas enrich the debate about these issues. I am
grateful to Rosie Abella, Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Dorit Beinisch, Stephen Breyer, Robert
Burt, Guido Calabresi, Michael Cheshin, Alan Dershowitz, Owen Fiss, Paul Gewirtz, Richard
Goldstein, Gershon Gontovnik, Leonard Hoffman, Frank Iacobucci, Jeffrey Jowell, Paul Kahn,
Michael Kirby, Roy Kreitner, Pnina Lahav, Anthony Lester, Beverley McLachlin, Yigal Mersel,
Jon Newman, Boaz Okon, Georghios Pikis, Richard Pildes, Robert Post, Judith Resnik, Johan
Steyn, Cass Sunstein, Laurence Tribe, Lorraine Weinrib, Stephen Wizner, Harry Woolf, Gustavo
Zagrebelsky, and Yitzhak Zamir. I also wish to thank Jonathan Davidson and Sari Bashi for
their translation work.
1 See generally Michael Kirby, Judging: Reflections on the Moment of Decision, i8 AUSTL. B.
REV. 4 (I999); Beverley M. McLachlin, The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?, 29 ALTA. L.
REV. 540 (iggi) [hereinafter McLachlin, The Charter]; Beverley M. McLachlin, The Role of the
Court in the Post-Charter Era: Policy-Maker or Adjudicator?, 39 U. N.B. L.J. 43 (i99o) [hereinaf-
ter McLachlin, The Role of the Court]; Georghios M. Pikis, The Constitutional Position and Role
of the Judge in a Civil Society, COMMONWEALTH JUD. J., Dec. 2ooo, at 7.
2 Although aesthetics are important, as Richard Posner's discussion of Justice Cardozo indi-
cates. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 10, 42, 143 (1990).
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beyond merely deciding the dispute before me according to the law?
These questions occupy me daily as I enter the courtroom and take my
seat on the bench. In my twenty-four years of service on the Supreme
Court of Israel, I have written thousands of opinions. But am I a
"good" judge?
I am opening the issue of the Harvard Law Review analyzing last
Term's United States Supreme Court decisions. What are the criteria
for judging the Justices who wrote those opinions? This question is
important not merely to judges who want to assess their performance,
but to the system as a whole. The answer determines the criteria for
developing the law and provides a basis for formulating a system of
interpretation of all legal texts. Establishing criteria for judging
judges is particularly important in view of the frequent attempts to
dress up political problems in legal garb and place them before the
court. De Tocqueville characterized this tendency to legalize political
questions 170 years ago as a quirk of the United States.3 Today, how-
ever, this phenomenon is common in modern democracies. 4 How are
we judges to deal with political problems that have taken on a legal
character?
The questions I wish to consider are not new. They are as old as
judging itself and they have accompanied various legal systems in
their progressions throughout history. Sometimes they can be found at
the center of public debate. Sometimes they are marginalized. The
time has come to reconsider these questions. There are four main rea-
sons for their timeliness.
First, democracy is celebrating its victories over Nazism and Fas-
cism in the Second World War and over Communism at the end of the
twentieth century. New countries have joined the community of de-
mocracies. Many of them wish to reexamine the nature of modern
democracy,5 which is not based solely on the rule of people through
their representatives (formal democracy), but also on human rights
(substantive democracy). A key historical lesson of the Holocaust is
that the people, through their representatives, can destroy democracy
and human rights. Since the Holocaust, all of us have learned that
human rights are the core of substantive democracy. The last few
decades have been revolutionary, as we have learned the hard way
3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835).
4 See, e.g., McLachlin, The Role of the Court, supra note i, at 49-50 (applying de Toc-
queville's observation to Canada).
5 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992);
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COM-
MUNIST EUROPE (2000); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (200o); TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Totsky ed., 1993).
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that without protection for human rights, there can be no democracy
and no justification for democracy. The protection of human rights -
the rights of every individual and every minority group - cannot be
left only in the hands of the legislature and the executive, which, by
their nature, reflect majority opinion. Consequently, the question of
the judicial branch's role in a democracy arises.
Second, in present times democracy faces the emergent threat of
terrorism. Passive democracy has transformed into defensive democ-
racy. All of us are concerned that it not become uncontrollable democ-
racy. As judges, we are aware of the tension between the need to pro-
tect the state and the rights of the individual. This ever-present
tension intensifies and becomes more pronounced in times of national
emergency. What is the role of the judge in these special situations?
6
Third, since the Second World War there has been a better under-
standing of the nature of judging. 7 Legal realism, positivism, the
natural law movement, the legal process movement, critical legal stud-
ies, and the movements to integrate other intellectual disciplines into
law have provided new tools for understanding the complexity of the
judicial role. I find much truth in all of these approaches. Nonethe-
less, like the human condition, legal reality is too complex to be ade-
quately captured by any one of these schools of thought. In my opin-
ion, it is time for what I call an "eclectic" reexamination of the various
theories about the judicial role. This reexamination is timely now, as
globalization exposes us to ideals and thoughts that transcend national
boundaries and legal systems.
8
Finally, a survey of the de facto status of the judicial branches in
the various democracies shows that since the end of the Second World
War, the importance of the judiciary relative to the other branches of
the state has increased. People increasingly turn to the judiciary, hop-
ing it can solve pressing social problems. Several questions therefore
arise: Is this enhanced judicial status appropriate? Have judges taken
on too much power? Has the separation of powers become blurred?
Indeed, some claim that, in recent years, the gap has widened between
the practices and public expectations of democratic supreme courts, on
the one hand, and the intellectual-normative principles that are sup-
posed to guide the courts, on the other. This gap is dangerous, be-
cause, over time, it will likely undermine public confidence in judges.
Some now argue that judges are too active, while others argue that
they are too self-restrained., These criticisms come from all corners of
society. In recent years, for example, accusations that the U.S. Su-
6 See infra Part VI.
7 See generally BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (2d ed. 1999).
8 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000).
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preme Court is too activist have swelled. 9 Such allegations should be
evaluated within the framework of a supreme court's role in a democ-
racy. A reexamination is therefore needed, and conclusions must be
drawn - both about what can be demanded of judges and what can
be expected from the normative frameworks within which they oper-
ate.
These questions do not arise in the "easy cases"'1 in which there is
only one answer to the legal problem, and the judge has no choice but
to choose it. Such cases do not generally reach the highest court at all.
But how am I to decide the "hard cases," the cases in which the legal
problem has more than one legal answer? These are the cases that
find their way to the highest court, and I have discretion in resolving
them." My decision may be legitimate, but how do I know if it is the
proper one? What must I do in order to fulfill my role? What is my
role?
One might try to dismiss my question with the philosophical argu-
ment that there are no "hard cases" and that judicial discretion in this
sense does not exist. That answer is far from satisfactory. Even Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin - proponent of the theory that every legal
problem has only one correct answer 12 - merely says that there are
better and worse judicial decisions. 13 He propounds a complete theory
describing how the judge Hercules should make the better decision in
"hard cases." Is Hercules the proper model by which we should
judge? 14 Whatever the philosophical answer may be, the reality is that
the large majority of judges on supreme courts think, as I do, that in
some cases they do have a choice. 5 In such cases, it is not that their
decisions legitimate their rulings, but rather that their decisions are
based on a legitimacy that precedes the rulings. Their judicial discre-
tion is an expression of this legitimacy. How, then, should judicial dis-
cretion be exercised? When does exercising judicial discretion advance
the role of a judge, and when does it depart from the proper path?
What is the proper path?
9 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 130-58 (2001).
10 With respect to the easy cases, see AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 36-39 (Yadin
Kaufmann trans., 1989) (1987).
I1 See generally MARISA IGLESIAS VILA, FACING JUDICIAL DISCRETION: LEGAL KNOW-
LEDGE AND RIGHT ANSWERS REVISITED (2001).
12 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 8i (1977); Ronald Dworkin, Judi-
cial Discretion, 6o J. PHIL. 624, 624-25 (1963).
13 Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY 359, 367 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., igi); see also TOM
BINGHAM, THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING: SELECTED ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 25 (2ooo).
14 On Dworkin's Hercules, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-40 (1986).
15 See ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 190-95 (1982).
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I reject the contention that the judge merely states the law and
does not create it. It is a fictitious and even a childish approach.
16
Montesquieu's theory that the judge is "no more[] than the mouth that
produces the words of the law"17 is similarly discredited. I suspect
that most supreme court judges believe that, in addition to stating the
law, they sometimes create law. Regarding the common law, this is
certainly true: no common law system is the same today as it was fifty
years ago, and judges are responsible for these changes. This change
involves creation. The same is true of the interpretation of a legal text.
The meaning of the law before and after a judicial decision is not the
same. Before the ruling, there were, in the hard cases, several possible
solutions. After the ruling, the law is what the ruling says it is. The
meaning of the law has changed. New law has been created. What is
my role, as a judge, in this creative process?
When I refer to the "role" of the judge, I do not mean to suggest
that the judge has a political agenda. As a judge, I have no political
agenda. I do not engage in party politics or politics of any other kind.
My concern is with judicial policy; that is, with formulating a system-
atic and principled approach to exercising my discretion. I ask
whether judges in supreme courts, who set precedent for other courts,
have (or should have) a judicial policy with regard to the way we exer-
cise our discretion. I wish to examine the judicial philosophy underly-
ing our role as judges in the highest courts of our democracies.
18
Different judges have varying answers to the question that I am
posing. These differences stem from variances in education, personali-
ties, responses to the world around us, and outlooks on the world in
which we live. This is only natural. Each judge is a distinct world
unto himself or herself, and we would not wish it otherwise. Ideologi-
cal pluralism, not ideological uniformity, is the hallmark of judges in
democratic legal systems. Diverse judges reflect - but do not repre-
sent - the different opinions that exist in their societies. But I think
many of us agree that the question I have posed is central to our func-
tion as judges, even if we disagree about its answer. Our judicial pol-
16 See Bora Laskin, The Role and Functions of Final Appellate Courts: The Supreme Court of
Canada, 53 CAN. B. REV. 469, 477-80 (1975); Anthony Lester, English Judges as Law Makers,
1993 PUB. L. 269, 269 (quoting Reid, infra, at 22); Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J.
Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 22 (1973).
17 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 209 (Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1977)
(1750).
18 Justice Cardozo performed similar examinations - with great success - in his books, par-
ticularly in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). See
POSNER, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that Cardozo's nonjudicial writings are a contribution to
jurisprudence, but adding that "they are not only that. They are also a judge's effort to articulate
his methods of judging."). The Nature of the Judicial Process is the first systemic effort by a
judge to explain how judges reason and to articulate a judicial philosophy.
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icy and our judicial philosophy are fundamental to us, since they guide
us in our most difficult hours. Every supreme court judge has difficult
hours. They mold us and give us self-confidence. They inform us that
our strength as judges is in understanding our limitations. They teach
us that, more than we have answers to the difficult legal problems that
confront us, we have questions regarding the path we should take.
They make us understand that, like all human beings, we err, and we
must have the courage to admit our mistakes. And they lead us to the
judicial philosophy that is proper for us, for there is nothing more
practical than good judicial philosophy.
My purpose in this Foreword is to suggest answers to the questions
I have posed. I wish to present my views on the role of a supreme
court and its judges in a democracy. My aim is to describe the judicial
policy and judicial philosophy that guide me. I do not nalvely claim
that my position reflects an absolute truth. Democratic countries dif-
fer from one another, and what is good and proper for one may not be
good and proper for another. 19 I claim only that it is a legitimate ap-
proach, and, in my opinion, the most appropriate one for the Israeli le-
gal system of which I am a part.
20
The Israeli legal system is a young system, albeit one with deep his-
torical roots that reflect its Jewish values. It is a legal system that
guards its democratic nature despite the existential struggle it has
faced since its founding. It is a system composed of immigrants and
the descendants of immigrants from countries that, for the most part,
had no democratic tradition. It is also part of the Middle East, whose
democratic tradition is weak. Although it is certainly a unique legal
system, I hope that many supreme court judges in other democratic
countries view their work in their own legal systems similarly. I hope
that even those who do not fully accept my outlook and conclusions
are prepared to walk with me part-way, because they agree with my
general direction, if not with the speed of travel or the final destina-
tion.
My proposed judicial philosophy applies only to the supreme court
judge in a democracy. I do not address societies that are not democ-
ratic.2 1 The democratic nature of a regime shapes the role of all
19 See Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216 (i999).
20 For a discussion of the different situation in England, see Lord Hoffman, Human Rights
and the House of Lords, 62 MOD. L. REV. 159 (I999).
21 For discussions of this topic, see INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF
THE THIRD REICH (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., i9gi) (i987); and MICHAEL STOLLEIS,
THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES IN LEGAL HISTORY IN NAZI GERMANY (Tho-
mas Dunlap trans., 1998) (1994). South Africa is an additional example. For a discussion of the
functioning of its judges during apartheid, their behavior, and the way they should have behaved,
see DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (i9I); DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE
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branches of the state. It also directly affects the judiciary. For exam-
ple, a central precondition for understanding the judicial role is the in-
dependence of the judiciary. This condition usually does not exist in
regimes that are not democratic. Furthermore, the character of the re-
gime affects the interpretive system that the judge should adopt. A
judge should not advance the intent of an undemocratic legislator. He
must avoid giving expression to undemocratic fundamental values.
Indeed, my entire theory about the role of the judge and the means he
employs is grounded in the character of a democratic regime. With a
regime change, the view of the judge's role and the way it is exercised
also change. Moreover, I am examining my role as a judge in a mod-
ern democracy - that is, as a judge at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. I do not think that it would have been possible to for-
mulate a judicial philosophy like my own a hundred years ago or
more. 22 And my philosophy will inevitably no longer be valid in a
hundred years' time. Indeed, any perspective on the judicial role is a
function of place and time. It is influenced by its environment. It is
relative and incomplete. It changes periodically. Therefore, recogni-
tion and realization of the judicial role will vary with different democ-
racies at different times.
While I focus mainly on supreme courts of legal systems that be-
long to the common law family, such as the United States, England,
Canada, Australia, and a number of mixed jurisdictions, such as South
Africa, Scotland, Cyprus, and Israel, I think that what I have to say
also applies substantially to other legal systems, such as the Roman-
Germanic family, including France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and the
family of Scandinavian systems. I believe that my approach is also
valid for legal systems that have emerged from the family of socialist
systems, such as Russia, Hungary 2 3 Poland, and the Czech Republic.
24
After this Introduction, in Part II of this Foreword, I will lay the
foundation for the two central elements of the judicial role beyond ac-
tually deciding the dispute, as I see them. One element is bridging the
gap between law and society. I regard the judge as a partner in creat-
ing law. As a partner, the judge must maintain the coherence of the
legal system as a whole. Each particular creation of laws has general
implications. The development of a specific common-law doctrine ra-
JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL
ORDER (1998) [hereinafter DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES].
22 Of course, many aspects of my approach are not unique to contemporary life. The need to
bridge the gap between law and society, for example, is not unique to the present. In the past,
too, this was understood to be central to the role of judging.
23 See generally LASZL6 S6LYOM & GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN
A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2000) (anthologizing se-
lected decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary).
24 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 5; TEITEL, supra note 5.
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diates into the entire legal system. The interpretation of a single stat-
ute affects the interpretation of all statutes. A legal system is not a
confederation of laws. Legal rules and principles together constitute a
system of law whose different parts are tightly linked. The judge is a
partner in creating this system of law. The extent of this partnership
varies with the type of law being created. In creating common law,
the judge is a senior partner. In creating enacted law, the judge is a
junior partner. Nonetheless, he is a partner and not merely an agent
who carries out the orders of his principal. The second major task of
the judge is to protect the constitution and democracy. In my opinion,
every branch of government, including the judiciary, must use the
power granted it to protect the constitution and democracy. The judi-
ciary and each of its judges must safeguard both formal democracy, as
expressed in legislative supremacy, and substantive democracy, as ex-
pressed in basic values and human rights. I will conclude Part II by
considering a critique of this view and the responses to it.
In Part III, I will discuss the preconditions for carrying out the
complex role of the judge. I will consider the needs for judicial inde-
pendence (personal and institutional), judicial objectivity, and the
maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary.
In Part IV, I will explore the means by which the court can fulfill
its role. These means are bounded. Judges have only a few basic ma-
terials with which to build legal structures. I will focus on constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation as instruments for realizing the ju-
dicial role by presenting purposive interpretation as the proper system
of interpretation. I will then discuss the fundamental principles of the
legal system as an instrument for realizing the role of the judge and
will analyze the theory of balancing as a complex and sensitive judicial
tool. I will also discuss a number of tools and concepts that help the
judge fulfill his role, including justiciability, standing, comparative
law, and a good philosophy.
In Part V, I will discuss the reciprocal relationship between the su-
preme court and other branches of the state in a democracy. I will
elaborate, in this context, my perspective on the concepts of separation
of powers and the rule of law. I will consider the relationships among
the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive. This relationship is
perpetually tense because each branch comprises a separate but inter-
connected part of the state. This tension should be based on each
branch's respect for the other branches and a recognition of their cen-
trality. The court must engage in a dialogue with the legislature and
executive. In this context, I will analyze the principle of separation of
powers and its implications for judicial review of legislative decisions
(as expressed in statutes and elsewhere). I will also examine the scope
of judicial review of administrative actions.
In Part VI, I will focus on terrorism, one of the most important
problems that supreme courts in democracies face today. In this con-
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text, I will develop the concept of defensive democracy - with the su-
preme court at its center - as a response to the phenomenon of mod-
ern terrorism. In this area, regrettably, the Israeli Supreme Court has
acquired a certain expertise. Numerous legal problems related to a de-
fensive democracy's battle with terrorism reach the doors of the Israeli
Supreme Court. We evaluate them ex ante, as the court of first and
last instance.
It goes without saying that the opinions expressed in this Foreword
are my personal opinions. They do not reflect the opinions of the Su-
preme Court of Israel. As is evident from the decisions I cite, in some
cases my view reflects Israeli case law, while in other cases I write a
minority opinion.
In this Foreword, I cite many opinions that I have written - per-
haps more than is customary. I have done so in order to indicate that
I have put my theoretical viewpoints to the test of judicial reality by
applying them in actual opinions. In some instances, my views have
become binding caselaw. In others, they were merely obiter dicta. In
still others, they were in minority opinions.
Finally, I must confess that, as I write this Foreword, I feel a cer-
tain unease. United States public law in general, and United States
Supreme Court decisions in particular, have always been, to me and to
many other judges in modern democracies, shining examples of consti-
tutional thought and constitutional action. The United States is the
richest and deepest source of constitutionalism in general and of judi-
cial review in particular. We foreign jurists all look to developments
in the United States as a source of inspiration. I therefore asked my-
self whether it was appropriate for a foreign judge to express an opin-
ion, in an American forum, about issues on which most of the experts
are American. I nevertheless accepted the task, out of deep apprecia-
tion for the impressive accomplishments of United States constitu-
tional law and of its Supreme Court in particular. If I am occasionally
critical of the American Supreme Court, it is because I regret that it is
losing the central role it once had among courts in modern democra-
cies. 25
II. THE ROLE OF A SUPREME COURT
The primary concern of the supreme court in a democracy is not to
correct individual mistakes in lower court judgments. That is the job
of courts of appeal. The supreme court's primary concern is broader,
25 See generally Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization, the
Rehnquist Court, and Human Rights, in THE REHNQUIST COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE 234
(Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (reviewing the Rehnquist Court's international impact and critiquing
its provincialness).
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systemwide corrective action.2 6 This corrective action should focus on
two main issues: bridging the gap between law and society, and pro-
tecting democracy.2 7  The judge is charged with both jobs simultane-
ously, and in most cases, they are complementary.2 8 But during vari-
ous periods of history, one of them has taken precedence over the
other. I think that in light of the increasing recognition of judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of statutes since the Second World War
and of the inclusion of human rights provisions in new constitutions,
the second role, preserving democracy, has grown in importance. This
is certainly the case in the current age of defensive democracy, al-
though the second role has always existed, particularly in the field of
private law. Of course, these two roles are not unique to the judiciary.
Every branch of government in a constitutional democracy must pro-
tect that institution and work to bridge the gap between law and soci-
ety. The individual branches of government are partners in fulfilling
these roles. 29 I emphasize the role of the judiciary to point out that the
judiciary shares responsibility for these tasks, and I wish to examine
the methods that the judiciary employs to carry them out.
A. Bridging the Gap Between Law and Society
The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes pat-
terns of behavior. It reflects the values of society. The role of the
judge is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the
law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organ-
ism. 30  It is based on a given factual and social reality that is con-
stantly changing. 31 Sometimes the change is drastic, sudden, and eas-
ily identifiable. Sometimes the change is minor and gradual, and
cannot be noticed without the proper distance and perspective. Law's
26 See Laskin, supra note i6, at 475; William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme
Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. I, 9-IO (1986).
27 Of course, courts have other roles. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Vir-
tues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1852-76 (2001) (surveying U.S.
state court practices such as issuing advisory opinions, deciding political questions, and engaging
in judicial administration).
28 It can be argued that there is a discrepancy between these two roles. According to this
view, bridging the gap between law and society requires the judge to give expression to modern
developments, whereas in protecting the constitution and democracy, the judge must protect
against modern developments. See Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995).
This outlook is unacceptable. The two roles require a recognition of modern developments, while
giving expression to principles and fundamentals, and not to passing vogues.
29 See Lorraine E. Weinrib, Canada's Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?, 6 REV. CONST.
STUD. II9, 124 (2002).
30 See Brian Dickson, A Life in the Law: The Process of Judging, 63 SASK. L. REV. 373, 388
(2000).
31 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE io-I I (Greenwood
Press 1970) (1928).
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connection to this fluid reality implies that it too is always changing.
Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and is even in-
tended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is the
result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social reality
changes, the law must change too. Just as change in social reality is
the law of life, 32 responsiveness to change in social reality is the life of
the law. It can be said that the history of law is the history of adapt-
ing the law to society's changing needs. 33 . A thousand years of com-
mon law are a thousand years of changes in the law in order to adapt
it to the needs of a changing reality.3 4 The judge is the primary actor
in effecting this change. 35 He is the senior partner in making common
law. The legislature is the junior partner. Its role is to correct mis-
takes in case law or in the margins of case law, and not to try to re-
place the judge in his primary role as developer of the common law.
Similarly, the history of legislation is the history of adapting law to so-
ciety's changing needs. Here the main role lies, of course, with the leg-
islature. It is the senior partner. The judge acts as a faithful inter-
preter of legislation. He is the junior partner.
i. Change with Stability. - The need for change presents the
judge with a difficult dilemma, because change sometimes harms secu-
rity, certainty, and stability. The judge must balance the need for
change with the need for stability. Professor Roscoe Pound expressed
this well eighty years ago:
Hence all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting
demands of the need of stability and of the need of change. Law must be
stable and yet it cannot stand still.
3 6
Stability without change is degeneration. Change without stability
is anarchy. The role of a judge in a supreme court is to help bridge
the gap between the needs of society and law without allowing the le-
gal system to degenerate or collapse into anarchy. The judge must en-
sure stability with change, and change with stability. Like the eagle in
the sky that maintains its stability only when it is moving, so too is the
law stable only when it is moving. Achieving this goal is very diffi-
cult. The life of the law is complex. It is not mere logic. It is not
32 See Rehnquist, supra note 26, at i.
33 See, e.g., C.A. 207/79, Raviv Moshe Partners Ltd. v. Beit Yulis Ltd., 37(i) P.D. 533, 556 (Isr.)
("Life is in constant motion. So too is the judge. The judge must balance between stability and
movement.").
34 See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 2o9-98 (Stanford
Univ. Press I968) (1964); JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 149-204
(1961).
35 On the role of the common-law judge, see generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
36 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY I (1923).
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mere experience.37  It is both logic and experience together. The pro-
gress of case law throughout history must be cautious. The decision is
not between stability or change. It is a question of the speed of the
change. The decision is not between rigidity or flexibility. It is a
question of the degree of flexibility. The judge must take into account
a complex array of considerations. I will discuss three such considera-
tions that apply in the development of the law. A supreme court judge
must consider: (I) the coherence of the system in which he operates; (2)
the powers and limitations of the institution of the judiciary as defined
within that system; and (3) the way in which his role is perceived.
2. Considerations of System. - The development of law, be it
common law or enacted law, must maintain normative coherence
within the legal system. 38  It must reflect the fundamental values of
the legal system. Every ruling must integrate into the framework of
that system. As Professor Lon Fuller explains:
Those responsible for creating and administering a body of legal rules will
always be confronted by a problem of system. The rules applied to the de-
cision of individual controversies cannot simply be isolated exercises of ju-
dicial wisdom. They must be brought into, and maintained in, some sys-
tematic interrelationship; they must display some coherent internal
structure.
3 9
Indeed, a judge who develops the law does not perform an individ-
ual act, isolated from an existing normative system. The judge acts
within the context of the system, and his ruling must integrate into it.
For this reason, judges must ensure that the change is organic and the
development gradual and natural.40 Change generally should occur by
evolution, not revolution. 4 1 We are mostly concerned with continuity,
not discontinuity. Judicial activity - according to the attractive anal-
ogy of Professor Dworkin - is like several coauthors writing a book,
one after another.4 2  Judges no longer on the bench wrote the earlier
chapters. We must now write the continuation of the work. We must
ground ourselves in the past, while ensuring historical continuity. The
37 But see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW i (Little, Brown & Co.
199o) (I88I) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
38 See BARAK, supra note io, at 152; NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND
LEGAL THEORY (1993).
39 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 94 (1968).
40 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (,9,7) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ROSCOE
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (1938); Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of
a Lawyer- Newly Become Judge, 7, YALE L.J. 218, 223 (z96i).
41 See Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1031-32
(1978) ("The greatest judges of the common law have proceeded in this way, moving not by fits
and starts, but at the pace of the tortoise that steadily advances though it carries the past on its
back.").
42 See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 229 (likening judges to collaborators in a vast "chain
novel').
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chapters that we are writing become, after they are written, chapters
from the past. New chapters, the creations of new judges, will be
written in the future.
Likewise, we must ensure consistency. 43 In similar cases we must
act similarly, unless there is a proper reason for distinguishing the
cases. This rule does not bar departure from existing precedent, but it
does ensure that departure from precedent is proper;44 that it reflects
reason and not fiat;45 and that it is done for proper reasons of legal
policy,4 6 so that the contribution the change makes to future law out-
weighs any harm caused by changing the old law, including the insta-
bility and resultant uncertainty inherent in change. 47 Indeed, devia-
tion from supreme court precedent is a serious matter and must be
undertaken responsibly. Precedent is not immutable, but bucking es-
tablished case law is not a goal in itself. Departures from precedent
should be the exception, not the rule. And when a judge does depart
from precedent, he should be explicit about it, taking personal respon-
sibility for making the change. The judiciary must be transparent.
Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court correctly noted
that "[a] judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does it will
breed understanding. And confidence based on understanding is more
enduring than confidence based on awe. '48  The "burden of proof"
ought to rest with whoever wishes to depart from precedent. There-
fore, when the scales are balanced, we should stick with precedent.
49
Considerations of system must also recognize the fact that, in su-
preme courts (and in some appellate courts, for that matter), a judge
hears cases as part of a panel. A supreme court justice often asks him-
self whether he should write a separate opinion. My position is that I
do not dissociate myself from my colleagues' positions just because I
don't like the way they articulate them, or because I think I can do it
better. Stylistic differences should not be grounds for writing a sepa-
rate opinion.5 ° Of course, if the difference of opinion is over the law, I
43 See BARAK, supra note io, at 166-67.
44 See generally RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (4th ed.
1991) (describing the extent of English judges' adherence to precedent); INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1997) (comparing the extent of judicial adherence across several countries' judicial systems).
45 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946).
46 See generally JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1983) (exam-
ining different paradigms of the judicial role in light of the value judgments inherent in policy
decisions).
47 See Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1966).
48 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (I949).
49 See BARAK, supra note io, at 259.
50 See Schaefer, supra note 47, at io.
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will express my opinion, even if it is a dissent.51 Having said that,
when the issue arises again, I will not necessarily restate my dissent.
For issues in which stability is actually more important than the sub-
stance of the solution - and there are many such cases - I will join
the majority, without restating my dissent each time. Only when my
dissenting opinion reflects an issue that is central for me - that goes
to the core of my role as a judge - will I not capitulate, and will I
continue to restate my dissenting opinion: "Truth or stability - truth
is preferable.
'5 2
Beyond regard for systemwide concerns, a judge must consider his
own case law. Over the years, a supreme court judge who presides for
a long period of time creates a "system" of his own that reflects his ju-
dicial and legal policy. These are the "footprints"13 judges leave in the
field of law. As a rule, they must follow their own footprints, unless
there is a proper reason for departing from them. The "burden" in this
regard rests with those who wish to diverge from their own previously
chosen paths.
3. Institutional Considerations. - In bridging the gap between
law and society, the judge must take into account the institutional
limitations of the judiciary.5 4 Admittedly, judicial lawmaking, mostly
through interpretation, is central to the role of a supreme court. But
that role is incidental to deciding disputes. This is the striking differ-
ence between judge-made law and enacted law. Without a dispute
there is no judicial lawmaking.5 By nature, then, judges create law
sporadically, not systematically. The changes they make to law are
partial, limited, and reactive. The issues brought before a court are, to
some extent, selected randomly. Many years may pass before a prob-
lem that troubles the public enters a judicial forum. A court's control
over the matters it hears is negative in nature, permitting only dis-
missal of what the court does not want to consider. Consequently, a
judge cannot plan a strategy of bridging the gap between law and so-
ciety. The changes he or she makes to the law are partial and limited.
When a comprehensive and immediate change is needed in an entire
51 See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); Stanley
Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1962); Roger Traynor, Some Open Questions
of the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1957).
52 C.A. 376/46 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 2 P.D. 235.
53 Justice Breyer has attributed this expression to Justice O'Connor. See Stephen Breyer, Ju-
dicial Review: A Practising Judge's Perspective, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 153, i6o (1999).
54 See BARAK, supra note io, at 172; Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral
Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984).
55 The dispute may be of a private nature or of a public nature; it may be concrete or abstract;
it may involve only situations where there is a "case and controversy" (as in the United States) or
it may do without it (as in Germany); it may be - as the Canadian reference - of an advisory
nature. But there must always be a dispute. Regarding the different possibilities, see ALLAN-
RANDOLPH BREWER CARfAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1989).
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branch of law, the legislature ought to make it. Moreover, one cannot
bridge the gap between society and law without having reliable infor-
mation about society. The court does not always have the information
about social facts that might justify a change in the law. Our laws of
evidence usually look backward (adjudicative facts), providing a (par-
tial) answer to the question of "what happened." They usually do not
look forward (legislative facts), and do not provide an answer to the
question of "what should happen." Moreover, the means at a judge's
disposal are limited. The court may, in developing the common law in
its legal system, impose a new duty of care in torts. But it cannot, for
example, impose taxes or establish a licensing regime.
Finally, the nature of the legal policy underlying existing law
should be a factor in the judge's willingness to change the law. For
example, a judge is generally qualified to consider the legal policy un-
derlying human rights protections. Naturally, he or she has little diffi-
culty evaluating legal policy that can be derived from logic, a sense of
justice, or existing law (enacted or case law). By contrast, a judge
should beware evaluating complex polycentric questions of economic
or social policy that require specialized expertise and knowledge and
that may rely on assumptions concerning issues with which he or she
is unfamiliar. I am aware of the difficulties in making this distinction.
I mean to say only that a judge should be sensitive to this type of con-
sideration. I feel much more comfortable holding that one economic
plan is discriminatory compared to another than I do holding that one
economic plan falls within the range of reasonableness while another
does not.
4. Considerations of the Perception of the Judicial Role. - Judi-
cial lawmaking that bridges the gap between law and society must be
consistent not only with society's basic values, but also with society's
fundamental perception of the role of the judiciary.56 The power of a
judge to bridge the gap between law and society in a society that, like
Montesquieu,5 7 sees the judge merely as the mouthpiece of the legisla-
ture is different from the judge's power in a society that views com-
prehensive judicial lawmaking as legitimate. Society's perception of
the judicial role, however, is fluid. Judicial activity is not only influ-
enced by it; it also influences that perception.
56 See BARAK, supra note io, at 192; M.D.A. Freeman, Standards of Adjudication, Judicial
Law-Making and Prospective Overruling, 26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. I66, 18i (1973) ("Every
institution embodies some degree of consensus about how it is to operate. To understand the ju-
dicial role and apprise the legitimacy of judicial creativity one must explore the shared expecta-
tions which define the role of judge."); Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46
CAN. B. REV. 4o6, 407-08 (1968).
57 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 17.
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In common law systems, bridging the gap between law and society
appears to be a central role of the judiciary. By their nature, common
law systems view the judge as a senior partner in lawmaking. But
does this perception apply beyond the confines of the common law?
And, in common law systems, is it possible to regard the judge as
someone who ought to bridge the gap between law and society in the
sphere of legislation?58 Certainly the main actor in this bridging is the
legislature. Its democratic nature (in the sense of its being chosen by
the people), the tools at its disposal, and the ways in which it receives
information about different policies and different alternatives all make
the legislature chiefly responsible for bridging the gap between law
and society.
But can the judge be recognized as a junior partner in such bridg-
ing because of his role as the interpreter of legislation? The answer to
this question is not at all simple. The question is whether to accept a
model of partnership - albeit a limited partnership - or a model of
agency. s9 According to the agency model,60 the judge is an agent of
the legislature. He or she must act according to its instructions, like a
junior officer bound to carry out the orders of his or her superior offi-
cer. 61 There are many problems with this approach. To my mind, a
judge is not an agent who receives orders, and the legislature is not a
principal that gives orders to its agent.62 The two are branches of the
state with different roles: one is legislator and the other is interpreter.
Indeed, legislatures create statutes that are supposed to bridge the gap
between law and society. In bridging this gap, the legislature is the
senior partner, for it created the statute. But the statute itself cannot
58 On this question, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
2 (1982) (proposing that judges be authorized to determine whether a statute has become obso-
lete).
59 These are not the only models, and they certainly do not apply to all issues that arise. I ad-
dress them because they are relevant to the two roles of a judge in a democracy that I focus on
here. For an extensive discussion of these two models, see RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF
LAW IN AMERICA 46-97 (2oo1). Cass claims that the prevailing model in American law is the
"Weak Agency Model," in which the judge acts as a translator. See id. at 49, 92-97. I disagree.
60 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985);
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6o (1984); John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion from the Constitution, lol COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648 n.1 (2oo).
61 For this analogy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269
(1990).
62 See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV L. REV. 4, i9 (I988) (noting an alternative to textualism "in which courts
play a vital role as partners with, rather than mere servants of, the legislature"); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322 (1989); Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1989) (stating that all branches are "the agent of the people").
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be implemented without being interpreted. The task of interpreting
belongs to the judge. Through his or her interpretation, a judge must
give effect to the purpose of the law and ensure that the law in fact
bridges the gap between law and society. The judge is a partner in the
legislature's creation and implementation of statutes, even if this part-
nership is a limited one.
63
Regarding the judge merely as an agent is too narrow an approach.
That point of view isolates a particular statute and sees it as an island.
But a statute is not an island. It is part of a legislative enterprise that
is many years old. Moreover, legislation, together with the common
law, forms part of the legal system. All parts of the law are linked.
Whoever interprets one statute interprets all the statutes. Whoever en-
forces one statute enforces the whole legal system. Normative har-
mony must exist among the different parts of the legal system. An in-
terpretation of an individual statute, like a new common-law rule,
must be integrated into the system. The judge is responsible for all of
this. He or she must interpret the individual statute consistently with
the whole system and ensure that the interpretation succeeds in bridg-
ing the gap between law and life. From this perspective, the judge's
role in creating common law (as a senior partner) is similar to the
judge's role in interpreting legislation (as a junior partner).64 In both
cases, the judge works in the interstices of legislation. 65 Of course, he
or she has a different degree of freedom in each situation, but his or
her role is primarily the same: to bridge the gap between law and soci-
ety. A judge must therefore consider the elements discussed above -
63 See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 313 ("[Hercules, the hypothetical ideal judge] will treat
Congress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law, though an author with special
powers and responsibilities different from his own, and he will see his own role as fundamentally
the creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the statu-
tory scheme Congress began."); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT. THE HISTORY
AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 155 (1999) (viewing judges "as collaborators
in the interpretive process, albeit as junior partners"); Douglas Payne, The Intention of the Legis-
lature in the Interpretation of Statutes, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 96, 105 (1956) ("The proper
office of a judge in statutory interpretation is not, I suggest, the lowly mechanical one implied by
orthodox doctrine, but that of a junior partner in the legislative process, a partner empowered and
expected within certain limits to exercise a proper discretion as to what the detailed law should
be.").
64 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
879 (1996). Justice Scalia's approach is different. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3-14 (1997). According to his view,
there is a profound difference between the activity of a judge in interpreting legislation and the
activity of a judge in the enterprise of the common law. See id. Although I agree that such a dif-
ference exists, I do not believe it is as acute as Justice Scalia describes.
65 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially .... ");
see also BELL, supra note 46, at 17-20 (1983) (outlining a model of the judge as an "interstitial
legislator").
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the need to guarantee stability through change and to take systemic
and institutional considerations into account - in bridging the gap be-
tween law and society, both by creating common law and by interpret-
ing legislation. This approach directly impacts the formation of a
proper system of interpretation. It should be a system that bridges law
and society's needs. It should be a system that ensures dynamic inter-
pretation,66 giving a statute a meaning compatible with social life in
the present and, as far as can be anticipated, in the future, too.
B. Protecting the Constitution and Democracy
i. The Struggle for Democracy. - The second role of the judge in
a democracy is to protect the constitution
67 and democracy itself.68
Legal systems with formal constitutions impose this task on judges,
but judges also play this role in legal systems with no formal constitu-
tion. Israeli judges have regarded it as their role to protect Israeli de-
mocracy since the founding of the state, 69 even before the adoption of
a formal constitution.70 In England, notwithstanding the absence of a
written constitution, judges have protected democratic ideals for many
years.71 Indeed, if we wish to preserve democracy, we cannot take its
existence for granted. We must fight for it. This is certainly the case
for new democracies,7 2 but it is also true of the old and well-
66 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9
(1994).
67 See Hunter v. Southam, [19841 2 S.C.R. 145, 155 (Can.) ("The judiciary is the guardian of
the constitution.").
68 See generally THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988).
69 See Aharon Barak, Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary,
in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY, supra note 68, at 448; Zeev Segal, A Constitution With-
out a Constitution: The Israeli Experience and the American Impact, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. i, 3
(1992).
70 In C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.D. 22I,
the Israeli Supreme Court unanimously held that the two "Basic Laws" passed in 1992, Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, together with existing Basic Laws
on the structure of government, are the supreme law of the land and constitute Israel's constitu-
tion. Mizrahi Bank subjects any new statute to judicial review under these Basic Laws. I called
this development a "constitutional revolution." Some Israeli scholars have criticized my approach.
See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, The Constitutional Revolution: A Reality or a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?,
28 MISHPATIM 21 (1997).
71 See STANLEY DE SMITH, LORD WOOLF & JEFFREY JOWELL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 159-62 (1995); Sir John Laws, The Constitution: Morals and Rights,
PUB. L. 622 (1996); Sir John Laws, Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitu-
tional Rights?, PUB. L. 59, 6o (1993); Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy, PUB. L. 72, 81 (1995);
Lord Woolf, Droit Public - English Style, PUB. L. 57, 67 (1995); see also R. v. Sec'y of State for
Home Affairs ex parte Leech, 1994 Q.B. 198 (Eng. C.A.) ("It is a principle of our law that every
citizen has a right of unimpeded access to a court .... Even in our unwritten constitution it must
rank as a constitutional right."); R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't ex parte Simms, 3 W.L.R.
328, 340 (A.C. 1999) (Can.).
72 See sources cited supra note 5.
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established ones. The assumption that "it cannot happen to us" can no
longer be accepted. Anything can happen. If democracy was per-
verted and destroyed in the Germany of Kant, Beethoven, and Goethe,
it can happen anywhere. If we do not protect democracy, democracy
will not protect us. I do not know whether the supreme court judges
in Germany could have prevented Hitler from coming to power in the
193os. But I do know that a lesson of the Holocaust and of the Second
World War is the need to enact democratic constitutions and ensure
that they are put into effect by supreme court judges whose main task
is to protect democracy. It was this awareness that, in the post-World
War II era, helped promote the idea of judicial review of legislative ac-
tion7 3 and made human rights central. It led to the recognition of de-
fensive democracy 4 and even militant democracy. 75  And it shaped
my belief that the main role of the supreme court judge in a democ-
racy is to maintain and protect the constitution and democracy. As I
noted in one of my opinions:
The struggle for the law is unceasing. The need to watch over the rule of
law exists at all times. Trees that we have nurtured for many years may
be uprooted with one stroke of the axe. We must never relax the protec-
tion of the rule of law. All of us - all branches of government, all parties
and factions, all institutions - must protect our young democracy. This
73 See generally MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 45 (I97I); CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero & Ste-
ven C. Wheatley eds., 1993); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate &
Torbj6rn Vallinder eds., I995); Marina Angel, Constitutional Judicial Review of Legislation: A
Comparative Law Symposium, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 287 (1983).
74 See E.A. 1/65, Yardor v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Sixth Knesset, 19(3)
P.D. 365 (Isr.). This case addressed the question whether the court could proscribe a party that
denied the existence of the "State of Israel" from participating in the electoral process. This ques-
tion arose because the relevant legislation did not include any express provision on the matter.
The court held that such a party could not participate in the electoral process. For the majority,
Justice Sussman wrote:
The said basic supra-legal rules are merely, in this matter, the right of the organized soci-
ety in the State to protect itself. Whether we call these rules "natural law" to indicate
that they are the law of the State by virtue of its nature . . . or whether we call them by
another name, I agree with the opinion that the experience of life requires us not to re-
peat the same mistake to which we were all witness .... As for myself, with regard to Is-
rael, I am prepared to satisfy myself with "defensive democracy," and we have tools to
protect the existence of the State, even if we do not find them set out in the Elections
Law.
Id. at 390. A few years later - after additional case law that restricted this power only to a party
that denied the existence of the State but not its democratic nature, E.A. 2/84, Neiman v. Chair-
man of Cent. Elections Comm. for Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225 - the Knesset amended its
Basic Law, enacting an express provision to this effect.
75 In contemporary Germany, the militant democracy (streitbare Demokratie) is one of the
foundations of the constitutional structure. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 213 (1994); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 37 (2d ed. 1997.
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protective role is conferred on the judiciary as a whole, and on the Su-
preme Court in particular. Once again we, the judges of this generation,
are charged with watching over our basic values and protecting them
against those who challenge them.
76
The protection of defensive democracy is, I believe, a priority for
many supreme court judges in modern democracies. Judicial protec-
tion of democracy in general and of human rights in particular is a
characteristic of most developing democracies. 77 This phenomenon, as
suggested before, is largely a result of the events of the Second World
War and the Holocaust. Legal scholars often explain this phenomenon
as an increase in judicial power relative to other powers in society.78
This change, however, is merely a side effect. The purpose of this
modern development is not to increase the power of the court in a de-
mocracy, but rather to increase the protection of democracy and hu-
man rights. An increase in judicial power is an inevitable result, be-
cause judicial power is one of many factors in the democratic balance.
Each branch of the government must protect the constitution and
democracy. The legislature must do so by enacting legislation and ex-
ercising its other powers. The executive (the president in a presiden-
tial democracy and the government in a parliamentary democracy)
must do so by actualizing democracy in all its actions. And every
judge in the state, but particularly the judges of the supreme court,
must also give effect to democracy. They must educate the people in
the democratic spirit, because judges are also educators. To do so
judges must educate the public about the law and the role of the judi-
ciary.79 In this regard, a supreme court should function as a pedagogi-
cal institution whose judges are teachers participating, as Eugene
Rostow puts it, "in a vital national seminar." 80 The supreme court's
judges must give expression to democracy in its richest sense in their
rulings, so that the public will understand it.
2. What Is Real Democracy? - (a) Constitutionalism. - Every-
one agrees that a democracy requires the rule of the people, which is
often effectuated through representatives in a legislative body. There-
fore, frequent elections are necessary to keep these representatives ac-
76 H.C. 5364/94, Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, 49(i) PD. 758, 8o8 (internal
citations omitted).
77 See Michael Kirby, Australian Law - After ii September 2001, 21 AUSTL. B. REV. 21
(2oo1); Sir Anthony Mason, A Bill of Rights for Australia?, 5 AuSTL. B. REV. 79, 8o (1989); Bever-
ley McLachlin, The Role of the Supreme Court in the New Democracy 13-i5 (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
78 See THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 73, at 1-5.
79 See Mama S. Tucker, The Judge's Role in Educating the Public About the Law, 31 CATH.
U. L. REV. 201, 205 (I98i).
80 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,
208 (1952).
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countable to their constituents.81 However, real or substantive democ-
racy, as opposed to formal democracy, is not satisfied merely by these
conditions. Democracy has its own internal morality, based on the
dignity and equality of all human beings. Thus, in addition to formal
requirements, there are also substantive requirements. These are re-
flected in the supremacy of such underlying democratic values and
principles as human dignity, equality, and tolerance.8 2  There is no
(real) democracy without recognition of basic values and principles
such as morality and justice. Above all, democracy cannot exist with-
out the protection of individual human rights - rights so essential
that they must be insulated from the power of the majority.83 As Jus-
tice Iacobucci of the Canadian Supreme Court observed, "[t]he concept
of democracy is broader than the notion of majority rule, fundamental
as that may be. ''84 Real democracy is not just the law of rules and leg-
islative supremacy; it is a multidimensional concept. It requires recog-
nition of both the power of the majority and the limitations on that
power. It is based on legislative supremacy and on the supremacy of
values, principles, and human rights.8 5 When there is internal conflict,
the formal and substantive elements of democracy must be balanced to
protect the essence of each of these aspects. In this balance, the system
must place limits on both legislative supremacy and on the supremacy
of human rights.
To maintain real democracy - and to ensure a delicate balance be-
tween its elements 86 - a formal constitution is preferable. To operate
effectively, a constitution should enjoy normative supremacy, should
not be as easily amendable as a normal statute, and should give judges
the power to review the constitutionality of legislation. Without a
formal constitution, there is no legal limitation on legislative suprem-
acy, and the supremacy of human rights can exist only by the grace of
the majority's self-restraint. A constitution, however, imposes legal
limitations on the legislature and guarantees that human rights are
protected not only by the self-restraint of the majority, but also by
constitutional control over the majority. Hence the need for a formal
constitution.
81 See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 95-96 (1998).
82 See RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 35-36 (199o).
83 See Woolf, supra note 71, at 68-69; McLachlin, supra note 77, at 6.
84 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 566 (Can.).
85 See Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV.
429 (1998) (distinguishing between democracy as a substantive value and popular sovereignty as a
mechanism for decisionmaking).
86 This is not, of course, the only reason. For other reasons, see Walter F. Murphy, Constitu-
tions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, supra note 73, at 3, 8-12; Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 636-43 (199I).
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The need for judicial review is less intense when one can rely on
the self-restraint of the majority. This is apparently the situation in
the United Kingdom. The Human Rights Act - an ordinary statute
- allows judges to hold legislation incompatible with it, without au-
thorizing them to void the incompatible legislation. I hope that this
arrangement will work well in the United Kingdom and that it will
guarantee the proper combination of parliamentary supremacy and
human rights.87  Personally, however, I am skeptical. In hard situa-
tions, like terrorist attacks or other emergencies, this self-restraint is
unlikely to suffice. In any event, what is good and proper for the
United Kingdom - which, in any case, is subject to the jurisdiction of
the European Convention on Human Rights - is not necessarily good
and proper for other countries, like Israel. Therefore, while a written
constitution and judicial review are not necessary conditions for the
existence of democracy, they are important conditions that should be
preferred.8
8
I am aware that this brief description of democracy is somewhat
imperfect and problematic, but I think that relative to other possible
approaches it is the best description of real democracy. In any event,
this is my understanding of democracy, and it shapes my views on the
role of the judiciary.
(b) Legislative Supremacy. - Democracy means the rule of the
people. This rule is, in modern times, effectuated by elected represen-
tatives. Therefore, we must determine the rules of elections ab initio89
to create a fair and equal system of elections that allows for the par-
ticipation of each citizen. Some human rights - such as freedom of
political expression - derive from, inter alia, the need to ensure the
proper functioning of the systems through which the people choose
their representatives. These human rights are so important that the
High Court of Australia was prepared to grant them constitutional
status, even though they are not mentioned expressly in the Australian
Constitution. The Court regarded them as implied constitutional
rights.90 As Justice Brennan of the Australian High Court observed:
87 See Lord Irvine, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and
America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 18-19 (2OOI). But see DWORKIN, supra note 82.
88 See Dieter Grimm, Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy, 33 ISR. L. REV. 193, 199
(1999).
89 For an example of the problems that result when the rules are unclear, see Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
90 See Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 19o CLR I, 112-21 (Austl.); Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189
CLR 579; Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520; Stephens v. W. Austl. Newspapers
Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 211; Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 104;
Austl. Capital Television Party Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR io6; Nationwide News
Party Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR i.
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Once it is recognized that a representative democracy is constitutionally
prescribed, the freedom of discussion which is essential to sustain it is as
firmly entrenched in the Constitution as the system of government which
the Constitution expressly ordains.9 1
This approach is a proper one. It reflects the role of the judge in
giving effect to democracy.
The rule of the people implies legislative supremacy. This concep-
tualization, however, is imprecise because supremacy belongs to the
constitution and not to the legislature. Nonetheless, judges must re-
spect the role of the legislature. Legislative supremacy tends to restrict
the legislative power of the executive to those situations in which the
primary arrangements are determined by primary legislation. 92 A re-
spect for the legislative role should influence the formulation of a
proper system of interpretation, which would recognize the will of the
legislature as an important factor in the interpretation of legislation. 93
Indeed, the people create a statute through their representatives in the
legislature. The statute is designed to carry out a public policy that
the legislature wishes to effect on behalf of its constituents. This pol-
icy should be taken seriously and should be given expression in the in-
terpretation of the legislation.
(c) Fundamental Principles. - I have emphasized that it is the
role of the judge to give effect to democracy by ruling in accordance
with democratic values and foundational principles. In my view, fun-
damental principles (or values) fill the normative universe of a democ-
racy. 94  They justify legal rules. They are the reason for changing
them. They are the spirit (voluntas) that encompasses the substance
(verba). Every norm that is created in a democracy is created against
the background of these values. Justice Michael Cheshin of the Su-
preme Court of Israel expressed this well when he wrote:
All of these - principles, values and tenets - are prima facie extra-legal,
but they serve as an anchor for the law - for every law - and no law
can be described without them. A law without that anchor is like a house
without foundations; just as the latter will not last, so too a law which has
only itself is like a castle in the air.
95
My position is that every norm - whether expressed in a statute or
in case law - lives and breathes within this normative world replete
with values and principles. These values create a "normative um-
brella" for the operation of the common law and a framework for in-
91 Nationwide News Party, 177 CLR at 48.
92 See infra p. 66.
93 See infra p. 66.
94 For a discussion of how values underlie legal principles, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). See also DAWN
OLIVER, COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 57 (1999).
95 C.A. 7325/95, Yediot Aharonot Ltd. v. Kraus, 52(3) PD. I, 72 (Isr.) (Cheshin, J., dissenting).
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 41 2002-2003
HAR VARD LAW RE VIE W
terpreting all legal texts. The assumption is that every legal norm
seeks to give effect to these values. Below I will consider the nature
and operation of these fundamental values.
96
(d) Human Rights. - We live in an age of human rights. 97  As
Justice Pikis, President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, rightly ob-
served:
The essence of human rights lies in the existence within the fabric of the
law of a code of unalterable rules affecting the rights of the individual.
Human rights have a universal dimension, they are perceived as inherent
in man, constituting the inborn attribute of human existence to be enjoyed
at all times in all circumstances and at every place.
98
We are experiencing a human rights revolution as a result of the
Second World War and the Holocaust.99 Indeed, a central element of
modern democracy is the protection of constitutional, statutory, and
common-law human rights. Without these rights, we cannot have true
democracy. Take human rights out of democracy and democracy loses
its soul; it becomes an empty shell. It is the task of the judge to pro-
tect and uphold human rights. Justice McLachlin of the Supreme
Court of Canada rightly said that "[t]he courts are the ultimate guardi-
ans of the rights of society, in our system of government. '" 100 These
rights are the rights of man as an individual, as well as his rights as a
member of a minority group. 10 1 Judges must protect these rights.
Judges must resolve cases of conflict between individual and group
rights. Human rights are not absolute; the right of one individual is
limited by the right of another. The right of the individual is also lim-
ited by the needs of society: every legal system has its own limitation
formula for balancing the right of the individual against society's de-
mands. 102 In Canada, the limitation formula operates so that the hu-
96 See infra section IV.B.
97 See NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 32 (Allan Cameron trans., 1996) (199o)
(discussing "the increasing importance given to the recognition of human rights in international
debates, among cultured people and politicians, in working groups and government conferences");
LouIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix (i99o) ("Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is the
idea of our time, the only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance.").
98 Pikis, supra note i, at 9.
" See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Supreme
Court of Canada in the Age of Rights: Constitutional Democracy, The Rule of Law and Funda-
mental Rights Under Canada's Constitution, 8o CAN. B. REV. 699, 701 (2002) ("We live in the age
of rights. In the aftermath of the Second World War, commitment to the principles embodied in
the modern idea of human rights has intensified in the West, although the record of achievement
is undeniably blemished.").
100 McLachlin, The Role of the Court, supra note i, at 57.
101 See Beverley M. McLachlin, Democracy and Rights: A Canadian Perspective 3 (2000) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
102 See THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I-I12 (Armand de Mestral et al. eds., 1986) (a series of essays considering limitations on human
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man rights set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
are subject "only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."10 3 In Israel,
the limitation formula provides that "[t]he rights under this basic law
may only be infringed by a law that befits the values of the State of Is-
rael, is intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent that is not ex-
cessive."
0 4
In Israel, as in Canada, the limitation formula applies across all the
rights established by the Constitution. In some other countries and in-
ternational instruments, particular rights have their own unique limi-
tation formulae.10 5 In the absence of limitation formulae prescribed by
the constitution - which is the case in the United States with refer-
ence to several human rights - the courts develop the limitation for-
mulae through case law. The "levels of scrutiny" developed by United
States law can fit into this category. Such limitations, whether in a
written constitution or in case law, reflect the idea that human rights
are not the rights of a person on a desert island. Robinson Crusoe
(sans Friday) does not need human rights. Human rights are the rights
of a human being as part of society. The rights of the individual must
conform to the existence of society, the existence of a government, and
the existence of national goals. The power of the state is essential to
the existence of the state and the existence of human rights themselves.
Therefore, limitations on human rights reflect a national compromise
between the needs of the state and the rights of the individual. This
compromise is a product of the recognition that human rights should
be upheld without disabling the political infrastructure. This balance
rights in Canada, Europe, and the United States); Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limita-
tions on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 290 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (examining public interest limitations embed-
ded in various human rights provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
103 On the Canadian limitation clause (Article i), see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 864 (4th ed. 1997). The South African Constitution contains a limitation clause
that provides as follows:
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general applica-
tion to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democ-
ratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all rele-
vant factors, including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of
the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the
limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1).
104 BASIC LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY § 8 (1992).
105 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocol No. ii, Nov. 4, 195o, http://conventions.coe.int.Treaty/en/'TreatieslHtml/
oo5.htm (placing a limitation in Article 5 on the right to liberty and security in the situation of
"the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court").
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is intended to prevent the sacrifice of the state on the altar of human
rights. As I once stated:
A constitution is not a prescription for suicide, and civil rights are not an
altar for national destruction .... The laws of a people should be inter-
preted on the basis of the assumption that it wants to continue to exist.
Civil rights derive from the existence of the State, and they should not be
made into a spade with which to bury it.
10 6
Similarly, human rights should not be sacrificed on the altar of the
state. After all, human rights are natural rights that precede the state.
Indeed, human rights protections require preservation of the sociopoli-
tical framework, which in turn is based on recognition of the need to
protect human rights. Both the needs of the state and human rights
are part of one constitutional structure, which simultaneously provides
for human rights and allows them to be limited. A unique feature of
democracy is this fact that the breadth and limits of human rights de-
rive from a common source. Justice Dickson of the Canadian Supreme
Court nicely noted this peculiar underpinning of democracy with the
following comment about Canada's limitation formula: "The underly-
ing values and principles of a free and democratic society are the gene-
sis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ulti-
mate standard against which a limit on a right or freedom must be
shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justi-
fied.",1
07
This is the constitutional dialectic. Human rights and the limita-
tions on them derive from the same source, and they reflect the same
values.' 0 8 Human rights can be limited, but there are limits to the
limitations. The role of the judge in a democracy is to preserve both
of these limitations. Judges must ensure the security and existence of
the state as well as the realization of human rights; judges must de-
termine and protect the integrity of the proper balance.
Most central of all human rights is the right to dignity. 10 9 It is the
source from which all other human rights are derived. Dignity unites
106 C.A. 2/84, Neiman v. Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm. for Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D.
225, 3 10 (citation omitted).
107 The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 136.
108 See Weinrib, supra note 29, at 127-28.
109 See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES I (2oo2); HUMAN DIGNITY: THIS CENTURY AND THE
NEXT 3-97 (Rubin Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo eds., 1970) (a trio of essays discussing human rights
and human dignity); Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitu-
tional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903 (2000) (discussing historical antecedents to the
modern concept of dignity and the centrality of dignity in Israeli law due to Israel's 1992 Basic
Law on Human Dignity and Liberty); G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22
U.W. ONT. L. REV. 171, 171 (1984) ("No one would question whether the protection of human
dignity was a primary task of the contemporary legal culture."); A. Melden, Dignity, Worth, and
Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 29,
[Vol, I1I6:06
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 44 2002-2003
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
the other human rights into a whole. 110 It also constitutes a right in
itself and is recognized as such in several constitutions.III The right of
dignity reflects the "recognition that a human being is a free agent,
who develops his body and mind as he wishes, and the social frame-
work to which he is connected and on which he depends.""12 Human
dignity is therefore the freedom of the individual to shape an individ-
ual identity. It is the autonomy of the individual will. It is the free-
dom of choice. Human dignity regards a human being as an end, not
as a means to achieve the ends of others.
When human dignity is expressly mentioned in a constitution, the
scope of its application as a right is determined by its relationship with
other rights, in accordance with the structure of rights protection in
that particular constitution. Therefore, the same right of dignity may
have a different scope in different constitutions. When human dignity
is not mentioned expressly in a constitution - as is the case in those of
the United States, Canada, and many other countries - the question
arises whether human dignity can be recognized as a human right in
these legal systems. One way of recognizing a constitutional right to
dignity in those systems is through interpretation of specific rights,
mainly the right to equality. 113  It can also be recognized through in-
terpretation of the whole bill of rights, whereby either human dignity
is implied by the overall structure of the rights, or is derived from their
"penumbras."' 14 Another method of establishing an unspecified right
46 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) ("[A]ttention to human rights is of the first
importance for the promotion of the dignity and the worth of human beings."); Jordan J. Paust,
Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and
Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 223 (1984) ("[Hjuman rights law provides a rich set of general criteria
and content for supplementation of past trends in Supreme Court decision[s] about human dig-
nity.").
110 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, 27 S. TEX. L. REV 433, 438 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity of
man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of libertarian dignity protected through law.");
Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 745 (i98o) ("The
basic value in the United States Constitution, broadly conceived, has become a concern for hu-
man dignity.").
111 The German Constitution, for example, provides that "[t]he dignity of man shall be inviola-
ble. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." F.R.G. CONST. art. I, trans-
lated in BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (igi). On dignity in the
German Constitution, see CURRIE, supra note 75, at 314-16; EBERLE, supra note IO9, at 4I;
KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 298.
112 H.C. 5688/92, Wechselbaum v. Minister of Def., 47(2) P.D. 812, 827 (Isr.).
113 See Law v. Canada [999] i S.C.R. 497, 507 (Can.).
114 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.").
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to dignity is to determine that the absence of the right to dignity con-
stitutes a constitutional "lacuna" that the court may fill.'1 s
Implied by human dignity - but existing in its own right - is the
right to equality. Except for dignity, it is the most important of all
rights:
[E]quality is a fundamental value of every democratic society.... [T]he
individual integrates into the overall fabric and plays his part in the build-
ing of society, in the knowledge that others too are doing the same. The
need to ensure equality is natural to a person. It is based on considera-
tions of justice and fairness. Whoever asks for recognition of his right
must recognize the right of others to ask for similar recognition. The need
to uphold equality is essential for society and the social consensus on
which it is built. Equality protects the government from arbitrariness.
Indeed, there is no force more destructive in society than the feeling of its
members that they are victims of haphazard treatment. The feeling of the
lack of equality is the most difficult of feelings. It undermines the forces
that unite society. It undermines a person's independent identity.
116
Though this Foreword is not the proper forum for examining the com-
plex right of equality, I want to emphasize that a judge cannot realize
his or her role without a deep appreciation for this right.
C. Criticism and a Possible Response Thereto
I am aware that my theory of the role of a supreme court judge in
a democracy is not universally accepted. It may be said that legisla-
tion and adjudication serve wholly different functions and that a judge
is neither a senior nor a junior partner of the legislature. It may also
be said that my approach to the judicial role departs from the proper
outlook on separation of powers and democracy, for democracy -
both formal and substantive - is too important to be left to the pro-
tection of judges who are not elected by or otherwise accountable to
the people. Who will guard the guardians? It may even be argued
that my approach is based on judicial "imperialism,"'"17 conferring on
judges an inappropriately prominent status. These criticisms are im-
portant, and I take them seriously. They accompany me always and
restrain me always. However, there are proper answers to these criti-
cisms. I do not claim that the court can cure every ill of society, nor
115 This method is available to those legal systems in which the doctrine of the "lacuna" is well-
developed. See infra note I85.
116 H.C. 953/87, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 42(2) PD. 309, 332 (Isr.).
117 See Nathan Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary?, PUB. INT., Fall 1975, at 104, 122 ("I
believe we have a considerably worse [society as a result of judicial imperialism], because a free
people feels itself increasingly under the arbitrary rule of unreachable authorities, and that cannot
be good for the future of the state.').
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do I claim that it can be the primary agent for social change. 18 I do
not claim that the court is always the most effective branch for the
resolution of disputes. My claim is much more limited: I claim that
the court has an important role in bridging the gap between law and
society and in protecting the fundamental values of democracy with
human rights at the center.
i. The Role of the Judge as Creator of the Common Law. - Within
the field of common law, almost a thousand years of history validate
my approach. If the common law does not merely declare what has
existed since time immemorial - and I do not think that anyone still
believes this myth - then it is hard to deny the creative role of the
judge in the common law. Judges created and developed the common
law.119 Judges bridged the gap between law and society by giving ex-
pression to the fundamental principles of society. And judges are re-
sponsible for the common law's provision of fitting solutions to life's
changing needs. Naturally, over the years, judges made mistakes. But
there were many achievements, too. It is difficult to forget Lord
Mansfield's statement, "the black must be discharged,' 120 releasing in
,772 a black slave who fled to England from his American master.
Lord Mansfield issued this statement after the court heard from coun-
sel for the slave that "the air of England was too pure for slavery.'' 11
It was the judge who declared and gave effect to the fundamental val-
ues on which the common law is founded. The judge must protect
and promote these fundamental values. In these activities, the main
responsibility rests with the judge, the senior partner.
2. The Role of the Judge as Interpreter of the Constitution and
Statutes. - The role of the judge is to interpret the constitution and
statutes, and the system of interpretation is usually determined by the
judge himself or herself. This implies that each branch of the state
cannot devise its own interpretive system. The rule of law would be
undermined if the system of interpretation accepted by judges were
not binding on the legislature and the executive.' 22  The difficulty, of
118 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 343 (Igi) (examining the ability of courts to enact social change and
concluding that "[t]o ask [courts] to produce significant social reform is to forget their history and
ignore their constraints").
119 See EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 1 (1988) ("The common law ... is that part of the law
that is within the province of the courts themselves to establish."); Michael McHugh, The Law-
Making Function of the Judicial Process, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 15, i6 (1988) ("Historically, then, the
judge has made law as he applied an established rule to a novel situation.').
120 The Case of James Sommersett, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 82 (K.B. 1772).
121 Id. at 79.
122 This issue is not free of uncertainty in United States law. See Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, iio HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997)
(defending the "assertion of judicial supremacy without qualification 'against' accepted wisdom");
Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HAS-
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course, is that there is no single interpretive system. 23 Changes in the
law that aim to bridge the gap between law and society alter the sys-
tems of interpretation. We do not interpret statutes today in the same
way that they were interpreted two hundred or one hundred or even
fifty years ago. In any event, I accept the system of interpretation that
allows me, in interpreting both the constitution and statutes, to take
my status as a junior partner in the legislative enterprise into account
and to realize my role as a judge of a supreme court.
Until now, my response to criticism regarding the interpretation of
the constitution and statutes has been to demonstrate that my ap-
proach is legitimate. But is it proper? In my opinion, the answer is
yes. If one can rely on the objectivity, integrity, and balance that
judges employ as creators of common law, why can one not rely on
them to fulfill that same role as interpreters of the constitution and
statutes? If we are trusted as senior partners, why are we not trusted
as junior partners? Naturally, in our interpretive approach, we will
not depart from the language of the constitution and statutes by giving
them a meaning that their language cannot sustain. But within the
range of possible linguistic meanings, and taking account - to differ-
ent degrees - of the intentions of the authors of the constitution and
statutes, why do we not recognize that when judges interpret the con-
stitution and statutes - just as when they create the common law -
they have a role to play in protecting democracy and in bridging the
gap between society and law?
3. The Role of the Judge and Judicial Review of the Constitution-
ality of Statutes. - Critics of my theory argue that the non-
accountability of judges should deprive them of the power to void
statutes. Such power must only be given to the representatives of the
people, who are accountable to them. This is the countermajoritarian
argument made again and again. In my opinion, this argument is ex-
tremely problematic.1 24 First, some constitutions contain express pro-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 364 (1997) ("[Vliews about the descriptive or normative appropriateness
of judicial supremacy are by no means uniform."); Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of
the Constitution, 47 UCLA L. REV 491, 519 (i99) ("I am reluctant to subscribe to any theory of
constitutional law that downplays the significance of the Court's power over the law of the Con-
stitution."); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 5o DUKE L.J. 1335,
1336 (2001) ("The structural variances between the courts and Congress can be analyzed profita-
bly to develop a theory of interbranch interpretation."); William D. Popkin, Foreword: Nonjudi-
cial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV 301 (I99O) (imtroducing a symposium focus-
ing on statutory interpretation by bodies other than courts, including agencies and Congress).
123 See infra pp. 5 7-59.
124 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 140, i45 (2002) (noting that
"[a]lthough the countermajoritarian difficulty has a core of truth, it has been blown out of propor-
tion"); see also Steven P Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
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visions for judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. In such
circumstances, the legitimacy of judicial review should not be in
doubt. The only remaining question in these situations is whether the
constitutional arrangement is proper and consistent with the society's
perception of democracy.1 25  Second, if the countermajoritarian argu-
ment is correct, then states ought to refrain from making a constitu-
tion. After all, a constitution is not a democratic document, since it
negates, in certain circumstances, the power of the current majority.
126
Therefore, if a constitution is desirable, we cannot attribute much
weight to countermajoritarian considerations. 127  But if a constitution
is democratic, then its implementation by courts is democratic; if de-
mocracy is not merely the rule of the majority, but also the protection
of human rights, then judicial review for constitutionality that imple-
ments substantive democracy - thereby giving expression to the role
of the judge - is not antidemocratic. 2 8  I discussed this in one case,
where I said:
Democracy is a delicate balance between majority rule and the fundamen-
tal values of society that rule the majority.... [W]hen the majority de-
prives the minority of human rights, this harms democracy.... [W]hen
REV. 577 (1993); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV< 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajori-
tarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993);
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV.
i881, 1924 (i99i). Farber and Sherry observe that "[o]ne might call these scholars the anti-
counter majoritarianists." FARBER & SHERRY, supra, at i99 n.8.
125 See In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [19851 2 S.C.R. 486, 497 ("It ought not to be forgotten that
the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but
by the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those representatives who extended
the scope of constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous re-
sponsibility. Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as
to its legitimacy.").
126 See generally ROBERT DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2001) (exploring the vital tension between the belief of Americans in the legitimacy of their Con-
stitution and their belief in the principles of democracy).
127 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 233 (1993) (observing that "constitutional de-
mocracy is dualist," constraining the current majority to protect original democratic guarantees);
Grimm, supra note 88, at 196.
128 See DWORKIN, supra note 82, at 35 ("Would it offend democracy if a British court had the
power to strike down the blasphemy law as inconsistent with the [European Convention of Hu-
man Rights]? No, because the true democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which anything
a majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal democracy, in which ma-
jority decision is legitimate only if it is a majority within a community of equals."); Pikis, supra
note i, at 9 ("[H]uman rights require constitutional entrenchment with corresponding power on
the part of the judiciary to void or derogate from legislation offensive to or incompatible with
human rights."). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay
on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1211-26 (1984) (argu-
ing that the countermajoritarian difficulty is based on a misdefinition of democracy as majority);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV L. REV 43, 74-77 (I989) (same).
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judges interpret provisions of the Constitution and void harmful laws,
they give expression to the fundamental values of society, as they have
evolved throughout the history of that society. Thus they protect constitu-
tional democracy and uphold the delicate balance on which it is based.
Take majority rule out of constitutional democracy, and you have harmed
its essence. Take the rule of fundamental values out of constitutional de-
mocracy, and you have harmed its very existence. Judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes allows society to be honest with itself and to
respect its fundamental tenets. This is the basis for the substantive legiti-
macy of judicial review .... [T]hrough judicial review we are faithful to
the fundamental values that we imposed on ourselves in the past, that re-
flect our essence in the present, and that will guide us in our national de-
velopment as a society in the future.
129
Indeed, in a constitutional democracy neither the legislature nor the
judiciary is supreme. Only the constitution is supreme. When a con-
stitution is adopted, the legislature is obliged to uphold its provisions.
The task of the court is to protect the provisions of the constitution
and ensure that the legislature fulfills its obligation. 130 This was aptly
expressed by Justice McLachlin, when she said:
The elected legislators are subject to the Constitution and must stay
within its bounds, as must the courts. The courts have the duty to rule on
whether the elected legislators have done so. Democracy is more than
mere populism; it is the lawful exercise of powers conferred by the consti-
tution .... When the courts hold a law to be invalid, they are not limiting
parliamentary supremacy. They are merely expounding the limits that the
Constitution imposes on Parliament. The claim that the Charter has re-
placed parliamentary supremacy by judicial supremacy is not true; rather,
it is a myth.
13 1
Third, the countermajoritarian argument does not give sufficient
weight to the possibility of changing the constitution. Many constitu-
tions are more easily amended than the U.S. Constitution is. Fre-
quently the legislature itself - by a special supermajority of its mem-
bers - may amend the constitution.
We are still left with the non-accountability argument, which
claims that it is inappropriate for the judge, who is not accountable to
the public, to exploit constitutional vagueness and "majestic generali-
129 C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill., 49(4) PD. 221, 423-24; see
also Rosalie Silberman Arbella, The Judicial Role in a Democratic State, 26 QUEEN'S L.J. 573,
577 (2001) ("The most basic of the central concepts we need back in the conversation is that de-
mocracy is not - and never was - just about the wishes of the majority. What pumps oxygen
no less forcefully through vibrant democratic veins is the protection of rights, through courts,
notwithstanding the wishes of the majority.").
130 See Brian Dickson, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Dawn of a New Era?, 2
REV CONST. STUD. i, 12 (i994).
131 Beverley McLachlin, Charter Myths, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 23, 31 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
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ties" 132 by giving expression to his or her subjective beliefs. In such
circumstances, the opinion of the legislature, which reflects the will of
the majority, should receive preference. My answer to the non-
accountability argument is twofold. First, it is a mistake to assume
that to be a true democracy, every organ of the state must be account-
able to the public as the legislature is. Accountability to the people is
necessary for the legislature. But such accountability is not required
from the judiciary, which has another type of accountability. The
question is not whether every organ of the state is accountable as the
legislature is. The question is, as Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna
Sherry put it, "whether the system as a whole fits our concept of de-
mocracy.
' 13 3
Second, it is a myth that judges always give expression to their sub-
jective beliefs. According to my view - both normatively and de-
scriptively - the judge gives expression not to his or her own beliefs
but to the deep, underlying beliefs of society. The key concept is judi-
cial objectivity:134 "Judicial objectivity underlies judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes. In giving weight to the various considera-
tions, the judge aspires, to the best of his ability, to judicial objectivity.
He does not reflect his subjective values and his personal considera-
tions. ' 135  The judge must reflect the beliefs of society, even if these
are not his or her own beliefs. The judge gives expression to the val-
ues of the constitution as they are understood by the culture and tradi-
tion of the populace in its progress through history. The judge reflects
the fundamental tenets of the people and the national credo rather
than his or her personal beliefs. In this way he or she gives effect to
the constitution and to democracy. Thus, the choice is not between
the wishes of the people and the wishes of the judge. The choice is be-
tween two levels of the wishes of the people. The first, basic level re-
flects the most profound values of society in its progress through his-
tory; the second, ad hoc level reflects passing vogues. As Justice
Iacobucci of the Supreme Court of Canada has observed:
Democratic values and principles under the Charter demand that legisla-
tors and the executive take these into account; and if they fail to do so,
courts should stand ready to intervene to protect these democratic values
as appropriate .... [J]udges are not acting undemocratically by interven-
ing when there are indications that a legislative or executive decision was
not reached in accordance with the democratic principles mandated by the
Charter.1
36
132 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947).
133 FARBER& SHERRY, supra note 124, at 141.
134 See infra section III.B.
135 C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) P.D. 221, 426 (Isr.).
136 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 566-67.
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It is the judge - who enjoys independence and does not need to
stand for reelection every few years 137 - who is best equipped for suc-
ceeding in the difficult task of choosing between these two levels. It is
the legislator - who must stand for reelection, and who needs the ap-
proval of the voters - who is ill-suited to make this choice. 138  Ac-
cording to this line of thinking, only the judge, who has nothing to
hamper his independence, is capable of, and suited for, reflecting the
fundamental wishes of society. It is only the judge who can give effect
to real democracy. Indeed, I contend that the most important asset a
judge has in fulfilling his or her role is the lack of direct accountability
to the public. 39 Note that when I say the judge is not accountable I
am saying only that he or she is not accountable in the same way that
the legislature is accountable. A judge is not a politician, 140 and his or
her accountability differs from that of the politician. A judge's ac-
countability is not expressed in regular elections by the people. It is
expressed in other terms. It is expressed in accountability to the legis-
lature, which can respond to a court's ruling with legislation.' 4 ' It is
expressed in accountability to the legal community, by the need to give
reasons for every judgment - reasons that are accountable on appeal
and stand open to public scrutiny. It is expressed in accountability for
judicial misconduct.
Naturally, not everyone believes that judges act objectively, with-
out imposing their subjective views on their societies. But if one as-
sumes judicial objectivity within the framework of the common law,
why should one not assume it within the framework of interpreting the
constitution and statutes? Admittedly, the activity of a judge in the
field of common law differs from the activity of a judge in interpreting
a legal text. Nonetheless, both activities are replete with values and
principles. If we trust judges to be objective when balancing among
various values and principles in the common law, why should we not
trust them to be objective when balancing among values and princi-
ples in interpreting the constitution and statutes? They are the very
same judges. I am aware of the claim that, while the legislature may
pass a statute overriding judicial development of the common law, it
has no such power over judicial interpretation of a constitution. That
does not, however, explain the lack of faith in judicial objectivity in
137 Of course, in a number of states in the United States, judges are elected by the people. This
phenomenon is regrettable. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542-44
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-25 (1962); Rosalie
Silberman Abella, Public Policy and the Judicial Role, 34 MCGILL L.J. 102 1, 1033 (1989).
139 See P. S. Atiyah, Judges and Policy, 15 ISR. L. REV. 346, 369 (1988).
140 See Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 255 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141 See Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 566.
[Vol. 116:16
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 52 2002-2003
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
statutory interpretation. After all, the legislature can change the ef-
fects of judicial interpretation of a statute by amending the statute,
just as it can pass a statute overriding a common law rule. It is also
not clear to me why the mere fact that the constitution is difficult to
amend should undermine the faith in judicial objectivity apparently
present in the common law context. Of course, mistakes have been
made in the past. Some were very serious. But judges do not have a
monopoly on mistakes. Judges come and go, and most mistakes are
corrected by the judges themselves. Those that are not may be cor-
rected by constitutional changes, and in most modern democracies -
except for the United States - a special majority of the legislature
may make those constitutional changes. 142 Personally, I would en-
courage this possibility.
It is possible that, in the final analysis, the question is about finding
ways to prevent mistakes in the future. The twentieth century has
taught me that the best way is to form a partnership between the con-
stitution and judges. That is, of course, my subjective approach. But
is the approach of my critics not their subjective approach? And if the
life of the law is, as Holmes said, not logic but experience, should we
not make use of the experience that we accumulated during the twen-
tieth century? 143 Did all the democracies established after the Second
World War and after the fall of the Soviet bloc err in explicitly writing
into their constitutions provisions for judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of statutes? Why should we not be allowed to continue this
multinational experiment?
III. PRECONDITIONS FOR REALIZING THE JUDICIAL ROLE
What are the preconditions that must exist in a legal system to real-
ize the proper judicial role? I have already discussed one essential
condition - that the legal system operate in a democracy - but are
there other necessary preconditions? My answer is yes. Some of these
conditions vary from system to system, while others are common to all
democratic systems of law. I will discuss three of these common pre-
conditions: (i) independence of the judiciary, (2) judicial objectivity,
and (3) public confidence in the judiciary. These are not the only gen-
eral preconditions, but they seem to me the most important and the
most problematic. For all three, we must ensure not only that they are
upheld - which is the main point - but also that the public recog-
nizes that they are upheld.
142 This type of change may include, at some point, the use of popular referenda. See Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,666 (2000).
143 HOLMES, supra note 37, at i ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence.").
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A. Independence of the Judiciary
An essential precondition for the protection of the constitution
within the framework of a democracy is that the judge and the judici-
ary enjoy independence: 144 "the judiciary can effectively fulfill its role
only if the public has confidence that the courts, even if sometimes
wrong, act wholly independently. ''45  Many undemocratic countries
also have impressive constitutions that purport to protect human rights
and values, but these constitutions are empty shells, because there is
no independent judiciary to give them content. 146 Independence of the
judiciary means, first and foremost, that in judging, the judge is sub-
ject to nothing other than the law. The law is the sole master of the
judge. From the moment that a person is appointed judge, he or she
must act independently of everything else. Sometimes this independ-
ence is expressly provided in the constitution. But even in the absence
of an express provision, it is a constitutional principle implied by every
democratic constitution. 147  The other branches of the state must be
incapable of influencing judicial decisions. Other branches of the state
cannot be allowed to threaten the security of the judge's income, even
if there is no express provision in the constitution addressing the is-
sue. 148 Judicial behavior must be governed by rules of judicial ethics
(whether case law or enacted). All of these safeguards together will
ensure the personal independence of the judge.
But the independence of the individual judge, while of central im-
portance, is itself insufficient. 149  Personal independence must be ac-
companied - as it is in the United States - by institutional inde-
pendence.150  The judiciary, not merely the individual judge, must be
independent. It must be managed by judges. Its budget must be ap-
144 See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Shimon
Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., i985) (analyzing the concept of judicial independence from an
international and comparative perspective).
145 Johan Steyn, The Casefor a Supreme Court, 118 LAW. Q. REV. 382, 388 (2002).
146 See McLachlin, The Role of the Court, supra note i, at 57 (claiming that the "elaborate
guarantees" in the constitutions of nondemocratic countries are never realized because there is no
independent judiciary to uphold them).
147 See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.);
The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 71-74 (pointing to Canada's constitutional separa-
tion of powers and the court's role as a defender of basic liberties as the fundamental sources of
judicial independence).
148 See Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 704 (Can.) (describing financial security as
an "essential condition" of judicial independence).
149 See Patricia Hughes, Judicial Independence: Contemporary Pressures and Appropriate Re-
sponses, 8o CAN. B. REV. 18I, I86 (2001) (noting the general agreement that "judicial independ-
ence is both an individual and a systemic, institutional or 'collective' quality").
150 See Aharon Barak, Independence of the Judicial Branch, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
TODAY: LIBER AMICORUM IN ONORE DI GIOVANNI LONGO 49 (1999); Stephen G. Breyer,
Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989 (1996).
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proved by the legislature separately from the budget of the executive.
Unfortunately, in many modern democracies, the judiciary does not en-
joy this full institutional independence.1 5 1 In some countries, the judi-
ciary as an institution is connected to the Department or Ministry of
Justice. In my opinion, this linkage is improper. If we want to ensure
personal independence, we must also ensure institutional independ-
ence. Only if judicial independence is guaranteed in all its aspects can
the judge properly carry out his or her role in a democracy. Note that
judicial independence is not designed to ensure pecuniary benefits to
the judges, nor is it intended to suppress criticism. It has only one
purpose: to protect the constitution and democracy. 152
B. Judicial Impartiality and Objectivity
The judge must realize his or her role in a democracy impartially
and objectively. Impartiality means that the judge treats the parties
before him equally, providing them with an equal opportunity to make
their respective cases, and is seen to treat the parties so. Impartiality
means the judge has no personal stake in the outcome.5 3 Absence of
bias is essential to the judicial process; hence the image of justice as
blindfolded. With impartiality comes objectivity. 154 It means making
judicial decisions on the basis of considerations that are external to the
judge and that may even conflict with his or her personal views. 1 5
5
The judge must look for the accepted values of society, even if they are
not his or her values. He or she must express what is regarded as
moral and just by the society in which he or she operates, even if it is
not moral and just in his or her subjective views. 15 6 As I wrote in one
case:
It is not his own subjective values that the judge imposes on the society in
which he operates. He must balance among various interests, according to
what appear to him to be the needs of the society in which he lives. He
must exercise his discretion according to what seems to him, to the best of
151 See MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, A PLACE APART JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND AC-
COUNTABILITY IN CANADA 268 (1995) (recommending that Canada make "modest renovations"
to ensure the full independence of its judiciary).
152 See Antonio Lamer, The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in
Time of Change, 45 U. N.B. L.J. 3, 7 (1996) (arguing that judicial independence is a means of
maintaining the rule of law).
153 BARAK, supra note io, at 189.
154 See generally KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992); NICOS STAVROP-
OULOS, OBJECTIVITY IN LAW (1996).
155 See BARAK, supra note io, at 125; Aharon Barak, Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner Memorial
Lecture: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 12 10-ii (2002).
156 1 noted in one case: "The judge must reflect ... all the fundamental values of the enlight-
ened public, even if he personally does not accept one or another value.... [Tihe judge must re-
flect the long-term beliefs of society. He must refrain from imposing his personal beliefs on soci-
ety .... " H.C. 693/91, Efrat v. Dir. of Population Register, 47(0) P.D. 781, 781-82.
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his objective understanding, to reflect the needs of society. The question is
not what the judge wants but what society needs.
15 7
Judges with religious or secular outlooks on life ought not impose
those outlooks on the society in which they live. When a judge con-
siders the weight of different values, he or she must do so according to
the fundamental views of the society in which he or she lives, not ac-




This objectivity makes strenuous demands, requiring the judge to
take moral stock of herself. The judge must be aware that she may
have values that lack general acceptance and that her personal opin-
ions may be exceptional and unusual. I drew this distinction in one
opinion:
This requirement for objectivity imposes a heavy burden on the judge.
He must be able to distinguish between his personal desire and what is
generally accepted in society. He must erect a clear partition between his
beliefs as an individual and his outlooks as a judge. He must be able to
recognize that his personal views may not be generally accepted by the
public. He must carefully distinguish his own credo from that of the na-
tion. He must be critical of himself and restrained with regard to his be-
liefs. He must respect the chains that bind him as a judge.' 9
The judge must be capable of looking at himself from the outside
and of analyzing, criticizing, and controlling himself. A judge who
thinks that he knows all, and that his opinions are right and proper to
the exclusion of all else, cannot properly fulfill his role.
The judge is a product of his times - living in, and shaped by, a
given society in a given era. The purpose of objectivity is not to sever
the judge from his environment. Rather, its purpose is to allow him to
ascertain properly the fundamental principles of his time. The pur-
pose of objectivity is not to rid a judge of his past, his education, his
experience, his belief, or his values. 160 Its purpose is to encourage the
judge to make use of all of these personal characteristics to reflect the
fundamental values of the society as faithfully as possible. A person
who is appointed as a judge is neither required nor able to change his
skin. The judge must develop sensitivity to the dignity of his office
157 C.A. 243/83, Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, 39(l) PD. 113, 131 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
158 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952) (arguing that Supreme Court justices,
when interpreting the Due Process Clause, should not rely merely on personal and private notions
of due process); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy
into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them . .. ."); CARDOZO, supra note I8,
at 88-89, io8 (192 1) (arguing that a judge's personal beliefs and idiosyncrasies should not be im-
posed upon the community); McLachlin, The Charter, supra note i, at 546 (arguing that judges
have a "duty to set aside their personal prejudices and views").
159 Efrat, 47(i) P.D. at 782.
160 See Abella, supra note 138, at 1027.
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and to the restraints that it imposes. As the ancient Jewish text re-
minds judges: "Do you imagine that I offer you rulership? It is servi-
tude that I give you.' 16 1 The judge must display the self-criticism and
humility that will prevent him from identifying himself with every-
thing good and praiseworthy. A judge must display the self control
that will allow him to distinguish between personal feelings and na-
tional aspirations. A judge must display intellectual modesty.
The objectivity required of a judge is difficult to attain. Even
when we look at ourselves from the outside, we do so with our own
eyes. 6 Nonetheless, my judicial experience tells me that objectivity is
possible. A judge does not operate in a vacuum. A judge is a part of
society, and society influences the judge. The judge is influenced by
the intellectual movements and the legal thinking that prevail. A
judge is always part of the people. 163 It may be true that the judge
sometimes sits in an ivory tower - though my ivory tower is located
in the hills of Jerusalem and not on Mount Olympus in Greece. But
the judge is nonetheless a contemporary creature. He or she pro-
gresses with the history of the people. All of these elements contribute
to the judge's objective perspective.
Moreover, the judge acts within the limits of a court. He or she
lives within a judicial tradition. The same spark of wisdom passes
from one generation of judges to the next. This wisdom is mostly un-
written, but it penetrates little by little into the judge's consciousness
and makes his or her thinking more objective. The judge is part of a
legal system that establishes a framework for the factors that a judge
may and may not consider. The heavier the weight of the system, the
greater the objectification of the judicial process.
Having said that, when judges give expression to the fundamental
values of the system, they give expression to the values that, in their
eyes, seem proper and basic. Some subjectification of this process is
inevitable. Complete objectivity is unattainable. The personal aspect
of a judge is always present, and his life experience neither disappears
nor can disappear. We would not want it to, because in these situa-
tions, it is the judge's personality that finds expression - the same
personality that underwent, and passed, the judicial nomination proc-
ess. We need not, however, go from extreme to extreme. Rejecting
complete objectivity does not require us to embrace complete subjec-
tivity. There is a third way, reflected in acknowledging the importance
and centrality of judicial objectivity while recognizing, unreservedly,
161 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Horayot ioa-b.
162 See CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 13.
163 See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 751, 768-69 (1986) (explaining that some "currents of public opinion" inevitably influence a
judge's decisions, though perhaps in an unconscious way).
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that it can never fully be achieved. It is enough for a judge to make
an honest attempt to objectify his exercise of discretion, recognizing
that it cannot be done in every circumstance.
Furthermore, for some issues, the structure of the system grants the
judge discretion ultimately based on a subjective decision, bounded by
the range of considerations from which he chooses. Indeed, objectivity
is sometimes unattainable. There are numerous methods of developing
the common law. The interpretation of a legal text does not always
lead to a unique solution. The judge may find himself in a position to
exercise judicial discretion. Naturally, this discretion is limited, but it
nonetheless exists. In such situations, a judge may act according to his
own views. But even in these cases - and they are a tiny minority -
the path to full subjectivity is closed. 64 The judge may not resort to
his anomalous personal inclinations or to his particular opinions. The
judge may not resort to individual values that contradict the values of
the system, but must make the best decision within the framework of
objective considerations. The judge cannot return to the point of ori-
gin, but must march forward. He must try to give the best solution of
which he is capable. Indeed, someone who has taken personal stock of
himself, and who has succeeded in overcoming his particular inclina-
tions, will not resort to them. The judge must find the best solution
within the confines of the objective data available. Were the legal sys-
tem not to guide, the judge would be faced with several possibilities.
But the legal system limits the scope of the judge's considerations.
The judge is never permitted simply to do as he pleases. Even when
the judge is "with himself," he is within the framework of society, the
legal system, and judicial tradition.
Admittedly, there are some cases in which the judge has discretion
that allows him to choose among a limited number of options, accord-
ing to his views. How should the judge choose? All I can say is that
the choice is a product of the judge's personal life experience and the
balance he must find between certainty and experimentation, between
stability and change, between logic and emotion. The judge's choice is
influenced by his concept of the judicial role and attitudes towards the
other branches of the state. It is derived from the judge's judicial phi-
losophy.165 It is the product of a delicate balance in the judge's soul
between the specific and the general, between the individual and soci-
ety, and between the individual and the state. Most judges do not feel
comfortable in such situations. They are subject to tremendous inter-
164 See Breyer, supra note 53, at 158-6o.
165 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 697
(1976) (acknowledging that a judge's interpretation of the Constitution "will depend to some ex-
tent on his own philosophy of constitutional law").
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nal pressure. They usually display caution and self-restraint. 166 Their
sense of personal responsibility reaches its peak. 167 They feel greatly
isolated.1 68 In such situations, I try to be guided by my North Star,
which is justice. I try to make law and justice converge, so that the
Justice will do justice.
C. Public Confidence
In my view, another essential condition for realizing the judicial
role is public confidence in the judge. 169 This means confidence in ju-
dicial independence, fairness, and impartiality.170 It means public con-
fidence in the ethical standards of the judge. It means public confi-
dence that judges are not interested parties to the legal struggle, and
that they are not fighting for their own power, but to protect the con-
stitution and democracy. It means public confidence that the judge
does not express his own personal views, but rather the fundamental
beliefs of the nation.171  Indeed, the judge has neither sword nor
purse. 172 All he has is the public's confidence in him. This fact means
166 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (warning that, in the
"treacherous field" of substantive due process, "there is reason for concern lest the only limits to
... judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members
of this Court" and that the history of the Lochner era "counsels caution and restraint').
167 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", io
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 12 (1988) (explaining that "[n]o matter how much one has studied or
thought about the Constitution, the weight of responsibility that comes with the job of Supreme
Court Justice cannot be fully anticipated").
168 See Brennan, supra note iio, at 434 ("[T]he process of deciding can be a lonely, troubling
experience for fallible human beings conscious that their best may not be adequate to the chal-
lenge.").
169 See BARAK, supra note io, at 215-21; OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE '78
(i96i) (stating that a court's authority "rests on the community's preparedness to recognize the
judge's capacity to lend legitimacy or to withdraw it from an individual's act"); Steyn, supra note
145, at 388.
170 For five separate opinions articulating varying notions of judicial impartiality, see Republi-
can Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
171 1 noted in one case:
An essential condition for an independent judiciary is public confidence. This means
public confidence that the judiciary is dispensing justice according to the law. It means
public confidence that judging is being done fairly, impartially, with equal treatment of
both parties and without any trace of a personal interest in the outcome. It means pub-
lic confidence in the high ethical level of judging. Without public confidence the judici-
ary cannot operate .... [P]ublic confidence in the judiciary is the most precious asset
that this branch of government has. It is also one of the most precious assets of the na-
tion. As De Balzac noted, lack of confidence in the judiciary is the beginning of the end
of society.
H.C. 732/84, Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs, 40(4) P.D. I4, 148.
172 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's au-
thority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction.").
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that the public recognizes the legitimacy of judicial decisions, even if it
disagrees with their content.
The precondition of "public confidence" runs the risk of being mis-
understood. 17 3 The need to ensure public confidence does not mean
the need to ensure popularity. Public confidence does not mean
following popular trends or public opinion polls. Public confidence
does not mean accountability to the public in the way that the execu-
tive and the legislature are accountable. Public confidence does not
mean pleasing the public; public confidence does not mean ruling con-
trary to the law or contrary to the judge's conscience to bring about a
result that the public desires. On the contrary, public confidence
means ruling according to the law and according to the judge's con-
science, whatever the attitude of the public may be. Public confidence
means giving expression to history, not to hysteria. Public confidence
is ensured by the recognition that the judge is doing justice within the
framework of the law and its provisions. Judges must act - inside
and outside the court - in a manner that preserves public confidence
in them. They must understand that judging is not merely a job but a
way of life. It is a way of life that does not include the pursuit of ma-
terial wealth or publicity; it is a way of life based on spiritual wealth;
it is a way of life that includes an objective and impartial search for
truth. It is not fiat, but reason; not mastery, but modesty; not strength,
but compassion; not riches, but reputation; not an attempt to please
everyone, but a firm insistence on values and principles; not surrender
to or compromise with interest groups, but insistence on upholding the
law; not making decisions according to temporary whims, but pro-
gressing consistently on the basis of deeply held beliefs and fundamen-
tal values. Admittedly, judging is a way of life that involves some de-
gree of seclusion, abstention from social and political struggles,
restriction on the freedom of expression and the freedom to respond,
and a large amount of isolation and internalization. But judging is
emphatically not a way of life that involves a withdrawal from society.
There should be no wall between the judge and the society in which
the judge operates. The judge is a part of the people.
If this view of the judicial role is adopted by judges, we can hope
that the public will have and maintain confidence in the judiciary. In
this respect, I wish to note several judicial traits that can help the pub-
lic maintain confidence in its judges.
173 See, e.g., Elizabeth Handsley, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red Herring for the
Separation of Judicial Power, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 183, 214 (ig8) (criticizing the High Court of
Australia for shifting back and forth between a perception of public confidence as "an immutable
characteristic which can lend legitimacy to an otherwise suspect act" and a perception of public
confidence as "fragile" and easily destroyed).
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First, the judge ought to be aware of his power and his limits. A
judge has great power in a democracy. As with all power, judicial
power can be abused. The judge ought to recognize that his power is
limited to realizing the proper judicial role. From my experience, I
know that it takes considerable time for a new judge to learn his role
on a supreme court. Naturally, the judge knows the law and its power,
but he must also learn the limits imposed on him as a judge;174 he
must know that power should not be abused, and that a judge cannot
obtain everything he wants.
Second, a judge must recognize his mistakes. Like all mortals,
judges err. A judge must admit this. According to the well-known
statement of Justice Jackson, "[w]e are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final. ' 175 In one opinion,
citing to Justice Jackson's statement, I added that "I think that the
learned judge erred. The finality of our decisions is based on our abil-
ity to admit our mistakes, and our willingness to do so in appropriate
cases. ' 176 In another case, I wrote an opinion on a matter that was
subsequently reargued before an enlarged panel. My decision before
the enlarged panel reversed my original ruling. I explained the change
as follows:
This conclusion of mine conflicts with the conclusion that I reached in my
ruling, which is the subject of this petition. In other words, I changed my
mind. Indeed, since the judgment was given - and against the backdrop
of the further hearing itself - I have not ceased to examine whether my
approach is correctly grounded in law. I do not count myself among those
who believe that the finality of a decision testifies to its correctness. We
all err. Our professional integrity requires us to admit our mistakes, if we
are convinced that we have indeed erred ... in our difficult hours, when
we evaluate ourselves, our North Star should be uncovering the truth that
brings justice within the limits of law. We should not entrench ourselves
in our previous decisions. We must be prepared to admit our mistakes.' 77
I hope that if we admit our mistakes as judges, we will strengthen
public confidence in the judiciary.1
78
Third, in our writing and our thinking, judges must display mod-
esty and an absence of arrogance. Statements such as those of Chief
Justice Hughes that "we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution
174 See, e.g., Brian Dickson, supra note 3o, at 384 (arguing that "the Supreme Court of Canada
justice must display sensitivity to the limits of the court's ability to effect major legal change" and
that "the legislature is best equipped to set down guiding principles designed to address some of
our most complex social problems").
175 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (I953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
176 C.A. 243/83, Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, 39(0) PD. Ii3, 136-37.
177 Cr.A. 7048/97, Anonymous v. Minister of Def. 54(l) P.D. 721, 743.
178 See Beverley McLachlin, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective, 23 U.
B.C. L. REV. 579, 589 (1989) (arguing that judges should be flexible and admit their mistakes).
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is what the judges say it is"179 are not merely incorrect but also perni-
ciously arrogant.
Fourth, judges should be honest. If they create new law, they
should say so. They should not hide behind the rhetoric that judges
declare what the law is but do not make it. Judges make law, and the
public should know that they do. The public has the right to know
that we make law and how we do it; the public should not be de-
ceived. "The right to know the architect of our obligations," wrote
Professor Julius Stone, "may be as much a part of liberty as the right
to know our accuser and our judge.' 180 Public confidence in the judi-
ciary increases when the public is told the truth.
IV. THE MEANS OF REALIZING THE ROLE
In this Part, I wish to consider several devices through which a su-
preme court judge in a democracy may realize his or her role. Indeed,
it is not enough that we know where we need to go. We must develop
means to help us reach that goal. These means must be legitimate; the
principle of the rule of law applies first and foremost to judges them-
selves, who do not share the legislature's freedom in freely creating
new tools. The bricks with which we build our structures are limited.
Our power to realize our role depends on our ability to design new
structures with the same old bricks or to create new bricks. 181 Some-
times there is great similarity between the new structures we build
with the old bricks and the old structures we have known in the past.
We tend to say that there is nothing new under the sun and that the
legal pendulum swings to and fro before returning to its point of ori-
gin. But these analogies are inappropriate. The structures are always
new. There is no return to the point of origin; the movement is always
forward. Law is in constant motion; the question is merely one of the
rate of progress, its direction, and the forces propelling it. Moreover,
sometimes we succeed in creating new "tools." Here the genius of law
is evident. But such "inventions" are few. Usually we return to the
old tools, and use them to resolve new situations.
Use of the various legitimate tools - including the wording and
style of an opinion - is subject to the judge's discretion. This discre-
tion is exercised on the basis of the judge's understanding of his role.
In this respect, Sunstein argues that the proper principle is a minimal-
ist approach, which means "doing and saying as little as necessary to
179 Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira (May 3, 1907), in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 144 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., I973).
180 JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 678 (1966).
181 See Moshe Landau, Case-Law and Discretion in Doing Justice, I MISHPATIM 292 (i965).
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justify an outcome.1 82 This approach raises a number of questions.
First, should a supreme court hold that its adjudication is limited to
the case before it? It would seem as though the court cannot take this
route to limit the scope of the decision. Every decision of a supreme
court on a specific issue creates a change in the system as a whole.
Every "movement" of a supreme court on a single issue changes the
existing "status quo" of all issues. Every judicial opinion resolves not
just a problem from the past, but also affects the resolution of similar
problems in the future. No judicial opinion can limit itself to the past
alone. Even when we whisper, our voices are heard out loud, trans-
mitted through a thousand amplifiers throughout the system. Thus,
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore183 can-
not limit itself - even if the Court wishes it - to that case alone. The
decision necessarily influences future situations. Indeed, even if the
Justices explicitly stress that their decision does not determine any
principle of the matter - a determination that itself is subject to criti-
cism 18 4 - future case law will extract from it principles that may be
applied to future cases.
Second, do we want minimalism in judging? There will certainly
be cases in which this approach is undesirable and a maximalist ap-
proach should be adopted. In my opinion, minimalism is not a consti-
tutional approach that dictates constitutional steps, but rather the re-
sult of a balance between constitutional and other considerations.
These considerations differ from country to country, from time to time,
and from one constitutional issue to another. They sometimes suggest
minimalism but at other times do not. Thus, for example, an old and
established democracy like the United States is unlike young and frag-
ile democracies, such as many of the new democracies in Eastern
Europe. In the former, the main principles of the constitutional
framework have already been established, and the judicial corrective
- which assumes the existence of democracy - is limited in its role.
In those countries, minimalism may often be appropriate. But new
democracies need to establish preliminary understandings of the basis
of democracy. Minimalism is likely to be unsuitable.
Similarly, constitutional issues that have already been mostly set-
tled differ from constitutional issues that arise for the first time and
may require nonminimalist elaboration. Indeed, just as one cannot
presume at the outset that a constitutional text should be interpreted
182 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
iio HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1996). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUD-
ICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (i999).
183 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
184 Guido Calabresi, In Partial (But Not Partisan) Praise of Principle, in BUSH v GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 69 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
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broadly or narrowly, one also may not presume that a case requires a
minimalist posture. The error costs - to use Sunstein's terminology
- of creating this presumption are too great. In bridging the gap be-
tween law and society and preserving a constitutional democracy, a
judge should use all the tools at his disposal. If this end requires him
to be a minimalist, he should be a minimalist; if this end requires him
to be a maximalist, he should be a maximalist. The means we employ
are diverse. In this Foreword, I will focus on seven such tools: inter-
pretation, fundamental values, balancing theory, justiciability, stand-
ing, comparative law, and good philosophy. I will begin with the most
important means of fulfilling the judicial role: interpretation.
A. Interpretation
i. The Essence of Interpretation. - Interpretation, by which I
mean rational activity giving meaning to a legal text (whether it be a
will, contract, statute, or constitution), 185 is both the primary task and
the most important tool of a supreme court. Interpretation derives the
legal meaning from the text. Put another way, interpretation consti-
tutes a process whereby the legal meaning of a text is "extracted" from
its linguistic meaning. The interpreter translates "human" language
into "legal" language. 186 He changes "static law" into "dynamic law"
by transforming a linguistic text into a legal norm.
185 My theory of interpretation draws a sharp distinction between interpreting and filling in a
gap (lacuna) in a legal text. Interpretation gives meaning to the text. Gap-filling subtracts from
or adds to the text by way of analogy or by applying the system's fundamental values. Continen-
tal jurisprudence has developed this distinction. See CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, DIE
FESTSTELLUNG VON LUCKEN IN GESETZ (1983); BERND RUTHERS, RECHTSTHEORIE 456
(1999). A gap in a text exists when its interpretation leads to the conclusion that the absence of a
solution to the legal problem conflicts with the purpose of the text. It is as if an essential brick is
missing from the wall that the text constructs. A gap may be apparent or hidden. An apparent
gap exists when the text does not cover a particular case. A hidden gap exists when the text does
cover the case, but lacks an exception necessary to remove a particular incident from the text's
coverage. Continental legal tradition authorizes a judge to fill in the gap, whether it be apparent
or hidden. An interesting example of an apparent gap is the absence of an express right to pri-
vacy in the American Bill of Rights. It may be argued that in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
473 (1965), Justice Douglas filled in this gap. Another example of an apparent constitutional gap
may be found in the decisions of the High Court of Australia recognizing "implied" constitutional
rights. See supra section II.B.2.b. A good example of a hidden gap is the case of the murderous
heir: the silence of the law of succession on the question of whether he can inherit is a hidden gap
that the judge is authorized to fill in. Such a solution is preferable to the one that denies the heir
his inheritance by way of interpretation. See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 23. Using gap-filling
overcomes the accusation of "spurious interpretation." See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpreta-
tion, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907). Common-law judges would do well to develop the doc-
trine that deals with these lacunae. With it, and by using analogy from the provisions of similar
statutes, a statute - like the common law - projects itself into the system and can be developed
beyond its language.
186 See generally BRIAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY (1993).
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Many aspire in vain to uncover what the legal meaning of a text
"truly" is. 187 This is a fruitless search: a text has no "true" meaning.
We do not have the ability to compare the meaning of a text before
and after its interpretation, through focus on its "true" meaning.
There is no pre-exegetic understanding of a text, for we can only ac-
cess and understand it through an interpretive process. Only different
interpretations of a given text can be compared. The most to which
we can aspire is the "proper" meaning, not the "true" meaning.
The key question is, what is the "proper" system of interpretation?
There are indeed many systems of interpretation. Legal history is the
history of the rise and fall of different systems of legal interpretation.
All interpretive systems struggle with the limitations of language and
generalizations. All interpretive systems must resolve the relationship
between text and context; between the "word" (verba) of the text and
its "spirit" (voluntas). All interpretive systems must adopt a position
on the relationship between the real and hypothetical intention of the
author; between the author's "declared" intent, which is learned from
the text, and his "real" intent, which is learned from the text and from
sources outside the text. How can we determine the proper system of
interpretation?
The answer to this question is critical, for every individual in the
legal system and every branch of the state engages in interpretation
and should know how to do it properly. The answer is especially im-
portant for the judge, and especially for the supreme court judge, the
vast majority of whose work is interpretive. How is he or she to carry
it out? Indeed, this question has occupied me since the moment of my
appointment to the bench. I discovered - as many better than I dis-
covered before me - that neither common law systems 18 8 nor civil law
systems1 89 have satisfactory answers to these questions. This is trou-
bling. Interpretation is the judge's primary tool for realizing his or her
role in a democracy. How can we have failed to agree upon a theory
of interpretation?
I do not know the answer to this simple question. In any event, it
seems to me that the solution lies in answering another simple ques-
tion: what is the purpose of interpretation? Indeed, you cannot know
187 See Aharon Barak, Hermeneutics and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 CARDOzO L. REV.
767, 769 (i093).
188 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) ("American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently
applied theory of statutory interpretation.").
189 See Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Juirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation - Civilian Style,
44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 715 (1970) ("Conspicuously lacking in civil law jurisprudence is a methodol-
ogy of the judicial development of the law.. . which would analyze, rationalize, and systematize
the specific role of the judge in the process of finding and making law.").
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 65 2002-2003
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
how to interpret without knowing why you are interpreting. In my
worldview, the answer to the question "for what reason?" is the follow-
ing: the aim of interpretation in law is to realize the purpose of the
law; the aim in interpreting a legal text (such as a constitution or stat-
ute) is to realize the purpose for which the text was designed. Law is
thus a tool designed to realize a social goal. It is intended to ensure
the normal social life of the community on the one hand, and human
rights, equality, and justice on the other. The history of law is a search
for the proper balance between these goals, and the interpretation of
the legal text must express this balance. Indeed, if a statute is a tool
for realizing a social objective, then interpretation of the statute must
be done in a way that realizes this social objective. Moreover, the in-
dividual statute does not stand alone. It exists in the context of soci-
ety, as part of general social activity. The purpose of the individual
statute must therefore also be evaluated against the backdrop of the
legal system. This approach underlies the system of interpretation that
I think is proper: "purposive interpretation." Let us now turn to a dis-
cussion of that system.
2. Purposive Interpretation. - Purposive interpretation is not a
new system. Continental law has long recognized teleological interpre-
tation, which is interpretation according to "telos" or objective. 190
Common law systems also accept purposive interpretation,' 91 although
there is some uncertainty about whether the purpose is subjective, re-
flecting authorial intent on a high level of abstraction, or objective, or
a blend of the two.1 92 The purposive interpretation I discuss will at-
tempt to clarify this issue by setting out a comprehensive interpretive
system.
Purposive interpretation is based, of course, on the concept of pur-
pose. Purpose is a normative concept that the law constructs. The
purpose of a given legislative work contains both subjective and objec-
tive elements. The real intent of the author (the subjective purpose) is
always relevant. The subjective purpose acts on different levels, for
190 See, e.g., KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (5th ed.
1983); Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 189.
191 See, e.g., FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 731 (3d ed. 1997);
PIERRE-ANDR9 COT9, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 381-92 (3d ed.
2000); SIR RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 92 (3d ed. 1995); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 24-35; RUTH SULLIVAN, DREIDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION
OF STATUTES 35-77 (3 d ed. 1994).
192 This lack of certainty surfaced in the writings of the American realists and scholars of the
legal process. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 188, at 1124-25; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Con-
structed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950) (arguing that "[o]ne does not progress far in legal life
without learning that there is no single right and accurate way of reading [a] case"); Max Radin, A
Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 398-99 (1942).
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every author usually wishes to realize multiple intentions on various
levels of abstraction.
Objective elements also influence purpose (the objective purpose),
again operating on various levels of abstraction. On a low level of ab-
straction, objective purpose is the hypothetical intent that a reasonable
author would want to realize through the given legal text or a type of
legal text. On a high level of abstraction, the objective purpose of a
text is to realize the fundamental values of the legal system. The (ul-
timate) purpose of every text is determined by the relationship among
the various subjective elements (the author's real intent) and the vari-
ous objective elements (the hypothetical intent of the author or the "in-
tent" of the legal system).
The critical question then becomes, how do we determine the
proper relationship between the subjective and the objective? We will
not find this answer in linguistics or general hermeneutics. The inter-
pretation of literature or music is interesting by way of comparison,
but it does not answer the question. Rather, the answer to this ques-
tion depends on constitutional considerations. 193 Constitutional law is
the appropriate vessel in which to seek an answer to the question of
how to balance authorial intent with the fundamental values embed-
ded in the legal system. However, the constitution does not necessarily
give a single, unique resolution to the proper balance between objec-
tive and subjective elements. Sometimes, constitutional law leaves
that resolution to the discretion of the judge; 194 indeed, proponents of
purposive interpretation view judicial discretion as an indispensable
element of any theory of interpretation. Interpretive theories vary only
in the extent of judicial discretion they permit.
I will now briefly consider how purposive interpretation applies to
the interpretation of constitutions and statutes. I should point out,
however, that, in my view, purposive interpretation applies to the in-
terpretation of all legal texts, including contracts and wills.
3. Purposive Interpretation of a Constitution. - In interpreting a
constitution - as in interpreting every other legal text - a judge pin-
points the legal meaning along the range of the text's various semantic
meanings. One should not give the constitution a meaning that its ex-
193 See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) (arguing
that "[a]ny theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law").
194 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (99g) (urging in-
terpreters to read words and phrases in a constitution in light of identical words and phrases
within the same document); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV 26 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of consti-
tutional text). Note, however, that I do not wish to establish a two-step process, the first examin-
ing the text and the second examining "doctrine," or according to my theory, purpose. Rather, I
am looking for a single step allowing for fluid movement back and forth between the doctrine and
the text.
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press or implied language cannot sustain. The express language con-
veys to the reader the dictionary meaning of the text. The implied
language conveys to the reader a meaning that is not derived from the
dictionary meaning of the language. It is a language written in invisi-
ble ink, between the lines, and derived from the structure of the consti-
tution.195 Any interpretation of the constitution must be grounded in
its own language.
From among the range of semantic meanings of the constitution,
the interpreter must extract the legal meaning that best realizes the
purpose of the constitution. This purpose strikes the proper internal
balance between subjective and objective aspects, namely between the
intent of the framers of the constitution (on various levels of abstrac-
tion) and fundamental contemporary values. The judge gleans these
aspects from the text of the constitution, from its history, and from
precedent. Comparisons with other national systems and from inter-
national law can also assist him. It is constitutional theory, grounded
in constitutional law, that determines this balance between subjective
and objective purpose.1
96
A constitution is a unique legal document. It enshrines a special
kind of norm and stands at the top of the normative pyramid. Diffi-
cult to amend, it is designed to direct human behavior for years to
come. It shapes the appearance of the state and its aspirations
throughout history. It determines the state's fundamental political
views. It lays the foundation for its social values. It determines its
commitments and orientations. It reflects the events of the past. It
lays the foundation for the present. It determines how the future will
look. It is philosophy, politics, society, and law all in one. Perform-
ance of all these tasks by a constitution requires a balance of its sub-
jective and objective elements, because "it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding." 197  As Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of
Canada noted:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of
construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is
easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is
drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when
joined by a Bill or Charter of rights, for the unremitting protection of in-
dividual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be
195 See i LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-13, at 40 (3 d ed.
2000). See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTIT-
UTIONAL LAW (1985) (arguing that there is a close relationship between textual and structural
interpretation).
196 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
97-117 (1991).
197 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (x81g) (emphasis omitted).
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repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and devel-
opment over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often
unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitu-
tion and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in
mind. 198
How does a constitution's unique character affect its interpreta-
tion? In determining the purpose of a constitution, how does its dis-
tinctive nature affect the relationship between its subjective and objec-
tive elements? Naturally, different judges and scholars of constit-
utional law answer this question differently. My answer is this: one
should take both the subjective and objective elements into account
when determining the purpose of the constitution. The original intent
of the framers at the time of drafting is important. One cannot under-
stand the present without understanding the past. The framers' intent
lends historical depth to understanding the text in a way that honors
the past. The intent of the constitutional authors, however, exists
alongside the fundamental views and values of modern society at the
time of interpretation. The constitution is intended to solve the prob-
lems of the contemporary person, to protect his or her freedom. It
must contend with his or her needs. Therefore, in determining the
constitution's purpose through interpretation, one must also take into
account the values and principles that prevail at the time of interpreta-
tion, seeking synthesis and harmony between past intention and pre-
sent principle.
The key question then becomes, what is the proper relationship be-
tween the subjective and objective elements in determining the pur-
pose of the constitution when the two elements conflict? To this ques-
tion there is no "true" answer. But that does not mean that any
interpretation is appropriate. We must construct a system to evaluate
different understandings of the relationship. I accept that there is no
absolute proof that one understanding is better than another. Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe rightly points out that there are no criteria external
to the constitution that determine the proper order of priorities among
the different considerations. 199 That does not mean, however, that we
cannot construct constitutional arguments showing that one under-
standing is preferable to another. These arguments may not be based
on a "true" revelation that allows no alternative, but they nevertheless
help us to arrive at a proper meaning.
198 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, i56.
199 See i TRIBE, supra note 195, § 1-18, at 88 (expressing skepticism about finding definitive
interpretive criteria external to the Constitution and quoting Robert Post in agreement); see also
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 179 (i991) (arguing that "we cannot
replace (or supplement) the operation of [forms of legal argument] by reference to an external
code, however internally consistent it may be").
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We return, then, to the original question: what is the proper (as op-
posed to "true") relationship between the subjective and objective ele-
ments in determining the purpose of the constitution when the subjec-
tive and the objective pull in different directions? In my opinion,
greater weight should be accorded to the objective purposes. This is
particularly true for constitutions like that of the United States, which
are very difficult to amend and change, and for which a long time has
passed between the creation of the constitution and its interpretation.
In my opinion, only by giving preference to the objective elements can
the constitution fulfill its purpose. Only thus is it possible to guide
human behavior over generations of social change. Only thus is it pos-
sible to balance among the past, present, and future; only thus can the
constitution provide answers to modern needs. Admittedly, the past
influences the present, but it does not determine it. The past guides
the present, but it does not enslave it. Fundamental social views, de-
rived from the past and woven into social and legal history, find their
modern expression in the old constitutional text. Justice Brennan ex-
pressed this idea well in the following remarks:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as
Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of fram-
ing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate
question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have
had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be
their measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamen-
tals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be their measure to
the vision of their time. 200
The same idea was advanced by Justice Michael Kirby of the High
Court of Australia, who said that "[o]ur Constitution belongs to the
21st century, not to the i9th." 201
Various supreme courts have issued opinions in the same spirit, in-
cluding the Canadian Supreme Court202 and the German Constitu-
tional Court.203 This is the purposive interpretation that I espouse. It
does not ignore the subjective purpose in constitutional interpretation,
but it does not give it controlling precedence either. The weight of the
subjective purpose decreases as the constitution becomes "older" and
more difficult to change. In interpreting such constitutions, preference
200 William J. Brennan, Jr., Constructing the Constitution, i9 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 2,7 (1985).
201 Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Wor-
ship?, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. i, 14 (2000); see also Kirby, supra note 77, at 9.
202 See, e.g., HOGG, supra note 103, at 1393-94 (discussing the Canadian Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the phrase "fundamental justice" in the Charter of Rights).
203 See KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 42.
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should be given to the objective purpose that reflects deeply held mod-
ern views in the movement of the legal system through history. The
constitution thus becomes a living norm and not a fossil, preventing
the enslavement of the present to the past. Indeed, constitutional in-
terpretation is a process by which each generation expresses its fun-
damental views, as they have been formed against the background of
its past. The interpreter honors the past through his or her desire to
maintain a link with it. Nonetheless, the ultimate purpose is modern.
A very clear expression of this approach was offered by Justice Deane
of the Australian High Court. He was asking himself if the Constitu-
tion - being silent on the subject of a bill of rights - can be con-
strued to include implied human rights. It had been noted that there
was no evidence that the framers of the Australian Constitution in-
tended to preclude the implication of constitutional rights by drafting
the constitution without a bill of rights. Here is what Justice Deane
observed:
[E]ven if it could be established that it was the unexpressed intention of
the framers of the Constitution that the failure to follow the United States
model should preclude or impede the implication of constitutional rights,
their intention in that regard would be simply irrelevant to the construc-
tion of provisions whose legitimacy lay in their acceptance by the people.
Moreover, to construe the Constitution on the basis that the dead hands of
those who framed it reached from their graves to negate or constrict the
natural implications of its express provisions or fundamental doctrines
would deprive what was intended to be a living instrument of its vitality
and adaptability to serve succeeding generations.
20 4
Some argue that giving a modern meaning to the language of the
constitution is inconsistent with regarding the constitution as a source
of protection of the individual from society.205 Under this approach, if
the constitution is interpreted in accordance with modern views, it will
reflect the views of the majority to the detriment of the minority. My
reply to this claim is, inter alia, that a modern conception of human
rights is not simply the current majority's conception of human rights.
The objective purpose refers to fundamental values that reflect the
deeply held beliefs of modern society, not passing trends. These beliefs
are not the results of public opinion polls or mere populism; they are
fundamental beliefs that have passed the test of time, changing their
form but not their substance.
The interpretation of the Constitution is a central issue in United
States constitutional law, with a vast literature on the subject.20 6 The
204 Theophenous v. Herald Weekly Time Ltd., (1995) I82 CLR 104, io6.
205 See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-63
(1989).
206 See, e.g., i TRIBE, supra note 195, § i-it, at 30-32.
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Justices of the United States Supreme Court are divided on how to
approach this task. 07 Some Justices give precedence to the subjective
element (intentionalism, Framers' intent), while others oppose privileg-
ing the subjective element. Among these opponents, some wish to give
the Constitution a meaning that does not necessarily accord with the
will of its authors, but rather reflects the understanding of the found-
ing fathers at the time the Constitution was written (originalism).
Others emphasize contemporary objective elements. This split in
American constitutional viewpoints is regrettable. Although it is not
my place to make recommendations, it is my view that purposive in-
terpretation provides a proper solution to this interpretive dilemma.
Regardless of the role that intentionalism may play in interpreting
legislation, it should not be predominant in interpreting constitutions.
As for originalism, it suffers from the twin defects of shutting its eyes
to the wishes of the authors (to the limited extent that those wishes
should be considered) and rejecting modern constitutional understand-
ing. Originalism chooses the worst of both worlds. If one espouses
originalism, why not also take into account the will of the constitu-
tional authors as an expression of the original meaning? But if one
succeeds, as do the originalists, in escaping the heavy hand of the sub-
jective will, why become entrenched in the historical past rather than
turning an eye towards contemporary needs? Why not take account of
fundamental modern principles that encompass the constitution? Why
can some enlightened democratic legal systems (such as Canada, Aus-
tralia, and Germany) extricate themselves from the heavy hands of in-
tentionalism and originalism in interpreting the constitution, while
constitutional law in the United States remains mired in these difficul-
ties?20 8
207 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (i9gi) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the Court vacillates between a "purely literal approach" and one that "seeks guidance
from historical context"); see also Dorf, supra note 62, at 14-26 (1998) (discussing the Court's
struggle between textualism and purposivism).
208 See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 25, at 242:
[T]here is generally less debate ... over whether the intent of the framers of a constitu-
tion is what should govern its interpretation. Originalism, an extremely controversial
question in the United States, is usually simply not the focus, or even a topic, of debate
elsewhere. Not that there are not heated differences of opinion about "judicial activism"
or whether judging can be merely the interpretation of words on a page, but this is for
the most part not as focused on textualism and originalism as that in the United
States.... In Canada, there are few judges or commentators who would dispute the no-
tion that the rights and other provisions in our Constitution should be interpreted "as a
living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits" in the words of
Lord Sankey in a 1930 Privy Council case from Canada about whether the term "per-
sons" in our Constitution included women.
Id. (citations omitted). The judgment referred to above is Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [193o] A.C.
114, 136, in which Lord Sankey decided that women were "persons," even if the intention of the
framers did not include women.
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A constitution is a text that shapes the character of the state. What
underlies the constitution is the will of the people. But the will of the
people underlying the constitution is different from the will of the peo-
ple underlying ordinary legislation. 0 9 The former is the deeply held
view that justifies the constitutional nature of the democracy. This
view establishes the branches of the state and expresses the fundamen-
tal values and principles of the people. Foremost among these values
and principles are human rights. These elements of the constitutional
structure act as a basis for judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes. The values and principles underlying the constitution are
also the basis for constitutional interpretation, in which the judge must
give expression to the constitution's fundamental values.21 0 They form
a normative umbrella that extends over the constitution itself. The
constitution does not operate in a normative vacuum; outside and
around the constitution there are values and principles that the consti-
tution must realize.
2 1 1
These values are not the personal values of the judge. They are
the national values of the state: "it is a well-known axiom that the law
of a people must be studied in the light of its national way of life.
'21 2
The "national way of life" constitutes a source for the values and prin-
ciples that the constitution ought to realize. These principles and val-
ues reflect the social consensus that underlies the legal system. They
enshrine fundamental social outlooks. They are derived in part from
the constitutional text and its history. They are derived in part from
the historical experience of the people, their social and religious views,
and their tradition and heritage.2 13 Naturally, not all the values and
principles constituting the normative umbrella over the constitution
are mentioned (expressly or even implicitly) in the constitution. If they
are not mentioned, they should not be forced into the constitution arti-
ficially. Nonetheless, these unmentioned values and principles consti-
tute a point of reference for understanding the values and principles
that are mentioned in the constitution. Only with the help of these
unmentioned values and principles can the constitution realize its pur-
pose.
Purposive interpretation of the constitution is based on the status of
the judge as an interpreter of the constitution. A judge who interprets
209 For a discussion of this point, see generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Poli-
tics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989).
210 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 24-26 (1995).
211 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975).
212 H.C. 73/53, "Kol Ha'am" Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.D. 871 , 874 (Isr.).
213 See generally Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033
(I98I).
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the constitution is a partner to the authors of the constitution. The au-
thors establish the text; the judge determines its meaning. The authors
formulate a will that they wish to realize; the judge locates this will
within the larger picture of the constitution's role in modern life. The
judge must ensure the continuity of the constitution. He or she must
strike a balance between the will of the authors of the constitution and
the fundamental values of those living under it.
4. Purposive Interpretation of Statutes. - Purposive interpretation
applies not only to the interpretation of constitutions, but also to the
interpretation of all other legal texts, including statutes. Every statute
has a purpose, without which it is meaningless. This purpose, or ratio
legis, is made up of the objectives, the goals, the interests, the values,
the policy, and the function that the statute is designed to actualize. It
comprises both subjective and objective elements. The judge must
give the statute's language the meaning that best realizes its purpose.
The subjective purpose reflects the actual intention of the legisla-
ture, in contrast with the intention of the reasonable legislature, which
forms a part of the objective purpose. The subjective purpose is not
the interpretive intention of the legislature.2 14 The subjective purpose
consists of the policies the legislature sought to actualize. This aspect
of purpose deals with the legislature's "real" intention, which all credi-
ble sources - internal and external - help reveal.
21 5
214 For a description of "interpretive" intention, "concrete" intention, or "result-oriented" inten-
tion, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 48-50, 52-55 (1985); Ronald Dworkin,
Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 64, at 116-17; see also H.C. 547/84, Off HaEmek Registered Ag-
ric. Coop. Ass'n v. Ramat-Yishai Local Council, 40(I) P.D. I 3, 143-44 (Isr.) ("The judge does not
look to the legislative history for a concrete answer to the practical problem that he must decide.
The court is not interested in the specific scenarios and concrete examples that the legislator con-
sidered. We seek the purpose of the legislation in the legislative history. We seek the interests and
purposes that, after compromising and balancing among them, lead to the policy underlying the
norm we must interpret. We seek the principled viewpoint, not the individual application. We
seek the abstract, the principle, the policy and the objective. We are interested in the legislator's
conception of the purpose of the law, and not in his conception of the solution to a specific dispute
that is to be decided by the court." (citations omitted)).
215 Many scholars have argued that a multimember body like a legislature has no identifiable
intention. For example, Jeremy Waldron points out that, although each of the members of the
legislature has a will, this fact does not imply the existence of a similar will behind the product of
the collective body. The collective body only creates the statute itself. Because the legislators'
shared views and sense of common purpose do not exist beyond the meanings embodied in a
statutory text, interpreters must recognize the primacy of the language of the statute. See Jeremy
Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSPHY 353 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). Indeed, I accept that a collec-
tive body such as a legislature does not have a will in the same sense that an individual does. In-
stead of the will of any given individual, one should consider the purposes, social changes, and
goals upon which the members of the legislature agreed. Such agreement does exist and can be
identified, although it is not a part of the statute. Instead, it serves as a criterion for understand-
ing the statute. Similarly, although the intention of a testator is also not part of his will, no one
seriously argues that a will should not be interpreted according to the intention of the testator.
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Subjective purpose is not the only purpose relevant to statutory in-
terpretation, especially in situations where we lack information about
that purpose. Sometimes, even when we do have such information, it
does not help us in the interpretive task. Moreover, even when we do
find useful information about the subjective purpose, we must keep in
mind that focusing on legislative intent alone fails to regard the statute
as a living organism in a changing environment. It is insensitive to the
existence of the system in which the statute operates. It is not capable
of integrating the individual statute into the framework of the whole
legal system. It makes it difficult to bridge the gap between law and
society. Thus, it does not allow the meaning of the statute to be devel-
oped as the legal system develops. Rather, it freezes the meaning of
the statute at the historical moment of its legislation, which may no
longer be relevant to the meaning of the statute in a modern democ-
racy. If a judge relies too much on legislative intent, the statute ceases
to fulfill its objective. As a result, the judge becomes merely a histo-
rian and an archaeologist 216 and cannot fulfill his or her role as a
judge, which is to bridge the gap between the law and society. Instead
of looking forward, the judge looks backward. The judge becomes
sterile and frozen, creating stagnation instead of progress.2 17  Instead
of acting in partnership with the legislative branch, the judge becomes
subordinate to a historical legislature. This subservience does not be-
hoove the role of the judge in a democracy.
The objective purpose of the statute means the interests, values,
objectives, policy, and functions that the law should realize in a de-
mocracy. Objective criteria at the time of interpretation determine the
objective purpose, as the name indicates. The objective purpose is not
a guess or conjecture about the original intent of the legislature; in
fact, sometimes it is the opposite, because the objective purpose applies
even when it is clear that the legislature could not possibly have in-
tended such a purpose. Therefore, the objective purpose does not nec-
essarily reflect the real intent of the legislature. It is not an expression
of a psychological-historical reality. At low levels of abstraction, objec-
tive purpose reflects the intent the legislature would have had if it had
thought about the matter, or the intent of a reasonable legislature. 2 18
At a higher level of abstraction, it reflects the purpose that should be
Justice Breyer has rightly stated that even though the dictionary is not part of the statute, judges
may certainly use it to interpret statutory language. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legisla-
tive History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 863 (1992).
216 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21
(1988) (discussing the "archaeological" approach to statutory interpretation).
217 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66.
218 See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.. 245, 266 (2002) (re-
vised text of the James Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law, delivered on Oct. 22, 2001).
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attributed to a statute of that nature. From the nature of the matter
regulated by the statute, we can learn of its objective purpose. The
nature of the "legal institution" - for example, sale, lien, agency, li-
censing regime - indicates its purpose. Finally, at the highest level of
abstraction, the objective purpose of the statute is to realize the fun-
damental values of democracy. This purpose is not unique to one
statute or another; it applies to all statutes, constituting a kind of nor-
mative umbrella that extends over all legislation.
2 1 9
The judge can learn the objective purpose of the statute first and
foremost from its language. From the subject regulated by the statute
and from the nature of the arrangement, by exercising common sense
the judge can further grasp the objective purpose underlying the stat-
ute. An interpreter may derive the objective purpose of a statute not
only from the statute itself, but also from closely related statutes ad-
dressing the same issue (in pari materia). Moreover, the whole body of
legislation provides information about the objective purpose of the
statute. The individual statute becomes part of a body of legislation,
thereby creating a reciprocal relationship, with the statute and the
body influencing one another. As I expressed in one of my judgments:
[A] piece of legislation does not stand on its own. It constitutes a part of
the legislative body. It integrates into it, with the objective of legislative
harmony... [W]hoever interprets one statute interprets legislation as a
whole. The isolated statute is related to the body of legislation by a sys-
tem of interconnected vessels. The whole body of legislation influences
the purpose of the individual statute. An earlier statute influences the
purpose of a later statute. A later statute influences the purpose of an ear-
lier statute.
220
Moreover, a statute's social and historical background influences its
purpose. Social needs drove the creation of the statute; therefore, it is
relevant to consider them. Also relevant are the social and cultural
premises upon which the statute was based. The jurisprudence of the
system and its legal culture influence the process by which judges de-
termine the purpose of every statute. 2 1 This jurisprudence serves as a
well from which statutes draw their strength; it shapes common legal
experience. Indeed, as every statute is created by a legal community,
the community's fundamental views of culture, law, and jurisprudence
inevitably imprint themselves upon the statute's purpose. Thus, the
exact same statute in different legal systems may give rise to different
objective purposes.
219 H.C. 953/87, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 42(2) P.D. 309, 328.
220 H.C. 693/91, Efrat v. Dir. of Population Register, 47(I) P.D. 749, 765-66.
221 See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527,533,537,542-43 (i967).
[Vol. 116:16
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 76 2002-2003
THE SUPREME COURT- FOREWORD
Lastly, the fundamental principles of the democratic legal system
constitute the "spirit" (the purpose) that encompasses the "material"
(the statute). Every statute springs from the backdrop of these princi-
ples, which serve as part of the objective purpose.2 22 Purposive inter-
pretation translates these principles into presumptions about the gen-
eral purpose of every statute.2 23 These presumptions become part of
every statute's objective purpose. They are not limited to a particular
type of legislation or merely to "unclear" legislation - they apply al-
ways and immediately. They accompany the interpretive process from
beginning to end. They constitute what Sunstein calls the "back-
ground norms '224 that assist the interpreter.
As in the interpretation of a constitution, the key question in the in-
terpretation of statutes is the relationship between the subjective and
the objective in determining the statute's ultimate purpose. Naturally,
interpreters strive for synthesis and integration. The purposive inter-
preter does not look for conflicts; he aims for harmony. Nevertheless,
conflicts and inconsistencies among the various purposes exist. How
are they to be resolved? What I said with regard to the interpretation
of constitutions 22I also applies to statutes. The interpreter resolves the
subjective purpose (the intention of the legislature) and the objective
purpose (the "intention" of the system) on the basis of constitutional
criteria, of which the central one is democracy. As we have seen,226 we
must distinguish between formal democracy and substantive democ-
racy. Formal democracy in this context means the rule of the people
through their representatives in the legislature, from which the princi-
ple of legislative supremacy arises. Substantive democracy in this con-
text means the supremacy of values and human rights. From this rich
concept of democracy, what can we deduce about judicial statutory
interpretation? In my opinion, we can derive two conclusions.
First, in interpreting statutes, the judge must attach considerable
weight to the subjective purpose that underlies the statute. In this
way the judge gives effect to legislative supremacy, 227 thereby recog-
222 See Efrat, 47(I) P.D. at 768; see also Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte
Pierson [1998] A.C. 539, 587-88.
223 For a discussion of this point, see CROSS, supra note 6i; LOURENS M. DU PLESSIS, THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 6i (1986).
224 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 460
(1989); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 1023, io6o (1998) (discussing the application of "background principles" to administrative
law).
225 See supra p. 68.
226 See supra section II.B.2.
227 For various arguments regarding statutory interpretation and legislative supremacy, see
Eskridge, supra note 62, at 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statu-
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nizing that the legislature does not enact statutes merely for the sake of
legislation. Indeed, through legislation, the legislature determines so-
cial policy, allocates national resources, and orders national priorities.
A statute is a tool for realizing these goals. The legislature does not
produce a statute unless it wants to achieve a particular social goal.
Legislative supremacy requires that the interpreter give effect to the
(abstract) intention of the legislature. Indeed, where the judge has re-
liable information about the abstract intention of the legislature, and
this intention is relevant to solving the questions that the judge faces,
the judge should give weight to the subjective purpose in interpreting
the legislation.
Second, in interpreting a statute, the judge should attach significant
weight to its objective purpose. There is no democracy without a rec-
ognition of the values and principles that shape it, particularly human
rights values. Just as the supremacy of fundamental values, principles,
and human rights justifies judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes, so too must that supremacy assert itself in statutory interpre-
tation. The judge must reflect these fundamental values in the inter-
pretation of legislation. The judge should not narrow interpretation to
the exclusive search for subjective legislative intent. He must also
consider the "intention" of the legal system, for the statute is wiser
than the legislature s. 2 2  By doing so the judge is also able to give the
statute a dynamic meaning and thus bridge the gap between law and
society.
So we return to the original question: what is the proper relation-
ship between abstract subjective purpose and objective purpose in the
interpretation of statutes? In this regard, do we assume that the judge
faces a clear and reliable subjective purpose and that it conflicts with
the objective purpose? The reply of purposive interpretation is that
one cannot view all statutes monolithically. Purposive interpretation
distinguishes among different types of statutes. The age of the statute
influences the relationship between the different purposes it contains.
The older the statute, the greater the weight the judge should attach to
its objective purpose. Conversely, the younger the statute, the greater
the weight the judge should attach to its (abstract) subjective purpose.
As Francis Bennion rightly points out:
Each generation lives under the law it inherits. Constant formal updating
is not practicable, so an Act takes on a life of its own. What the original
tory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Suprem-
acy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767 (99i).
228 See Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK,
RADBRUCH AND DABIN 47, 141-42 (950) ("The interpreter may understand the law better than
its creators understood it. The law may be wiser than its authors - indeed, it must be wiser than
its authors.").
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framers intended sinks gradually into history. While their language may
endure as law, its current subjects are likely to find that law more and
more ill-fitting. The intention of the originators, collected from the Act's
legislative history, necessarily becomes less relevant as time rolls by.
22 9
Purposive interpretation also distinguishes among various statutes
according to the scope of the issues they regulate. A specific statute
that deals with a narrow and defined issue, for instance, cannot be
compared to the codification of a broad subject. The more specific
and narrow the statute, the greater the weight the judge should attach
to the subjective purpose the legislature wanted to achieve. By con-
trast, the more general and comprehensive the statute, the greater the
weight the judge should attach to its objective purpose. It is possible
to describe precisely the human behavior that a more specific or nar-
row statute is intended to regulate. It is possible to foresee future de-
velopments more precisely and thus to regulate them. In such circum-
stances, the justification for referring to the intention of the legislature
increases and the need to refer to the general values of the system de-
creases. This is not the case with a general statute that regulates a
large area of human activity. It is harder to describe precisely the
modes of human behavior such a statute is meant to regulate. It is
also more difficult to foresee future developments. Naturally, this type
of statute must be couched in general language that describes the so-
cial behavior regulated. In such circumstances, there is a greater need
to refer to the general values of the system and less need to refer to
legislative intent, which, in any event, ceases to be helpful as time
passes.
230
It is also important to distinguish between a statute based on rules
and a statute based on principles or standards. 231 My approach is to
give great weight to the intention of the legislature in interpreting a
rule-based statute and great weight to the principles of the system in a
more policy-oriented statute. The reason for this approach is that un-
der a statute establishing rules, adjudication usually must draw a clear
line between what the statute forbids and what it permits, and that
distinction can be derived from legislative intent. By contrast, a stat-
ute that formulates principles or policies prescribes an ideal to be
achieved. This ideal operates within the framework of the legal sys-
tem, is shaped by it, and in turn influences it. Naturally, significant
229 F. A. R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 687 (3d ed. 1997).
230 See Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1978); cf. Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting
Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2214 (i991) (arguing that codes such as the UCC become inte-
grated into the national legal heritage over time, making general principles and clauses more sali-
ent).
231 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, io6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-69 (1992).
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weight should be attached to the fundamental values of the legal sys-
tem in order to shape the ideal according to the current thinking of
members of society at the time of interpretation. Therefore, for a stat-
ute forbidding "unreasonable" behavior, legislative intent is of little
help in defining reasonableness. The question is not what the legisla-
ture understood by the word "reasonable" at the time of the legislation.
Rather, it is, how do members of society to whom the provision applies
understand reasonableness at the time of interpretation?
Another relevant distinction is between statutes enacted by stable
democratic social regimes and statutes enacted by undemocratic re-
gimes that nonetheless remain in force after the state's transition to
democracy. For statutes enacted during the undemocratic period, little
weight should be attached to the intention of the undemocratic legisla-
ture. Indeed, consideration of legislative intent in statutory interpreta-
tion is based on the need to give expression to the intent of the democ-
ratic legislator. When the legislator is not democratic, there is no
reason to give expression to his intent. Professor David Dyzenhaus
expressed this well in addressing the argument in favor of interpreting
statutes enacted by the white Parliament in South Africa during
apartheid according to the intent of the legislature:
[T]he legitimacy of that approach depends on a democratic theory which
says that the people speak through their elected parliamentary representa-
tives, and thus the statutes enacted by the legislature must be applied by
judges so as best to approximate what those representatives actually in-
tended. In others words, the legitimacy of an approach which requires
judges to ignore in their interpretation of the law their substantive convic-
tions about what the law should be requires a substantive commitment at
a deeper level to the intrinsic legitimacy of that law. However, the Par-
liament whose statutes they interpreted was illegitimate by the criteria of
any democratic theory and so the substantive justification for their ap-
proach was absent.2 32
Dyzenhaus notes that giving expression to legislative intent during
apartheid led to results disastrous for civil liberties. Indeed, in that
type of regime, one should give statutes a narrow semantic interpreta-
tion. Once the corrupt regime ends, and the statute is interpreted in
the context of a democratic regime, the intent of the undemocratic leg-
islature should be given no weight. Instead, weight should be attached
to the fundamental democratic values in whose framework the old leg-
islation now operates. An example of this interpretive principle is the
interpretation of legislation enacted in Palestine during the period of
the British Mandate. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court of Is-
rael has ruled that it should interpret this legislation in accordance
232 DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, supra note 21, at 166.
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with the fundamental values of the new, democratic state and not ac-
cording to the intention of the undemocratic legislature.
23 3
Finally, the content of the legislative arrangement may influence
the relationship between the subjective purpose and the objective pur-
pose. For example, in criminal law, great weight may be attached -
for rule-of-law reasons like the need for publicity and certainty - to
the objective purpose that is evident from the express language of the
statute. This language is what is seen by members of society, and the
purpose that is evident from it should be given great weight.
5. Purposive Interpretation and Judicial Discretion. - In both
constitutional and statutory interpretation, a judge must sometimes ex-
ercise discretion in determining the proper relationship between the
subjective and objective purposes of the law. Indeed, a theory of in-
terpretation cannot be constructed without interpretive discretion as
its foundation. Interpretation without judicial discretion is a myth.
Any theory of interpretation - intentionalism, originalism, purposiv-
ism, and so on - must be based on an inherent internal element of in-
terpretive discretion. 234 Discretion exists because there are laws with
more than one possible interpretation.2 3S  In such circumstances, the
judge undertakes "the sovereign prerogative of choice, '' 236 bounded by
the fundamental views of the legal community 37 This conceptualiza-
tion of the view of the "legal community" is, by its nature, imprecise.
There are many borderline cases with no clear resolution. Still, judi-
cial discretion is always limited, never absolute.23 8 The limitations
imposed on interpretive discretion are procedural and substantive.
The procedural limitations guarantee the fairness of the exercise of ju-
dicial discretion. The judge must treat the parties equally. He must
base his decision on the evidence presented to the court, and he must
give reasons for that decision. Above all, the judge must act impar-
tially, without appeal to personal biases or prejudices. The substantive
limitations mean that the exercise of discretion must be rational, con-
233 See, e.g., H.C. 68o/88, Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 42(4) PD. 617, 628; H.C. 2722/92,
Alamarin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip, 46(3) P.D. 693, 705.
234 See BARAK, supra note io, at 55-88; see also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 124, at 155
("[T]he grand theorists' desire to restrain judicial discretion is an impossible dream based on an
unwillingness to tolerate uncertainty."); Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a De-
mocracy, 33 ISR. L. REV. s, 2-3 (I1999).
235 See BARAK, supra note io, at 7; WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How To Do
THINGS WITH RULES 179 (4 th ed. 1999); THE USES OF DISCRETION (K. Hawkins ed., 1992);
VILA, supra note i i, at 12-13. See generally JOSE JUAN MORESO, LEGAL INDETERMINACY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998) (using formal logical analysis to determine
the truth-conditions of alternative interpretations of legislation).
236 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 210, 239 (1952).
237 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1982).
238 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 61 (1924).
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sistent, and coherent. The judge must act reasonably, taking into ac-
count the institutional constraints imposed by other parts of the legal
system.
What will the judge who is aware of all these responsibilities and
limitations do? Beyond the aforementioned procedural and substan-
tive boundaries, there are no rules for exercising discretion, except that
the judge must choose the solution that seems to him the best accom-
modation of the competing purposes he or she has considered. 239
Within this scope, pragmatism operates. My advice is that, at this
stage of the interpretive activity, the judge should aspire to achieve
justice. This means justice for the parties before the court and with
regard to the whole legal system. Justice guides the entire interpretive
process, for, indeed, justice is one of the core values of the legal system.
Within the bounds of judicial discretion, justice becomes a "residual"
value which can decide hard cases. Of course, it is only natural that
different judges have different conceptions of justice, for justice is a
complex concept. Despite all its theoretical complexity, however, each
of us has an intuitive feeling about the just solution of a dispute. This
feeling must guide us at all stages of the interpretive process. It must
direct our decisions in hard cases, when judicial discretion becomes
our most essential tool.
6. Purposive Interpretation and New Textualism. - United States
case law and legal literature have recently begun using an interpretive
system called "new textualism. ''240 This system holds that the Consti-
tution and every statute should be understood according to the reading
of a reasonable reader at the time of enactment. 241 To this end, inter-
preters may refer to the language of the text as a whole. They may re-
fer to contemporary linguistic aids in order to acquire information
about how the text was understood when it was enacted. They also
may refer to the various interpretive "maxims" - such as expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (expression of the one is the exclusion of an-
other) - because these indicate the way a reasonable reader may have
understood the text at the time it was enacted. Similarly, in the case of
239 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 197 (1979).
240 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-29
(1g); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, ii HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'VY 59, 65 (1998) ("The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the multiple
minds of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable person."); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (199o) [hereinafter Eskridge, The
New Textualism]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, II (1998); Scalia, supra note 205, at 862-65 (arguing that the "originalist" approach to in-
terpretation is preferable to the "nonoriginalist" approach); George H. Taylor, Structural Textual-
ism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 330-32 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The
"New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (I99I).
241 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999).
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a statute, judges may refer to other statutes passed by the same legisla-
ture to draw conclusions about its use of similar language. Reference
to the history of the text's creation or to the system's fundamental val-
ues, however, is not allowed. In this interpretive system, the question
is not at all what the founders or legislators intended. The question is
what they said. Justice Scalia writes:
It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.... [T]he objec-
tive indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is
what constitutes the law .... I object to the use of legislative history on
principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of
the law.
242
I disagree with new textualism's presumption that the true inten-
tion of the author cannot ever be discovered. 24 3 Although it is not al-
ways possible to discover the true intention of the author, that does not
mean that there are no cases in which the intent can be known. To the
extent that new textualism views intent as irrelevant, or claims that
taking intent into account undermines democracy, I disagree. Honor-
ing authorial intent in giving meaning to a text upholds the formal
democratic value of constitutional and legislative supremacy. Ignoring
the intention of the author - thereby viewing the constitution or stat-
ute as a text with no intention - is precisely what undermines formal
democracy.244 When the founders or legislature enacted a text, they
sought to give effect to a policy. This policy should be taken into ac-
count when interpreting the text.
Moreover, new textualism's refusal to take into account the legal
system's fundamental values harms substantive democracy. Purely
textual interpretation severs the constitution or statute from the fun-
damental values of society in general and from human rights in par-
ticular.
Worst of all, new textualism does not realize the judicial role. Un-
der the new textualist approach, the interpretation of a constitution or
statute ceases to be a tool for bridging the gap between the law and
society, and the judge ceases to fulfill his or her role in protecting de-
mocracy. Instead, the judge focuses on language and the understand-
ing of the reader at the time the text was created. Such a method ex-
pands judicial discretion and makes law less certain and less stable,
which offends the principles of formal democracy. Admittedly, formal
democracy holds that a statute is what the legislature actually enacts,
not its intention, the "intention" of a reasonable legislator, or the "in-
tention" of the legal system. But a judge who takes into account legis-
242 SCALIA, supra note 64, at 17, 29, 31.
243 See id. at 3 1-32.
244 See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 24o, at 683; Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997) (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 64).
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lative intent or the "intention" of the legal system does not claim that
these constitute the text of the legislature. We must distinguish be-
tween the text - which the legislature enacted - and the criteria for
understanding it.245 New textualism also offends substantive democ-
racy by failing to consider the legal system's fundamental values at the
time of interpretation. The principle of separation of powers recog-
nizes the judge's authority to interpret the text. This interpretation is
based on a partnership that recognizes the need to examine both the
intention of the author and the "intention" of the legal system (that is,
the current values of society).
Because new textualism is inconsistent with fundamental principles
of democracy, it cannot be a proper system of interpretation. Nonethe-
less, it can serve as a basis for a proper system of interpretation. Its
focus on the text as a basis for interpretation is proper. A statute that
forbids bringing a vehicle into a park 246 cannot be interpreted to for-
bid one from bringing an elephant into a park. Language limits the
interpretation. New textualism's rejection of the author's intent as a
permissible consideration has positive elements, too. Sometimes one
cannot know what this intention is; sometimes there is no reliable evi-
dence of it; sometimes, even if it can be discerned, it should not be
given weight. Similarly, new textualism's insistence on considering the
text as a whole as a source for understanding any part of it is also on
point. Nonetheless, to arrive at a proper system of interpretation, the
horizons of the interpreter need to be widened beyond those of new
textualism. The context of the text - the importance of which is
noted by new textualism, albeit narrowly - includes society's princi-
ples, values, and fundamental views, both at the time of enactment
and at the time of interpretation. These and other changes would be
necessary to transform new textualism into a proper system of inter-
pretation. At that point, however, it would cease to be new textualism
and become purposive interpretation.
B. The Fundamental Principles of the System
The fundamental principles of the legal system constitute both a
goal to which judges should aspire and a means through which they
realize this goal. Indeed, in addition to being a source of interpretive
guidance, fundamental principles constitute a primary tool that I need
to realize my role as a judge. My premise is that we are living in a
normative world. Our universe is full of fundamental principles.
245 This distinction has been discussed by American realists. See Jerome Frank, Words and
Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV 1259 (i947); Radin, supra
note 192; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV L. REV. 863 (930).
246 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV L. REV 593,
607 (1958).
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There is no corner of our lives that is not controlled by them. Judges
are steeped in them; a judge's whole being is a balance of conflicting
principles. This premise holds true both in private and public law.
These principles are the purposes to which we aspire. They are also
the devices through which we act. This notion is well expressed by
Justice Michael Cheshin of the Israeli Supreme Court in the following
analogy:
Morality and its directives appear as a lake of pure water, while law and
its directives can be compared to water lilies immersed in the water,
spread across the surface and drawing life and strength from the water.
Morality feeds law at the roots and encompasses law. Some of these water
lilies give legal force to the moral imperatives; some of the flowers of the
water lilies act as concepts that frame law, whose content is filled by the
directives of morality, both personal and social.
2 47
The common law is replete with fundamental principles. They are
the bases for its development. The interpretation of legal texts is dic-
tated by fundamental principles, since they constitute the objective
purpose of every legal text.248  Indeed, a legal norm - whether en-
acted or in case law - is an organism that lives in its environment.
This environment includes the fundamental principles of the system.
Indeed, judges are not able to sever themselves from the fundamental
values of their societies. They will give expression to them consciously
or subconsciously. The use of fundamental principles raises several
problems that I wish to consider briefly. I know that this is an area in
which different judges are likely to have conflicting opinions. I can
only indicate my own view regarding the status and role of fundamen-
tal principles in realizing the judicial role.
i. What Are Fundamental Principles? - Every legal system has
its own fundamental principles. Nonetheless, most democratic legal
systems share some common ones. As I wrote in one of my opinions:
These general principles include the principles of equality, justice, and mo-
rality. They extend to the social goals of the separation of powers, the rule
of law, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, worship, occupation, and
human dignity, the integrity of judging, public safety and security, the de-
mocratic values of the State and its very existence. These principles in-
clude good faith, natural justice, fairness, and reasonableness.
249
This list is certainly not exhaustive. It is composed of three types
of fundamental principles: ethical values (such as justice, morality, and
human rights), social purposes (such as the existence of the state and
public safety within it, certainty and stability in interpersonal ar-
247 C.A. 3798/94, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 50(3) P.D. i33, 182.
248 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1007-09 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 224, at 426-28.
249 Cr.A. 677/83, Borochov v. Yefet, 39(3) PD. 205, 218.
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rangements, and human rights), and proper ways of behavior (such as
reasonableness, fairness, and good faith). The distinctions among the
three types is not precise, and there is considerable overlap. It is suffi-
cient to point out that we are concerned with general and accepted
principles that form a central element of the legal system. They consti-
tute both the principles and the policies of the legal system.250
2. The Sources of the Fundamental Principles. - Since there is
usually no central text that articulates the fundamental principles of
the legal system, how will the judge derive them? One thing is clear:
judges must not impose their own personal, subjective perceptions of
the fundamental principles on the society in which they operate.
Judges should not reflect their own principles, but rather the funda-
mental principles that are implied by the legal system and the ethos
that it characterizes. 25 ' The nature of the fundamental principles and
the balance among them are determined by the fundamental positions
and fundamental beliefs of the society, such as those written into its
constitution or its declaration of independence. Judges also learn of
the fundamental principles from the democratic regime itself, including
principles about the separation of powers, the rule of law, and the in-
dependence of the judiciary. From the democratic nature of the state,
judges can infer the existence of human rights. Indeed, there is a re-
ciprocal relationship between the democratic nature of the state and its
fundamental principles: judges learn of the democratic nature of the
state from its fundamental principles. And from this democratic na-
ture, and the different statutes that characterize it, they may derive the
state's fundamental principles.
3. New and Old Fundamental Principles. - Fundamental princi-
ples do not live forever. New fundamental principles come into the
system, while outdated ones leave the system. New fundamental prin-
ciples find expression in new constitutions and in new statutes consis-
tent with the new constitutions. But even in the absence of new con-
stitutions and new statutes, introduction of new fundamental
principles is made possible by case law. The judge is faced with the
difficult and complex tasks of recognizing new fundamental principles
and of removing outdated ones from the system. Judges must under-
stand the legal system in which they operate and feel the pace and di-
rection of its development. They must introduce into the system only
250 Dworkin distinguishes between principle and policy. See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 244.
I do not insist on this distinction. See also N. MacCormick, On Reasonableness, in LES
NOTIONS A CONTENU VARIABLE EN DROIT chs. 5-8 (Chaim Perelman & Raymond Vander
Elst eds., 1984).
251 See CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 88-89, lO8.
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those fundamental principles that are ripe for recognition. 252 Different
values are gradually absorbed and gradually ripen until the moment
arrives when judges ought to recognize them as fundamental values of
their systems. We are concerned, therefore, with a lengthy social proc-
ess. This process was discussed by President Agranat of the Supreme
Court of Israel:
The conception and birth of these truths are the result of social thought.
Their creation and development are the outcome of clarifications and elu-
cidation through social organs (political parties, newspapers, various asso-
ciations and professional organizations, etc.). Only after they have under-
gone this process of initial crystallization does the State - i.e., the laws of
the legislature, the regulations and rulings of the executive, and the judg-
ments of the courts - come and reshape them, translate them into the
language of law and impress on them the positive and binding stamp of
the law. The explanation for this is as follows: the role of the State is -
so democracy teaches us - to fulfill the will of the people and to give ef-
fect to norms and standards that the people cherish. What follows from
this is that a process of "common conviction" must first take place among
the enlightened members of society regarding the truth and justice of those
norms and standards, before we can say that a general will has been
reached that these should become binding with the approval and sanction
of the positive law. It should be noted that the "common conviction" is
not that these norms and standards are yet to be born, but that they exist
in the present and contain truth, even though they lack an official statu-
tory stamp of approval. It follows that the social consensus regarding the
truth and justice of one norm or another must precede legal recognition
from the State, and the process of creating this kind of social consensus
does not begin and end in a day; it is a process of gradual development,
which continues for a long time and is sometimes renewed. 253
Generally, values that are insufficiently developed and that do not
enjoy social recognition and agreement should not be introduced into
the legal system judicially. This notion was discussed by Justice
Holmes:
As law embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle of ideas and
then have translated themselves into action, while there still is doubt,
while opposite convictions still keep a battle front against each other, the
time for law has not come; the notion destined to prevail is not yet entitled
to the field. It is misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious
sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets
252 See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 849 (1972) ("In
most countries one of the most general principles restraining judicial discretion enjoins judges to
act only on those values and opinions which have the support of some important segment of the
population."); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 236 (1973).
253 H.C. 58/68, Shalit v. Minister of Interior, 23(2) P.D. 477, 602.
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that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow
men to be wrong.
254
At times judges may find certain values to be fundamental and
proper, but this reason alone should not generally be sufficient for
judges to recognize them as fundamental values of the system. In
principle, judges should recognize only values that appear to be fun-
damental to the society in which they live and operate. The social
consensus around fundamental views is usually what ought to guide
judges, with regard to both the introduction of new fundamental prin-
ciples and the removal from the system of fundamental principles that
have become discredited. Consensus is a complex concept. As a rule,
I have always tried to carry out my role as a judge within the frame-
work of social consensus, to the extent that data exist about it.255 The
judge should generally not be the flagbearer of a new social consensus.
As a rule, judges should reflect values and principles that exist in their
system, rather than create them. Justice Traynor rightly stated: "The
very responsibilities of a judge as an arbiter disqualify him as a cru-
sader. 25 6
Nevertheless, there are cases - and they must naturally be few -
in which the judge carries out his role properly by ignoring the preva-
lent social consensus and becoming a flagbearer of a new social con-
sensus. I do not know what the consensus was in the United States
just before the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,257 but, in my opinion, the Court at that time fulfilled its role even
if it ruled against the then-prevailing consensus. Naturally, a supreme
court will not retain public confidence if it announces a new Brown
twice every week. Similarly, a supreme court will lose public confi-
dence if it misses an opportunity like Brown when faced with it. In
the final analysis, everything is a question of degree.
The consensus within which judges usually ought to operate should
be a consensus grounded in the fundamental values of the legal sys-
tem. Judges should not act according to a consensus formed by tran-
sient trends that are inconsistent with the society's fundamental val-
ues. Judges' social framework must be central and basic, not
temporary and fleeting. When society is not being true to itself, judges
are not required to give expression to its passing trends. They must
stand firm against these trends, while giving expression to the social
consensus that reflects their society's fundamental principles and ten-
254 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in HOLMES, supra note 236, at 291, 294-95.
255 See BARAK, supra note io, at 213-15.
256 Traynor, supra note 41, at 1O3O.
257 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ets: "[They] must reveal what is principled and fundamental, while
rejecting what is temporary and fleeting.
'25 8
Remaining in touch with these views requires a study of social con-
sensus; it requires judicial self-restraint, moderation, and sensitivity.
In exceptional situations, judges may depart from the current consen-
sus. Moreover, fundamental principles are the result of modern ex-
perience. While even modern experience sprouts from the soil of the
past to which it is connected, its horizons are not limited to the hori-
zons of the past. Every generation has its own horizons. This ap-
proach to fundamental principles - emphasizing deeply held views
and not the temporary and the fleeting, emphasizing history and not
hysteria - also provides a proper answer to the criticism that taking
into account the fundamental principles of the present may harm indi-
viduals in the minority.25 9 The answer to this criticism is, inter alia,
that the fundamental values of the present are not necessarily the val-
ues that today's majority accepts. They are the deeply held values of
the society that have developed over time. Again, it is precisely
judges, enjoying the independence of an appointed position, who are in
the appropriate position to ignore passing vogues and give expression
to the deeply held values of society2 60 Indeed, judges' nonaccountabil-
ity is their most precious asset, 261 enabling them to give expression to
the deeply held principles of society in its progress through history.
4. The Status and Weight of Fundamental Principles. -
Fundamental principles play various roles in the law. They are the
reason for creating new legal norms and for changing existing norms.
They influence the legislature in creating legislation and influence the
judge in developing the common law. They are sources of rights and
duties, and they are criteria for the validity of legal norms. As we
have seen within the framework of the objective purpose, fundamental
principles are an interpretive tool for all legal texts.
The legal status of fundamental principles is determined by their
normative sources. Fundamental principles derived from the constitu-
tion have constitutional status; fundamental principles derived from
statutes have statutory status; fundamental principles derived from the
common law have common law status. This framework leads to an
important question: are there principles so fundamental that they have
- in a legal system with a formal constitution (such as the United
States) - supra-constitutional weight,2 62 or - in a legal system with
258 H.C. 693/91, Efrat v. Dir. of Population Register, 47(I) P.D. 749, 780 (Isr.).
259 See Scalia, supra note 28, at 315-17.
260 See BICKEL, supra note 138, at 24.
261 See Atiyah, supra note 139, at 369.
262 The question arises whether every constitutional amendment that complies with the formal
provisions relating to amendments is constitutional. Alternatively, is it perhaps possible to recog-
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no formal constitution (such as England and New Zealand) - supra-
legislative status?
263
Fundamental principles reflect ideals. What makes them unique is
that they can be realized at different levels of intensity. When funda-
mental principles conflict, they do not cancel each other out. Instead,
the result of the conflict is a redefinition of the scope of each princi-
ple's boundary. The two conflicting principles continue to apply in the
legal system, and a proper balance is maintained between them.2 64
An important quality that characterizes principles - as discussed
by Dworkin2 65 - is that they have "weight." It is possible to resolve a
conflict between principles by means of "balancing" their respective
weights. The weight of a fundamental principle reflects its relative so-
cial importance, its place in the legal system, and its value within the
entire array of social values. Similarly, it is possible to speak of a
"gravitational force" of fundamental values. This gravitational force
varies according to the nature of the principles, their sources, and their
importance. William Eskridge rightly points out that "[p]ublic values
have a gravitational force that varies according to their source (the
Constitution, statutes, the common law) and the degree of our histori-
cal and contemporary commitment to these values.
2 6 6
How does the judge determine the "weights" of the various funda-
mental principles? The answer to this question is difficult. Legal sci-
ence has not yet developed a satisfactory "theory of values," and it is
questionable whether such a theory could ever be developed. But it is
certainly possible to say that a fundamental principle enshrined in a
superior norm, such as a constitution, is of greater "weight" than a
fundamental principle enshrined in an inferior norm, such as a statute
or common law. A judge can also take into account the weight given
to competing fundamental principles in the past. The judge must har-
monize the relative weight given to a fundamental principle in one
case (freedom of speech versus public safety) with the weight that
should be given to that fundamental principle in another case (freedom
of expression versus reputation). In doing so, the judge must aspire to
nize constitutional amendments as unconstitutional? See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 196, at 102-
03, iio. The most interesting judicial treatment of this issue comes from the Indian Supreme
court. In a series of decisions, the Court established that a constitutional amendment is unconsti-
tutional if it changes the constitution's basic structure and framework. See Matthew Abraham,
Judicial Role in Constitutional Amendment in India: The Basic Structure Doctrine, in THE
CREATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 195, 201-04 (Mads Andenas
ed., 2000).
263 See Sir Robin Cooke, Fundamentals, i988 N.Z. L.J. 158, 164; Lord Woolf of Barnes, Droit
Public -English Style, 1995 PUB. L. 57, 67.
264 1 discuss this issue further below and more extensively in section IV.C.
265 See DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 26-27.
266 Eskridge, supra note 248, at ioi8.
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uniformity and harmony. But we must admit that in certain cases the
matter is subject to judicial discretion.
There are many values and principles of substantive democracy. I
wish to discuss two of them: tolerance and good faith. "Democracy is
based on tolerance. This means tolerance for the acts and beliefs of
others. It also means tolerance for intolerance. In a pluralistic society
such as ours, tolerance is the unifying force that allows us to live to-
gether.'267 Indeed, "tolerance constitutes both an end and a means. It
constitutes a social goal in itself, which every democratic society
should aspire to realize. It serves as a means and a tool for balancing
between other social goals and reconciling them, in cases where they
conflict with one another. '268 As I have stated in one case:
Tolerance is a central value on the public agenda. If every individual in a
democratic society seeks to realize all of his desires, in the end society will
not be able to realize even a small number of its desires. Proper social life
is naturally based on reciprocal concessions and mutual tolerance.
2 6 9
Of course, tolerance has its limits.2 70  But although it is not an abso-
lute value, it is a central value to be considered and balanced against
others.
Tolerance means respect for the personal opinions and feelings of
every individual. Tolerance also means attempting to understand oth-
ers, even if they behave in a way that is unusual, and tolerance means
protecting opinions, ideas, and beliefs. Tolerance in religious-secular
relations, for example, means recognizing the existence of two impor-
tant human rights - freedom of religion and freedom from religion -
that require accommodation and compromise. Indeed, tolerance
means the willingness to compromise: compromise between the indi-
vidual and society and compromise between individuals. This will-
ingness to compromise does not mean waiving principles, but it does
mean waiving the use of all means to realize goals: "Tolerance is not a
slogan for accumulating rights, but a criterion for granting rights to
others."271
267 H.C. 399/85, Kahane v. Broad. Auth. Mgmt. Bd., 41(3) P.D. 255, 276-77 (Isr.) (citations
omitted).
268 C.A. 294/91, Jerusalem Cmty. Burial Soc'y v. Kestenbaum, 46(2) P.D. 464, 52 1 (Isr.).
269 C.A. 105/92, Re'em Eng'g Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth, 47(5) P.D.
189, 211.
270 See RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE
122-31 (1994); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Boundaries of Freedom of Expression Before and After
Prime Minister Rabin's Assassination, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF
TOLERANCE 79, 8i (Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., 2000); Mary Warnock, The Limits of Tolera-
tion, in ON TOLERATION 123, 139 (Susan Mendus & David Edwards eds., 1987). See generally
LEE BOLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1988); SUSAN MENDUS, JUSTIFYING
TOLERATION (1988); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
271 H.C. 257/89, Hoffman v. Dir. of the W. Wall, 48(2) P.D. 265, 354.
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The second principle of substantive democracy is good faith. I am
not referring to the subjective meaning of good faith, which is a lack
of evil intent. I am referring to its objective meaning, 27 2 which deter-
mines the standard of behavior for relationships among members of
society.27 3 In explaining this objective principle, I wrote in one opin-
ion:
The principle of good faith determines the mode of behavior of people that
life brings together. It establishes that this behavior must be honest and
fair as required by . . . society's sense of justice. By its very nature, the
principle of good faith constitutes an "open" criterion that reflects
... society's fundamental conceptions about the proper behavior between
people. The categories of good faith are never closed; they are never rigid
and they do not rest on their laurels. Good faith introduces into our sys-
tem a foundation of flexibility that allows the system to adapt itself to the
needs of changing life. It allows the law to bridge the gap between the
needs of the individual and the needs of society; between individualism
and community. It is a conduit through which the law absorbs new ideas.
Good faith does not assume benevolence. Good faith does not require a
person not to take account of his own personal interest. In this way, the
principle of good faith is different from the principle of fiduciary duty
(that applies to a director, agent, guardian, or civil servant). The principle
of good faith determines the standard of behavior for people concerned
with their own interest. The principle of good faith determines that pro-
tection of one's own interest must be done fairly and with consideration
for the justified expectations and proper reliance of the other party. Per-
son-to-person, one cannot behave like a wolf, but one is not required to be
an angel. Person-to-person, one must act like a person.
2 74
The main application of the principle of good faith is in private
law, for in public law the public authority has a heavier duty than the
one derived from the principle of good faith.2 7s The judge develops
private law using the principle of good faith, and uses good faith to
272 See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptu-
alization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 81o, 829-30 (1982).
273 This concept has been developed mainly in continental law, and especially in German law.
The German Civil Law Code provides (in English translation) that "[tihe debtor is bound to effect
performance according to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration to common usage."
§ 242 BGB. Israel has a similar provision, according to which every legal action, such as a con-
tract, must be executed in good faith. See The Contracts (General Part) Law, I973, 27 L.S.I. 123,
§ 39 (1972-73). Before legislation was enacted to this effect, Israeli common law recognized this
principle. On good faith in contract law, see STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON,
CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT
(i995); GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT. CONCEPT AND CONTEXT (Roger Brownsword, Norma
J. Hird & Geraint Howells eds., I999); GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
274 C.A. 6339/97, Roker v. Salomon, 55() P.D. 199, 279 (citations omitted).
275 The following interesting question has arisen in Israel: is the duty of the individual to the
state limited merely to good faith, or does the individual have a fiduciary duty to the state? See
H.C. 164/97, Kontris Ltd. v. Fin. Ministry, Customs Branch, 52(l) P.D. 289.
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interpret, for example, contracts27 6 and wills. The judge will consider
whether to void a contract that violates the principle of good faith.2 7
7
By relying on good faith, judges are able to fill a lacuna in a con-
tract2 7 8 or a will. Indeed, good faith constitutes one of the main tools
with which I fulfill my role as a judge. By virtue thereof, I have held
that every power given to an individual in private law should be exer-
cised in good faith, including procedural rights, 279 property rights,
280
contract negotiations, 281 and performance of contracts.2 8 2 Every rem-
edy in private law should be exercised in good faith.
C. Balancing and Weighing
From my judicial experience, I have learned that "balancing" and
"weighing," though neither essential nor universally applicable, are
very important tools in fulfilling the judicial role. Even where appli-
cable, however, they do not produce singular, unambiguous legal solu-
tions. Indeed, the main significance of balancing and weighing is the
order they lend to legal thinking rather than the particular legal judg-
ments they produce. To apply these tools, one must first identify the
relevant values and principles whose framework provides a necessary
context for balancing and weighing.283  These tools express the com-
plexity of the human being and of human relationships. They also ex-
276 See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Anderson, The World of a Contract, 72 IOWA L. REV. 861,
873 (I99O); Martijn Willem Hesselink, Good Faith, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE
285, 294 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 1998).
277 Judges did so in a number of countries during periods of extremely high inflation, including
Germany prior to World War II. See SHIRLEY RENNER, INFLATION AND THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS 12 (i999); KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 90 (1982); John P.
Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 17',
206 (934).
278 Good faith replaces the doctrine of implied terms. It is similar to the principle of reason-
ableness set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 (1979).
279 See C.A. 305/8o, Shilo v. Ratzkovsky, 35(3) P.D. 449.
280 See C.A. 6339/97, Roker v. Salomon, 55() PD. 199, 279.
281 This concept has not yet been recognized as a general legal principle in the United States.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 312 (1998); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precon-
tractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987).
282 This principle is accepted in United States law. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 281, § 7.17,
at 550-53.
283 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
946-47 (1987); Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 16, 23 (1988); Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1022, 1025 0978); Gerard V. La Forest, The Balancing of Interests Under the Charter, 2
NAT'L J. CONST. LAW 133, 134 (1992); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 319, 321 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293-94 (1992).
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press my eclectic approach, 28 4 which takes the entirety of the values
and interests into consideration, and which seeks to balance them ac-
cording to society's changing needs. I do not believe that one compre-
hensive theory can explain the complicated relationship between an
individual and society.285 Rather, I believe that jurists should balance
various theories and approaches, in recognition of the fact that law is
not all or nothing. Bridging the gap between law and society and pro-
tecting democracy demand accounting for this complexity. An expres-
sion of it can be given by means of the tools of "balancing" and
"weighing." Balancing and weighing, themselves metaphors, 286 reflect
the need to decide a conflict between values and principles that are ac-
cepted in the legal system.2 87  The result of the balance is important
both to the development of common law and to the determination of
objective purpose in a legal text (such as statutes and constitutions).2 88
The concept of balancing recognizes that fundamental principles may
conflict with one another, and that the proper resolution of this conflict
lies not in the elimination of the inferior value but in determining the
proper boundary between the conflicting values. Similarly, the concept
of "balance" reflects the recognition that fundamental principles have
"weight" and that it is possible to classify them according to their rela-
tive social importance. The act of "weighing" is merely a normative
act designed to give the principles their proper place in the law.
284 See infra p. 66.
285 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 124 (arguing that no single, all-encompassing theory
can successfully guide judges or provide definitive (or even sensible) answers to every constitu-
tional question).
286 See William J. Winslade, Adjudication and the Balancing Metaphor, in LEGAL
REASONING 403 (Hubert Hubien ed., 1971).
287 See H.C. 14/86, Laor v. Film & Play Review Bd., 41(l) P.D. 421, 434.
288 In a number of articles, Professor Richard Pildes has emphasized that judges who talk
about "balance" do not "balance" but rather only interpret. See Richard H. Pildes, Against Bal-
ancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711-12
(1994); Richard H. Pildes, The Structural Conception of Rights and Judicial Balancing, 6 REV.
CONST. STUD. 179, 188-89 (2002). I agree with Pildes that balancing is not an economic analysis
of costs and benefits. I also agree that, as far as a constitution or statute is concerned, we are in-
terested in interpreting the text. My claim is that, within the framework of interpreting a text and
determining its objective purpose, a balancing process takes place. For example, a statute origi-
nating from the time when Israel was under British mandatory rule provides that the High
Commissioner - today, the Minister of Interior - may close a newspaper if, in his discretion,
"any matter appearing in a newspaper is ... likely to endanger the public peace." Press Ordi-
nance, 1933, § 19(2)(a). In interpreting the word "likely," the Israeli Supreme Court has balanced
the right to freedom of speech with the interest in public peace, holding that "likely to endanger
the public peace" means there is near certainty that the publication will indeed harm the public
peace. See H.C. 73/53, "Kol HaAm" Co. v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.D. 871. The classification
that Pildes suggests does not negate the theory of balancing. It simply locates it within the
framework of the interpretive process. On this point, I agree with him, and I have acknowledged
as much in numerous opinions. See H.C. 693/91, Efrat v. Dir. of Population Register, 47(I) PD.
749; Cr.A. 6696/96, Kahana v. State of Israel, 52(l) P.D. 535.
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Naturally, acts of balancing and weighing are not scientific in na-
ture. They do not negate the existence of judicial discretion.2 89 None-
theless, they confine such discretion to those situations in which the le-
gal system fails otherwise to clarify the relative social status of the
conflicting values and principles. In this respect, one should not trade
one extreme for the other. Just as balancing and weighing do not ne-
gate judicial discretion entirely, these techniques also do not constitute
an open invitation for judicial discretion in every case. I should point
out that the doctrine of balancing has not been sufficiently developed
in the law. This is regrettable, since balancing is so central to fulfilling
the judicial role. I hope that jurisprudence will make a contribution to
answers for these questions. There have been some inroads in this
area. Consequently, I would like to consider several issues that have
arisen in the case law of the Supreme Court of Israel, which may fur-
ther the understanding of the balancing process.
i. Balancing Formulae. - The social status of a fundamental
principle is determined according to its relationship to all the princi-
ples of the legal system. We must compare different values of varying
weights. As I wrote in one of my opinions:
A social principle (such as freedom of expression) does not have "absolute"
weight. The weight of a social principle is always relative. The status of
a fundamental principle is always determined relative to other principles,
with which it may conflict. The weight of the freedom of speech relative
to the freedom of movement is different from its weight relative to judicial
integrity, both of these are different from the weight of the freedom of
speech relative to reputation or privacy, and all of these are different from
the weight of the freedom of speech relative to the public interest in secu-
rity and safety.290
The "balancing formula" reflects this relative value. The number
of balancing formulae will always exceed the number of conflicting
values, since within the limits of a given value (such as freedom of ex-
pression) there may be different levels of weight (political expression,
commercial expression, and so on). We should not search for only one
balancing formula to balance all of the conflicting principles.
2 91
2. Principled Balancing and Ad Hoc Balancing. - Balancing be-
tween fundamental principles may be principled or ad hoc. Principled
balancing determines a "weight" that is normative, leading to a legal
criterion or formula that can be applied in future cases. Thus, for ex-
ample, the principled balance between freedom of speech and public
safety in Israeli case law is that the state may restrict the freedom of
289 See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 352 (Max Knight trans., 1967) (196o).
290 C.A. I05/92, Re'em Eng'g Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth, 47(5) P.D.
189, 211.
291 See H.C. 2481/93, Dayan v. Jerusalem Dist. Comm'r, 48(2) P.D. 456.
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speech to protect public safety only if there is a near certainty that un-
restricted speech would severely compromise public safety.2 92 Ad hoc
balancing, by contrast, is not based on a general "formula" that can be
applied in similar cases other than the baseline determination that one
should balance the competing principles according to what the circum-
stances of the case require. Principled balancing is usually preferable
to ad hoc balancing. Judges should formulate a "rational principle"
that reflects "a criterion that incorporates a principled guideline,
'293
thus distancing themselves from a "random paternalistic criterion,
whose directions and nature cannot be anticipated.
'294
3. Vertical Balancing and Horizontal Balancing. - In several
opinions, I have discussed the distinction between two main types of
balancing: horizontal and vertical.2 9s Horizontal balancing occurs be-
tween values and principles of equal standing. This balancing will
happen, for example, when two constitutional human rights conflict
with one another. Thus, the freedom of speech may conflict with the
rights of privacy, reputation, or movement. Horizontal balancing ex-
presses the degree of reciprocal compromise that each of the funda-
mental principles must make, instructing judges to preserve the es-
sence of the conflicting principles by crafting reciprocal compromises
at the margins. This balancing attempts to ensure that the various
compromises are proportionate and to give "breathing space" to each
competing principle. One must avoid giving full expression to one
fundamental principle at the expense of another. Restrictions must
consider time, place, and manner, so that each of the competing prin-
ciples enjoys a substantive and real existence. Therefore, traffic con-
siderations should not necessarily preclude a demonstration in a city's
main streets, but the city may nevertheless reasonably restrict a dem-
onstration's time and manner. Horizontal balancing determines the
boundaries of the conflicting rights. The freedom of speech ends
where the right to reputation begins; the freedom of movement ends
where the freedom of demonstration begins.
Vertical balancing is different. The vertical balancing formula de-
termines the conditions under which certain fundamental principles
take precedence over others. This balancing occurs, for example,
when a human right is not fully protected because of the need to bal-
ance it with a state interest, such as public security or public order.
Thus, for example, an Israeli court has held that national security or
292 See "Kol HaAm" Co., 7 P.D. at 87!; Aharon Barak, Freedom of Expression and Its Limita-
tions, in CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR AND MEMORY OF ISAIAH
BERLIN 67, 179-80 (Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., 2000).
293 "Kol HaAm" Co., 7 P.D. at 881.
294 F.H. 9/77, Isr. Elec. Co. v. Haaretz Newspaper Publ'g Ltd., 32(3) PD. 337, 361.
295 See, e.g., Dayan, 48(2) P.D. at 475.
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public safety needs may restrict the freedom of speech or the freedom
of religion if there is a near certainty that actualizing these freedoms
will cause serious damage to national security or public safety.
29 6
Similarly, considerations of national security allow restriction of the
freedom of movement outside Israel if there is a genuine and serious
fear that granting this freedom will harm national security.2 97 Vertical
balancing does not determine the boundaries of the right that is being
infringed; rather, it determines the degree of protection that the legal
system affords a given right.298 Of course, the distinction between ver-
tical and horizontal balance is not absolute. In complex situations,
both types of balancing are required.
D. Justiciability or "Political Questions"
Another important tool that judges use to fulfill their role in a de-
mocracy is determining justiciability.299 That is, judges identify those
issues about which they ought not make a decision, leaving that deci-
sion to other branches of the state. 300 The more non-justiciability is
expanded, the less opportunity judges have for bridging law and soci-
ety and for protecting the constitution and democracy. Given these
consequences, I regard the doctrine of non-justiciability or "political
questions" with considerable wariness. I prefer - insofar as possible
- to examine an argument on its merits, or to consider abstaining
from a decision for lack of a cause of action rather than because of
non-justiciability.30 1 In many cases where my colleagues have dis-
missed claims on the grounds of non-justiciability, I dismissed on the
grounds that the disputed executive action was legal and therefore that
the claim should be dismissed on the merits. My approach does not
assume that the court is always the best institution to resolve disputes;
indeed, I accept that certain disputes are best decided elsewhere.
However, the court should not abdicate its role in a democracy merely
because it is uncomfortable or fears tension with the other branches of
the state. This tension not only fails to justify dismissing claims, but is
even desirable on occasion. 30 2 It is because of this tension that the
296 See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
297 See H.C. 448/85, Dahar v. Minister of Interior, 40(2) P.D. 701.
298 For the distinction between the scope of the right and the degree of protection afforded it,
see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89 (1982).
299 On justiciability and the political question doctrine, see generally i TRIBE, supra note 195,
§ 3-13, at 365-85; YAACOV S. ZEMACH, POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE COURTS (1976).
300 See Geoffrey Marshall, Justiciability, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 265, 269-
70 (A.G. Guest ed., I96I).
301 See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 621-22
(1976); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031,
1055 (1984); see also Hershkoff, supra note 27, at 1877-98.
302 See infra Part V.
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 97 2002-2003
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
freedom of the individual is guaranteed. True, the "passive virtues"
that Professor Alexander Bickel advocates so persuasively do have
great force. 30 3 Like everything, though, their power is relative and
must be balanced with their significant shortcomings. 30 4 Overall, the
benefit gained from a broad doctrine of non-justiciability is signifi-
cantly smaller than the benefit gained from a narrow one. Nonethe-
less, I know that many judges in the Anglo-American and other legal
systems think otherwise and regard the barrier of justiciability as a
proper protection of the court's effectiveness in other areas. Under ei-
ther view, the argument over this question goes to the heart of the ju-
dicial role, and for this reason is of fundamental importance. Below, I
discuss the nature of non-justiciability and the considerations motivat-
ing my aversion to it. I begin by making a distinction that seems to
me essential: between normative justiciability and institutional justi-
ciability.
305
i. Normative Justiciability. - Normative justiciability aims to an-
swer the question whether there are legal criteria for determining the
given dispute. This type of justiciability was discussed by Justice
Brennan, who said that a dispute is non-justiciable - or more cor-
rectly, raises a political question - if there is "a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it. ' 306 I reject this
approach. In my opinion, every dispute is normatively justiciable.
Every legal problem has criteria for its resolution. There is no "legal
vacuum." According to my outlook, law fills the whole world. There
is no sphere containing no law and no legal criteria. Every human act
is encompassed in the world of law. Every act can be "imprisoned"
within the framework of the law. Even actions of a clearly political
nature - such as waging war - can be examined with legal criteria,
as evidenced by the laws of war in international law. The mere fact
that an issue is "political" - that is, holding political ramifications and
predominant political elements - does not mean that it cannot be re-
solved by a court. Everything can be resolved by a court, in the sense
that law can take a view as to its legality. Of course, an activity's po-
litical nature may occasionally create a legal norm that, by the content
of the norm, gives broad discretion to the political authority to act as it
wishes. In that case, the political authority is then free to act within,
303 See BICKEL, supra note 138, at i i i; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42-58 (1961).
304 See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. i (1964).
305 See H.C. 9io/86, Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) P.D. 441. The two other Justices who
joined the majority, President Shamgar and Vice-President Ben-Porat, reserved judgment on
various aspects of my approach. For an English translation of the judgment, see ITZHAK ZAMIR
& ALLEN ZYSBLAT, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 275-302 (1996).
306 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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but not without, the law. Naturally, in a liberal system of law, the
premise is that the individual is free to do everything except what the
law prohibits, and the government may not restrict his or her conduct
without the law's authorization. This freedom of the individual is not
a freedom that operates outside the law, but rather a freedom that the
law recognizes. Once again, I do not claim that legal solutions are al-
ways the most important or the best; human relationships certainly ex-
tend beyond the law. I have already said that, in my opinion, the law
is a tool for regulating relationships between people, but of course this
tool is not the only one. My argument is instead jurisprudential -
that although not everything is law, there is law in everything.
Several rulings of the Supreme Court of Israel illustrate this point.
One case assessed the question whether a transitional or "lame-duck"
government - that is, a government that has resigned or does not
have the confidence of parliament and is awaiting impending elections
- is authorized to negotiate peace agreements.30 7 I said that it may
do so, if it is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. Several other
judges dismissed the action as non-justiciable. In my opinion, in the
absence of a specific relevant provision, this question was governed by
the general principles of administrative law, one of which is the prin-
ciple of reasonableness. Consequently, this principle produced the le-
gal criteria on which my decision turned.
Another case considered whether the Oslo Accords, signed by the
Israeli government and marking agreement with the Palestinians, were
null and void. I dismissed the petition, but not because no relevant le-
gal norm existed. 30  I certainly would have granted the petition had it
proved, for example, that Israel's negotiators received a bribe from the
Palestinian side. Instead, I dismissed the petition because the petition-
ers failed to show that the Israeli government secured the Accords
through unlawful, unreasonable conduct. I stated that different people
had different and conflicting opinions about the Oslo Accords, all of
which may fall within the zone of reasonableness.
In another petition, the Court assessed whether to prevent the re-
lease of a terrorist within the framework of a political "package
deal. '30 9  Again, I decided the petition using the concept of reason-
ableness, and I avoided resorting to the claim - which I think was in-
307 See H.C. 5167/00, Weiss v. Prime Minister, 55(2) PD. 455.
308 See H.C. 6057/99, Victims of Terrorism Ass'n v. Gov't of Israel (unreported); see also H.C.
3230/99, Elias v. Gov't of Israel (unreported); H.C. 884o/96, Elazra v. State of Israel (unreported);
H.C. 5934/95, Shilansky v. Prime Minister (unreported); H.C. 4o64/95, Porat v. Chairman of
Knesset, 49(4) RD. 177.
309 See H.C. 6315/97, Federman v. Prime Minister (unreported); H.C. 2455/94, "BeZedek" Or-
ganization v. Gov't of Israel (unreported); H.C. 5581/93, Victims of Arab Terrorism v. State of Is-
rael (unreported); H.C. 1403/91, Katz v. Gov't of Israel, 45(3) P.D. 353; H.C. 659/85, Bar Yosef-
Yoskovitz v. Minister of Police, 40(l) P.D. 785.
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correct - that there were no legal criteria for resolving the disputed
legal issue. Such criteria exist, according to which the release of ter-
rorists falls into the sphere of the executive authority's administrative
discretion. If I had been convinced that the release was, for example,
motivated by personal considerations or personal gain, I would not
have refrained from voiding the action.
In yet another case, the Israeli government held negotiations with
the Palestinian Authority concerning the future of various persons who
had holed themselves up inside the Church of the Nativity in Bethle-
hem while the Israeli army surrounded the church. The petitioners
argued that the Israeli government was not providing sufficient food to
those besieged in the church.310 The government argued that the peti-
tion should be dismissed because it was non-justiciable. I held that
customary international law regulated the provision of food, and that
the government was obliged to comply with that law. I further held
- after analyzing these rules and verifying the supply of food - that
the government had not violated these rules.
In a number of other judgments, the Supreme Court has considered
the legal scope of "political agreements" (mostly coalition agreements
among the parties forming the government or local councils). 311 The
normative framework exists, inter alia, in the general principles of ad-
ministrative law dealing with the restrictions that reasonableness and
proportionality impose on administrative discretion.
In a petition considered recently, we were asked to rule whether
the government should erect a security fence separating the state of Is-
rael from the areas of Palestinian autonomy. We dismissed the peti-
tion on the grounds that there could be different perspectives on the
erection of a border fence, all of which fell into the scope of reason-
ableness. 3 12  In Ressler v. Minister of Defense,3 13 I summarized the
doctrine of normative justiciability this way:
My approach is that where there is a legal norm, there are also legal crite-
ria that operate the norm. To say there are no legal criteria with which to
decide an issue means only that the legal norm that the petitioner argues
does not apply to the matter, but that another norm does apply to it. It
follows that the argument that the matter is not normatively justiciable is
merely the argument that the petitioner did not indicate a legal norm that
makes the executive action forbidden. Thus the argument about norma-
310 See H.C. 3451/02, Almadani v. Minister of Def., 56(3) P.D. 30.
311 See, e.g., H.C. 5364/94, Walner v. Chairman of Israeli Labor Party, 49() P.D. 758; H.C.
2285/93, Nahum v. Mayor of Petah-Tikva, 48(5) P.D. 63o; H.C. 4248/91, Natanzon v. Mayor of
Holon, 46(2) P.D. '94; H.C. 1635/90, Jerjevsky v. Prime Minister, 45(1) P.D. 749; H.C. 16oi/9o,
Shalit v. Peres, 44(3) P.D. 353. For a critical analysis of the case law, see David Kretzmer, Politi-
cal Agreements: A Critical Introduction, 26 1SR. L. REV. 407 (1992).
312 See H.C. 3460/02, HaLevy v. Prime Minister (unreported).
313 H.C. 9IO/86, Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) P.D. 441.
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tive non-justiciability is merely an argument that there is no cause of ac-
tion. In accepting an argument of normative non-justiciability, the Court
does not evade a consideration of the legality of the action. On the con-
trary, it adopts an attitude with regard to the legality of the action and de-
termines that it is legal....
The question arises as to whether every executive or administrative
decision is justiciable. For example, are going to war and making peace
also "justiciable" decisions that may be "confined" to a legal norm and a
judicial proceeding? My answer is yes. Even with regard to war and
peace we must determine which branch is competent to make the decision
and what is the nature of its considerations (for example, the prohibition
of personal corruption). It is of course possible to determine - and this
question is open and difficult - that the other restrictions governing the
use of administrative discretion do not apply. In this last case, the petition
will be dismissed not because of its non-justiciability, but because the ac-
tion is legal. In summary, the doctrine of normative justiciability (or non-
justiciability) seems to me to have no independent existence.
3 14
2. Institutional Justiciability. - Whereas normative justiciability
focuses on whether legal criteria exist to adjudicate a dispute, institu-
tional justiciability concerns the question whether the dispute should
be adjudicated in a court of law at all. As I wrote in Ressler:
A dispute is not institutionally justiciable if the dispute ought not to be
decided according to legal criteria in the court. Institutional justiciability
therefore deals with the question whether the law and the court are the
proper frameworks for deciding the dispute. The question is not whether
it is possible to decide the dispute according to the law and in court; the
answer to that question is yes. The question is whether it is desirable to
decide the dispute - which is normatively justiciable - according to le-
gal criteria in court.
3 15
This aspect of non-justiciability was discussed by Justice Brennan,
who said:
[A dispute is non-justiciable if there is] a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; ... or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
3 16
This reasoning is unconvincing. Consider the first non-justiciable
matter mentioned by Justice Brennan, namely the determination of a
question entrusted to a political authority. This is in fact the case with
314 Id. at 483-88.
315 Id. at 488-89.
316 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 217 (1962).
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regard to all of the issues that are considered in constitutional or ad-
ministrative law. That a certain matter is entrusted exclusively to one
branch of the state is not a permit for that branch to act contrary to
the constitution or a statute. When a certain provision of law gives
authority to a branch of government, it still requires the branch to act
lawfully within the framework of that authority. The provision also
gives the courts the authority to interpret it in order to determine the
scope of its application and to decide if it was exercised lawfully. En-
trusting a decision about a certain act to a branch of state does not
mean that the question of the legality of that act is also entrusted to
that branch of state. On the contrary, "the final and decisive interpre-
tive decision about a statute that is in force at any given time rests
with the court, and, regarding issues submitted for consideration
within the court system, the final decision lies with the highest
court. ' '3 17 It follows that determining the legality of an act whose per-
formance is entrusted to a particular branch of the state should not be
regarded as non-justiciable.
The second type of dispute Justice Brennan called non-justiciable is
one that is impossible to resolve judicially without expressing disre-
spect for coordinate branches of the state.318 This reasoning is unper-
suasive. All constitutional and administrative laws determine criteria
for the legality of the behavior of government. The court must do its
job and determine whether the government acted unlawfully, without
letting considerations of respect for coordinate branches of the state
inhibit its decision. As I have written:
[T]he role of the court is to interpret the statute, and sometimes, the
court's interpretation is different from that of another governmental
branch. It is inconceivable that preferring the judicial interpretation to
the interpretation of the other branch (whether executive or legislative)
expresses disrespect for that branch. How can we intervene in the actions
of the executive, if we take the attitude that we are being disrespectful to
it whenever we interpret the law contrary to its opinion? . . . [T]here is no
disrespect to the other branches, when each branch fulfills its constitu-
tional role and does what the law has ordered it to do. When the court in-
terprets the law, it carries out its role, and if its interpretation is different
from the one acceptable to the other branches, it advises them of their
mistake, and in doing so it expresses disrespect for them.3 19
I made a similar point in Ressler: "The important question is not re-
spect for one branch or another. The important question is respect for
the law. Personally, I cannot see how insisting that a branch of the
317 H.C. 3o6/8I, Flotto-Sharon v. Knesset Comm., 35(4) P.D. ioi, 141.
318 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
319 H.C. 73/85, "Kach" Faction v. Chairman of Knesset, 39(3) P.D. 141, 163.
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state respect the law can harm that branch or undermine the relation-
ship between it and the other branches."
320
One could argue that institutional non-justiciability is implicit in
the principle of the separation of powers. I cannot accept this argu-
ment. The separation of powers is not a permit for a branch of the
state to violate the constitution or a statute. Admittedly, it is natural
for a political branch to take political considerations into account, but
to the same degree it is also natural that the judiciary should examine
whether these political considerations - no matter how prudent they
are - are consistent with constitutional or statutory law. As I wrote
in Ressler:
There is nothing in the principle of separation of powers that can justify
negating judicial review of government acts, whatever their character may
be, and whatever their content may be. On the contrary, the principle of
separation of powers is what justifies judicial review of the acts of the
government, even if they are of a political nature, since it ensures that
every branch acts lawfully within its sphere, thus guaranteeing the separa-
tion of powers.
32 '
Nor is recognition of institutional non-justiciability implicit in the
concept of democracy itself. The formal aspect of democracy - the
rule of the majority - does not justify negating judicial involvement
where the argument is that the action is contrary to the constitution or
a statute. The substantive aspect of democracy - the rights of the in-
dividual - does not justify negating judicial review either. On the
contrary, judicial review usually aims to protect the individual and en-
sure his freedom, thereby promoting democracy. As I wrote in Ressler:
[T]his judicial review keeps a democratic system working properly. It
aims to guarantee, on the one hand, that the opinion of the majority finds
proper expression within the legal frameworks established by the regime
(constitution, statute, subordinate legislation, administrative rules) and
does not depart from these frameworks, and that executive action is car-
ried out within the legal framework determined by the majority through
its vote in the legislature; it aims to ensure, on the other hand, that the
majority does not harm individual rights, unless the law authorizes it.
Democracy is not harmed by judicial review invalidating actions by other
branches of the state which do take political considerations into account,
when those branches act unlawfully. Note that the court does not criticize
the internal logic or practical efficiency of such political considerations.
The court considers their legality. This evaluation does not undermine
democracy in any way. Nothing in democracy authorizes the majority to
act contrary to the statute for whose legislation it is responsible. Even the
most political of decisions must anchor themselves in lawful decisions. In
a democracy, law is not politics, and politics is subject to law. There is
320 Ressler, 42(2) P.D. at 490.
321 Id. at 491.
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 103 2002-2003
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
therefore nothing in the principles of democracy that justifies institutional
non-justiciability.
322
3. Justiciability and Public Confidence. - All that remains is the
argument that institutional non-justiciability is justified because it pro-
tects the court itself from a "politicization of the judiciary" that could
undermine public confidence in judicial objectivity. The argument is
that the general public is not aware of the fine distinctions I have dis-
cussed and that it may mistake a judicial ruling that a government act
of a clearly political nature is lawful or unlawful for a judicial ruling
on the propriety of the act. In one case, the Israeli Supreme Court
ruled that the expropriation of land in an area under Israeli military
occupation for the purpose of establishing a settlement was unlaw-
ful.3 23 The Court rejected the argument that the issue of settlement
construction in occupied territories was non-justiciable, since review-
ing individual harm is justiciable and the settlement construction al-
legedly harmed an individual's property right. On this point, Justice
Landau said:
This time we have proper sources for our decision and we do not need -
indeed, we are even forbidden, when sitting on the bench - to involve
our personal views as citizens of the State. But there is still serious cause
for concern that the court will be seen to have abandoned its proper
sphere and to have entered the arena of public debate, and that our deci-
sion will be welcomed by part of the public with cheers and be wholly and
fiercely rejected by the other. In this sense, I see myself here as someone
whose duty it is to rule according to the law on every matter that is law-
fully brought before the court. I am compelled to do so, even though I
knew from the outset that the general public will not pay attention to the
legal reasoning but only the final conclusion, and that the proper status of
the court, as an institution above the disputes that divide the public, is
likely to be undermined. But what can we do? This is our role and our
duty as judges.
3 24
Indeed, the public confidence argument is, in my opinion, problem-
atic. Public confidence may be undermined if the court decides a dis-
pute containing a political aspect, but it also may be undermined if the
court refrains from deciding it. Moreover, public confidence relates
not just to the content of the judicial decision, but to its motive. It
would be a great mistake - a mistake likely to undermine public con-
fidence - to refrain from making a decision merely because the deci-
sion may undermine public confidence. The role of the court is to ad-
judicate disputes, even if the public or some portion of it does not like
the outcome. For these reasons, I think that the United States Su-
322 Id.
323 H.C. 390/79, Dawikat v. Gov't of Israel, 34(l) P.D. i.
324 Id. at 4.
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preme Court rightly decided to hear Bush v. Gore325 rather than ab-
stain on grounds of non-justiciability. 326 The issue was justiciable -
both normatively and institutionally - and the Court did well to rule
on it.327
Thus, the doctrine of institutional non-justiciability is very prob-
lematic. 32 8  A number of democratic countries reject it: The German
Constitutional Court has rejected it.329 The Supreme Court of Canada
has not adopted it.33° The Supreme Court of Israel has also rejected it
in many cases loaded with political tension. In one case, for example,
the Court was required to review the validity of a pretrial pardon
granted by the President of the state to the head of the Israeli General
Security Services and to a number of its agents for illegal acts that
they committed. 331  The Israeli public was divided on this question.
The Court decided that the President may grant pretrial pardons. We
unanimously rejected the argument of non-justiciability. In another
case, the Court held that exceptional methods of interrogation (sleep
deprivation, loud music, head covering, and painful sitting positions)
employed by the Israeli security services against terrorists were illegal
even if used to prevent the explosion of a "ticking bomb. ''332  This
question, too, was the subject of significant public dispute, but the
Court did not refrain from deciding it because of non-justiciability.
Even though I am critical of the doctrine of non-justiciability, I
cannot say that it should never be used. In a number of cases, Israeli
judges, myself included, have resorted to it.333  I should point out,
however, that I prefer to dismiss a petition for lack of a cause of action
325 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
326 For an opposite view, see Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH V. GORE:
THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 129 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Jeffrey Rosen, Political
Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism, in BUSH V. GORE, supra, at 145.
327 Note that I do not express an opinion on the content of the decision, as I am not familiar
with the details of the legal issue.
328 My approach has been criticized in Israel. See, e.g., RUTH GAVISON, MORDECHAI
KREMNITZER & YOAR DOTAN, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, FOR AND AGAINS'. THE ROLE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 84 (1990).
329 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 170 (1994).
330 See Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 455 ("[C]abinet decisions fall
under s. 32(i)a of the Charter and are therefore reviewable in the courts and subject to judicial
scrutiny for compatibility with the Constitution."); HOGG, supra note 103, at 8io ("[I]t is clear that
there is no political questions doctrine in Canada."). But see LORNE SOSSIN, BOUNDARIES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY IN CANADA i99 (i999) ("Based on the vari-
ous settings in which Canadian courts have held political disputes to be non-justiciable, the view
that Canada has no 'political questions' doctrine would seem in need of reappraisal.").
331 See H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 5o5.
332 See H.C. 5 100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817.
333 See infra pp. 131-32 (concerning restrictions on the scope of a court's involvement in ad-
ministrative decisions of legislative organs).
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rather than for institutional non-justiciability. In cases where my col-
leagues on the bench dismissed petitions because of institutional non-
justiciability, I also found that the case should be dismissed, but not
due to non-justiciability; rather, I found that the challenged act fell
within a broad zone of reasonableness, and was thus lawful. Focusing
on the legality of the act rather than on institutional non-justiciability
increases public confidence in the state and allows the supreme court
to realize its role in a democracy. 334
E. Standing
The issue of standing appears to be marginal in public law. This is
certainly the case if one adopts the view that only a person who has
experienced an injury in fact possesses standing. But if we liberalize
the tests for standing, we will usher in a new era for judicial decision-
making whose ramifications are far greater than the issue of standing
itself. This is the case because liberal rules of standing enable courts
to hear matters that ordinarily would not find their way before a court.
Take, for example, the case I mentioned of the pretrial pardon given
by the President of the state of Israel to the head of the General Secu-
rity Services and his men.335 A private lawyer brought the petition to
the Court. If the Supreme Court had restricted standing to those who
suffer an injury in fact, the pardon's legality would not have been re-
viewed since only a few persons in Israel, if any, would have had
standing to challenge it. However, the liberal rules of standing
adopted in Israel opened the door to judicial review of the pretrial
pardon and the scope of the President's discretion. Liberal rules of
standing have also allowed judicial review of claims challenging the
legality of civil servants' behavior even where no individual interests
were harmed. The ordinary citizen would normally have no standing
in these cases. The Court can consider these questions only if it adopts
a liberal approach to the rules of standing. The following are several
questions the Supreme Court of Israel has been able to consider be-
cause of its liberal standing rules: Did the Attorney General exercise
his discretion properly in deciding not to indict someone? 336 Did the
Prime Minister exercise his discretion properly when he decided not to
dismiss a cabinet minister against whom an indictment had been is-
334 A bill proposed by legislators in the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) this year provided that
"[m]ilitary matters of an operational or combat character are not justiciable, and courts may not
address them." The bill did not pass. Draft bill amending the BASIC LAW: THE JUDICIARY,
(presented to the Chairman of the Knesset May 20, 2002).
335 See Barzilai, 40(3) P.D. at 505.
336 See H.C. 935/89, Ganor v. Attorney Gen., 44(2) P.D. 485.
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sued for bribery and embezzlement of public funds?337 Did the Minis-
ter of Justice exercise his discretion properly in deciding not to extra-
dite someone suspected of committing a crime outside Israel?338 Did
the government act lawfully when it held political negotiations over a
peace agreement at a time when it did not have the confidence of Par-
liament?339 Did a parole board act lawfully when it reduced a sen-
tence imposed by a civil 340 or military341 court?
Another standing issue involves a person whose right has been
harmed, but who refrains from suing. The recognition that another
party may sue - in most cases, human rights groups operating in the
country - allows the court to review the legality of the harm suffered.
Examples from the Israeli experience include Supreme Court recogni-
tion of the Israel Women's Network's standing to petition the Court to
enforce the provisions of the Government Corporations Law directing
that the composition of boards of directors should include members of
both sexes342 and Supreme Court recognition of a citizen watchdog
group's standing in various petitions intended to ensure proper and
honest administration of the law.
343
.r. Standing and the Judicial Role. - How a judge applies the
rules of standing is a litmus test for determining his approach to his
judicial role.344 A judge who regards his role as deciding a dispute be-
tween persons with rights - and no more - will tend to emphasize
the need for an injury in fact. By contrast, a judge who regards his
judicial role as bridging the gap between law and society and protect-
ing (formal and substantive) democracy will tend to expand the rules
of standing. I wrote the following in Ressler, a judgment that led to
the liberalization of Israel's standing rules:
337 See H.C. 4267/93, Amitai: Citizens for Proper Admin. & Integrity v. Prime Minister of Isr.,
47(5) PD. 44I; H.C. 3094/93, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Gov't of Israel, 47(5) P.D. 404.
338 See H.C. 852/86, Aloni v. Minister of Justice, 41(2) P.D. i.
339 See H.C. 5 167/00, Weiss v. Prime Minister, 55(2) P.D. 455.
340 See H.C. 192o/oo, Galon v. Parole Bd., 54(2) P.D. 313; H.C. 89/Ol, Pub. Comm. Against Tor-
ture v. Parole Bd., 55(2) P.D. 838.
341 See H.C. 3959/99, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Sentencing Review Comm., 53(3) P.D.
721.
342 See H.C. 453/94, Isr. Women's Network v. Gov't of Israel, 48(5) P.D. 501.
343 See H.C. 6673/01, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Minister of Transp. (not yet reported);
H.C. 932/99, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Chairman of Appointments Review Comm., 53(3)
P.D. 769; H.C. 3073/99, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Minister of Educ., 44(3) PD. 529; H.C.
6972/96, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Attorney Gen., 51(2) P.D. 757; H.C. 2533/77, Movement
for Quality Gov't v. Gov't of Israel, 51(3) P.D. 46.
344 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("Like their constitutional counterparts,
these 'judicially self-imposed limits [i.e. standing] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction' are
'founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic
society' . . . ." (citations omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992); Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea
- the idea of separation of powers.").
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You cannot formulate the rules of standing if you do not formulate for
yourself an outlook on the role of these rules in public law. In order to
formulate an outlook about the nature and role of the rules of standing,
you must adopt a position on the role of judicial review in the field of pub-
lic law .... [I]n order to formulate an outlook with regard to the role of
judicial review, you must adopt a position on the judicial role in society
and the status of the judiciary among the other branches of the state. A
judge whose judicial philosophy is based merely on the view that the role
of the judge is to decide a dispute between persons with existing rights is
very different from a judge whose judicial philosophy is enshrined in the
recognition that his role is to create rights and enforce the rule of law.
345
As can be seen from this Foreword and from a long list of judg-
ments, my approach is that the role of the supreme court in a democ-
racy is not restricted to adjudicating disputes in which parties claim
that their personal rights have been violated. I believe that my role as
a judge is to bridge the gap between law and society and to protect
democracy. It follows that I also favor expanding the rules of standing
and releasing them from the requirement of an injury in fact. The Su-
preme Court of Israel has adopted this approach.3 46 Gradually - at
first in minority opinions of justices in the I96os and 197os, and there-
after as a majority - we have adopted the view that when the claim
alleges a major violation of the rule of law (in its broad sense), every
person in Israel has legal standing to sue. Fears that the court would
be "flooded" with frivolous lawsuits have proven groundless. In prac-
tice, it is primarily citizen watchdog groups and human rights organi-
zations that have exploited this provision. I think that, overall, the
outcome has been positive. I was happy to learn that the Republic of
South Africa adopted a similar solution in its Constitution. Section 38,
applicable only to the Bill of Rights, provides that:
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened,
and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of
rights. The persons who may approach a court are:
(a) Anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own
name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
34 7
345 H.C. gio/86, Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) PD. 441, 458.
346 See generally ZEEV SEGAL, THE RIGHT OF STANDING IN THE HIGH COURT OF
JUSTICE (1984).
347 S. AFR. CONST. § 34.
[Vol. 116:16
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 108 2002-2003
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
Like the Israeli Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of India has
reached a similar result by adopting a liberal standing doctrine. 348
2. Standing and the Rule of Law. - The rules of standing are
closely related to the principle of rule of law. Closing the doors of the
court to a petitioner with no injury in fact who warns of a public
body's unlawful action means giving that public body a free hand to
act without fear of judicial review. The result is the creation of "dead
areas" in which a legal norm exists but the public body is free to vio-
late it without the possibility of judicial review. Such a situation may
lead in the end to a violation of the legal norm, undermining the rule
of law and undermining democracy. As I wrote in one case: "When
there is no judge, there is no law. The ability to turn to the court is
the cornerstone of the rule of law. '349 Naturally, even without judicial
review the law itself exerts a strong gravitational pull that shapes the
way people act. Furthermore, there are other means - for example,
public opinion or legislative review - of reviewing executive actions.
Where these methods of supervision are effective, they may suffice.
But where there is no tradition of executive self-restraint, and where
the other means of review are insufficient, judicial review is critical.
3. Standing and the Separation of Powers. - Does giving the
"public petitioner" (actio popularis) standing undermine the separation
of powers, which in itself forms a basis for the rules of standing? Can
it be said that where there is no interest, there is no dispute (lis), and
that the existence of a dispute is an essential condition for exercising
judicial power? Does allowing a public petitioner to activate the exer-
cise of judicial power, therefore, undermine the very principle of sepa-
ration of powers? 350 In my opinion, the answer to these questions is
"no." I accept that where there is no dispute, there can be no exercise
of the judicial function. But this requirement makes no demand with
regard to the nature of the dispute:
31
348 See Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the
Impossible, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 498-99 (1989). See also Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. i981
S.C. 87, 218-20.
349 Ressler, 42(2) P.D. at 462.
350 For an argument that the answer is "yes," see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, i7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 88I (1983). Cf. I
TRIBE, supra note 195, § 3-14, at 386 (noting the general requirement of "injury in fact" for stand-
ing in the United States).
351 See HANS KLINGHOFFER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (1957) ("The concept of the dispute
between the parties (lis inter partes) has no a priori test with regard to the nature of the dispute.
Legal logic does not require us to regard certain matters as matters that may serve as the subject
of a dispute, while excluding other matters from the possibility of being the subject of a dispute.
This depends entirely on the positive legal arrangement .... [Jiudging in the functional sense has
a priori no objective test. Judging takes place with regard to those matters with respect to which
positive law gives the procedure a form of a dispute.").
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[W]hat characterizes judging is the decision between claims .... Some-
times it is not the right that creates the dispute, but the dispute that cre-
ates the right. If a right is a desire or interest protected by law, then it is
through the judicial decision, which provides the law's protection, that the
right itself is created. It follows that the judicial nature of the function is
determined not by the content of the dispute but by its very existence.
35 2
I take issue with a standing doctrine under which someone who
claims that a public body unlawfully took his private money can resort
to the courts, but someone who claims that a public body unlawfully
took public money cannot. What is the principled argument, based on
jurisprudence and the doctrine of separation of powers, to justify this
distinction? In my view, recognition of the standing of the public peti-
tioner closes the "circle of standing." This circle begins with the re-
quirement that, to have standing, a petitioner have a definable right
that the government has violated. At the next level, the courts recog-
nize the standing of a petitioner with an interest in a governmental ac-
tion but no definable right. At the subsequent level, courts recognize
the standing of a petitioner with no tangible interest but who com-
plains of a substantial breach of the rule of law. Finally, the circle
culminates with the realization that the petitioner's right to insist upon
governmental compliance with the rule of law is imputed to the peti-
tioner by his very status as a member of society. Thus, the "circle of
standing" concept is based on the recognition that standing, at its core,
derives from membership in society.
F. Comparative Law
i. The Importance of Comparative Law. - I have found compara-
tive law to be of great assistance in realizing my role as a supreme
court judge. The case law of the supreme courts of the United States,
Australia, and Canada, of United Kingdom courts, and of the German
Constitutional Court have helped me significantly in finding the right
path to follow. Indeed, comparing oneself to others allows for greater
self-knowledge. With comparative law, the judge "expands the hori-
zon and the interpretive field of vision. Comparative law enriches the
options available to us."'35 3 In different legal systems, similar legal in-
stitutions often fulfill corresponding roles, and similar legal problems
(like hate speech, privacy, and now the fight against terrorism) arise.
35 4
To the extent that these similarities exist, comparative law becomes an
352 Ressler, 42(2) P.D. at 465.
353 C.A. 295/81, Estate of Sharon Gavriel v. Gavriel, 36(4) P.D. 533, 542-43.
354 See The Police v. Georghiades, (983) 2 C.L.R. 33, 50-54, 6o-65, in which Justice Pikis
compared different national and international legal systems to give content to the right of privacy.
It was decided by the Supreme Court of Cyprus that the right of privacy applies not only vis-h-vis
the state, but also within the relationships between individuals.
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important tool with which judges fulfill their role in a democracy ("mi-
crocomparison").355 Moreover, because many of the basic principles of
democracy are common to democratic countries, there is good reason
to compare them ("macrocomparison").35 6 Indeed, different democratic
legal systems often encounter similar problems. Examining a foreign
solution may help a judge choose the best local solution. This useful-
ness applies both to the development of the common law and to the
interpretation of legal texts.
Naturally, one must approach comparative law cautiously, remain-
ing cognizant of its limitations. Comparative law is not merely the
comparison of laws. A useful comparison can exist only if the legal
systems have a common ideological basis. The judge must be sensitive
to the uniqueness of each legal system. Nonetheless, when the judge is
convinced that the relative social, historical, and religious circum-
stances create a common ideological basis, it is possible to refer to a
foreign legal system for a source of comparison and inspiration. In-
deed, the importance of comparative law lies in extending the judge's
horizons. Comparative law awakens judges to the potential latent in
their own legal systems. It informs judges about the successes and
failures that may result from adopting a particular legal solution. It
refers judges to the relationship between a solution to the legal prob-
lem before them and other legal problems. Thus, comparative law
acts as an experienced friend. Of course, there is no obligation to refer
to comparative law. Additionally, even when comparative law is con-
sulted, the final decision must always be "local." The benefit of com-
parative law is in expanding judicial thinking about the possible ar-
guments, legal trends, and decisionmaking structures available.
2. Comparative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes. - Com-
parative law is an important source from which the judge may learn
the objective purpose of a statute. 357 This is the case with regard to
both the specific purpose ("microcomparison") and the general purpose
("macrocomparison") of the statute. The comparison is relevant even
if it is clear that the legislature was not inspired by foreign law. In
looking for the specific statutory purpose, a judge may be inspired by a
similar statute in a foreign democratic legal system. This is so when
he wishes to learn of the purpose underlying legislation that regulates
355 See I KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 5
(Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987).
356 See id. at 4-5.
357 For a discussion of comparative law and the courts, see generally THE USE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999); Giinter Franken-
berg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1985); H.
Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal Practice: On Removing the Borders, 75 TUL. L. REV.
977 (2001).
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a legal "institution," such as an agency or a lease. The judge does not
refer to the details of the foreign laws. Rather, he examines the func-
tion that the legal institution fulfills in the two systems. If there is a
similarity in the functions, he may find interpretive ideas about the
(objective) purpose of the legislation. An example of this potential use
is the principle of good faith in executing a contract. To the extent
that this principle fulfills a similar function in different legal systems,
it is possible to use the law of a foreign system to discern the purpose
that underlies the principle of good faith in local law. Moreover, it is
possible to use comparative law - from other national systems and
from international law - to determine the general (objective) purpose
that reflects the basic principles of the system. Again, however, this
comparative analysis is possible only if the two legal systems share a
common ideological basis.
3. Comparative Law and Interpretation of the Constitution.
Comparative law can help judges determine the objective purpose of a
constitution. Democratic countries have several fundamental princi-
ples in common. As such, legal institutions often fulfill similar func-
tions across countries. From the purpose that one given democratic
legal system attributes to a constitutional arrangement, one can learn
about the purpose of that constitutional arrangement in another legal
system. Indeed, comparative constitutional law is a good source of ex-
panded horizons and cross-fertilization of ideas across legal systems. 35 8
This is clearly the case when the constitutional text of one country has
been influenced by the constitutional text of another. But even in the
absence of any (direct or indirect) influence of one constitutional text
on another, there is still a basis for interpretive inspiration. An exam-
ple is where a constitution refers expressly to democratic values or
democratic societies.3 5 9  But even without such a reference, the
interpretive influence of comparative law is proper. 360 This is the case
358 See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(ig9); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (gg9); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a
Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 695-96 (1998); Christopher McCrudden, A Com-
mon Law of Human Rights? ransnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HISTORY 29 (Katherine O'Donovan & Gerry R. Rubin eds.,
2ooo); Kathryn A. Perales, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not Here? Comparative Law and
Constitutional Federalism, 23 VT. L. REV. 885 (ig); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, lO8 YALE L.J. 1225 (i999); Lorraine Weinrib, Constitutional Con-
ceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
359 See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § I; S. AFR. CONST.
§ 36(I); see also David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM.
J. COMP. L. 79, 102-09 (2001).
360 See Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 MARSHALL J.
PRACS. & PROCS. 685 (1976).
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with regard to determining the scope of human rights, resolving par-
ticularly difficult issues such as abortion and the death penalty, and
determining constitutional remedies.
Nonetheless, as we have seen, interpretive inspiration is only
proper if there is an ideological basis common to the two legal systems
and a common allegiance to basic democratic principles. A common
basis of democracy is, however, a necessary but insufficient condition
for comparative analysis. As judges, we must also examine whether
there is anything in the historical development and social conditions
that makes the local and the foreign system different enough to render
interpretive inspiration impracticable. 36 1 But when there is an ade-
quate similarity, interpretive inspiration is proper. This is the case
with regard to inspiration from the law of another democratic country.
It is also the case with regard to interpretive inspiration from interna-
tional law, as various international conventions enshrine constitutional
values.36 These conventions influence the formation of the objective
purpose of different constitutional texts. 363 The case law of interna-
tional and national courts that interpret these conventions ought to
serve as a basis for the interpretation of the constitutions of various
nations.
4. Use of Comparative Law in Practice. - The use of comparative
law for the development of the common law and the interpretation of
legal texts is determined by the tradition of the legal system. Israeli
law, for example, makes extensive use of comparative law. When the
Supreme Court of Israel encounters an important legal problem, it fre-
quently examines foreign law. Reference to United States law,
36 4
United Kingdom law, Canadian law, and Australian law is common-
place. Those with the linguistic ability also refer to Continental law,
361 See R. v. Keegstra [1990], 3 S.C.R. 897, 740; Rahey v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639
("While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional
jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in
the United States Constitution, they should be wary of drawing too ready a parallel between con-
stitutions born to different countries in different ages and in very different circumstances.");
HOGG, supra note 103, at 827.
362 For the products of some of the most important international conventions, see International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. i9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. i6, 1966, 993
U.N.TS. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 195o, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official
Rec., OEA/Ser. L./V./II.23 , doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, pt. i, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/8io (1948).
363 See, e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1998) 195 C.L.R. 513,655.
364 See Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (I98I).
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and sometimes we use English translations of Continental (mainly
German, French, and Italian) legal literature.
In countries of the British Commonwealth, there is much cross-
fertilization. Each such nation refers to United Kingdom case law.
United Kingdom judges refer to Commonwealth case law, and Com-
monwealth judges, in turn, refer to each other's case law. The Su-
preme Court of Canada is particularly noteworthy for its frequent and
fruitful use of comparative law. 365 As such, Canadian law serves as a
source of inspiration for many countries around the world.
Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court makes very little use
of comparative law.366 Many democratic countries derive inspiration
from the United States Supreme Court, particularly in its interpreta-
tion of the U.S. Constitution. 367  By contrast, most Justices of the
United States Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their
judgments. They fail to make use of an important source of inspira-
tion, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and
strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different legal sys-
tems. Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 of the Canadian Supreme Court
has rightly observed that "[i]f we continue to learn from each other, we
as judges, lawyers, and scholars will contribute in the best possible
way not only to the advancement of human rights but to the pursuit of
justice itself, wherever we are. ' 368 Of course, American law in general,
and its constitutional law in particular, is rich and developed. Ameri-
can law is comprised of not one but fifty-one legal systems. Nonethe-
less, I think that it is always possible to learn new things even from
other democratic legal systems that, in their turn, have learned from
American law. As Judge Guido Calabresi rightly said: "Wise parents
do not hesitate to learn from their children. '369
365 See Anne Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 295, 310 (Benedetto Conforti &
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).
366 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ii (1997) ("Justice Breyer's dissent would
have us consider the benefits that other countries, and the European Union, believe they have de-
rived from federal systems that are different from ours. We think such comparative analysis in-
appropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369
n.i (1989) ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, reject-
ing the contention of petitioners and their various amici . . . that the sentencing practices of other
countries are relevant."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("The plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account of what it pronounces to be
civilized standards of decency in other countries ... is totally inappropriate as a means of estab-
lishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation.").
367 See Gerald V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L.
REV. 211 (1994); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 537 (1988).
368 See L'Heureux-Dub, supra note 25, at 247.
369 United States v. Then, 56 F.3 d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
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G. A Good Philosophy
I will conclude my discussion of the tools for realizing the judicial
role with an important tool: a good philosophy. Maybe philosophy
ought not to be called a tool in the hands of a judge. My intention is
merely to say that the most practical instrument for a judge is good
philosophy. I am referring to several types of philosophy: philosophy
of life, philosophy of law, philosophy of judging. A full discussion of
this complex subject is outside the scope of this Foreword, but I would
like to make three points.
First, I consider it essential that a supreme court judge in a democ-
racy have the tools to allow him to understand the philosophical dia-
logue through which he may participate in the search for truth, the
limits of the human mind, and the role of human beings. Many judges
whom I have met are frustrated philosophers because they have not
been given the opportunity to participate in this rich dialogue. Per-
sonally, I enjoy and admire the writing of Judge Richard Posner, who
merges tools for philosophical thinking with a practical judicial ap-
proach. I am aware that Posner believes that the final adjudication
must be pragmatic,370 but such pragmatism, as Posner himself ac-
knowledges, is a philosophical theory.371
Second, from the outset of our studies in law school until the end of
our professional lives, we are exposed to various philosophical ap-
proaches to the law:372 positivism, naturalism, realism, legal process,
critical legal studies, law and sociology, law and economics, feminism,
and others. I have found these theories to be of great interest. Per-
sonally, I think that each has an element of truth. Nonetheless, my
approach is that human experience is too rich to allow it to be impris-
oned in only one legal theory. I accept the following remarks that Pro-
fessor Edwin Patterson made fifty years ago:
My own philosophy of law is eclectic because I recognize that each of the
major philosophers has begun his system with several appealing self-
evident principles, and I cannot reject th as wholly wrong.... My eclecti-
cism in legal philosophy is based partly on my belief in tolerance, partly
on my belief in pluralism, and partly on the inertia of habit.
3 73
Indeed, in my view, only by considering all the theories, while giv-
ing each of them the proper weight, will it be possible to understand
the law and the role of the judge. In my opinion, law is a tool that is
intended to realize social goals. There is no consensus about the con-
370 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227
(1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
371 See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
372 See BRIAN BIx, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (2d ed. 1999).
373 EDWIN PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 556 (195 3).
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tent of these goals, which is why it is necessary to find a balance
among the various theories inter se. Some will regard the eclectic ap-
proach as an attempt to avoid a coherent legal theory. There will
doubtless be others who regard the eclectic approach as an independ-
ent legal theory in itself.37 4 Whatever the case, each judge should
adopt for himself a position on these questions. It will serve him as a
tool for realizing his judicial role. It is unfortunate that in recent
years, a widening gap has formed between academics involved in the
philosophy of law and a large number of judges.37 5 I think we should
do whatever we can to narrow this gap. Judges need theories of law.
Theories of law need judges. I fully acknowledge that I learned these
theories from others, especially the legal process movement, which I
first learned from Professor Henry Hart himself at a seminar in 1966,
and also Dworkin's approach, which seems to me to be the closest to
the judicial philosophy that should guide a judge.
Third, in fulfilling his judicial role, a judge would do well to for-
mulate for himself a judicial philosophy. A judge should be aware of
his own judicial policy. Most of us have one, but only a few of us, try-
ing to follow in the footsteps of Cardozo, think about it and con-
sciously formulate it. In this Foreword I have tried to put my judicial
philosophy into writing. It is the most important tool with which I re-
alize my judicial role.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE OTHER BRANCHES OF THE STATE
A. The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Other Branches
i. The Tension Among the Branches. - There is constant tension
in the relationships between the supreme court and the other branches
of the state,37 6 a tension that stems from the different roles of the
branches. The role of the judiciary is to review the actions of other
branches and evaluate whether they are acting lawfully. This role
naturally meets with opposition from the other branches, particularly
374 See JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 23-24 (1996)
(discussing the theory of integrative jurisprudence and the work of Winfried Brugger); Harold J.
Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779
(1988); Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some
Remarks From a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 395 (I994); Jerome Hall, Integrative
Jurisprudence, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 313 (Paul Sayre ed., 1947).
375 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
376 See Lord Woolf, Judicial Review - The Tensions Between the Executive and the Judiciary,
114 L.Q. REV. 579 (1998).
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when the judiciary, by its rulings, frustrates political goals the other
branches pursue. In such circumstances many argue that a body that
is not accountable to the people should not be able to frustrate the will
of the people. The more cherished the voided act is to the hearts of
the political authorities, the greater the criticism, amplified across all
forms of media. The court has limited access to such media. As a re-
sult, the tension between it and the other branches increases. It
reaches its peak when the other branches try to use their powers to
change the composition or jurisdiction of the court.377 In these situa-
tions, an impartial court examines the use of these powers by the other
branches with the same objectivity that it usually exercises, for the
court does not seek to protect its own composition or jurisdiction but
rather to protect the values of democracy.3 78 The court may deter-
mine, therefore, that some of these means are lawful. In the event that
the court makes such a determination, the composition or jurisdiction
of the court may be preserved only with the help of social forces that
seek to protect democracy and the court. In this instance, public con-
fidence in the court plays a central role.
Tension between the court and the other branches is natural and,
in my opinion, also desirable. If the court's rulings were always satis-
factory to the other branches, it would raise suspicion that the court
was not properly fulfilling its role in the democracy. Thus, criticism of
the court's rulings is proper and benefits the court itself, for this criti-
cism helps to guard the guardians. Matters begin to deteriorate, how-
ever, when the criticism loses its objectivity and transforms into un-
bridled attack. Public confidence in the courts may be harmed, and
the checks and balances that characterize the separation of powers
may be undermined. When subjective attacks affect the composition
or jurisdiction of the court, the crisis point is reached. This condition
may signal the beginning of the end of democracy.
What should supreme court justices do when they find themselves
in this tension? Not much. They must remain faithful to their judicial
approach; they should realize their outlook on the judicial role. They
must be aware of this tension but not give in to it. Indeed, every
judge learns, over the years, to live with this tension. Experience
strengthens the judge. Many factors affect the intensity of the tension
between the court and the other branches of the state. In the follow-
ing pages, I would like to consider two of these factors: the attitude
377 See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan,
i966 Sup. CT. REV. 347 (describing President Roosevelt's desire "to pack the court").
378 This exercise of judicial authority created a tension between the Appellate Division and the
Parliament in South Africa with regard to the implementation of apartheid. See C. F. FORSYTH,
IN DANGER FOR THEIR TALENTS 58-128 (1985).
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toward the state, and the judiciary's and other branches' understand-
ings of the principle of the separation of powers.
2. The Attitude Toward the State. - The intensity of the tension
between the judiciary and the other branches derives, in part, from the
attitudes of society and the judiciary toward the state itself. This atti-
tude, in turn, reflects that polity's history and the way the polity for-
mulates its national identity. Naturally, this attitude is always com-
plex, and I am far from an expert. Nonetheless, I think that we can
distinguish roughly among three primary societal models.
The first model is that of societies that regard the state with great
suspicion. In these societies, the state is perceived as a force that
threatens the individual and his freedom rather than as a sovereign
power that protects the individual and his freedom. The purpose of
this particular constitutional arrangement is to restrict the power of
the state - embodied mainly in the legislature and the executive -
and thereby to protect the individual. In American society - in view
of its history, particularly its revolution against British rule - this atti-
tude seems prevalent. The Bill of Rights and other constitutional
amendments are mainly composed of restrictions on the power of the
branches of state ("No State shall, '37 9 "Congress shall make no
law"380 ). The main rights recognized in the Bill of Rights are the free-
doms that the state is forbidden from harming. These freedoms thus
constitute "negative" rights (status negativus) that are concerned with
limiting state action.381 Under these limitations, the tension between
the court and the other branches of government may reach a crisis
point. A longstanding political tradition and significant government
restraint in exercising power - including judicial restraint based on
the view that the judiciary is itself a branch of the state - are all that
379 U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § i.
380 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
381 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("[T]he
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual."); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)
("[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.'); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019,
1026 (1997) ("Our courts, through judicial review, are accustomed to telling government what it
may not do; they are not, by tradition or staffing, well-equipped to map out elaborate programs
detailing what the government must do."). But see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Govern-
ment: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991) (challenging
DeShaney on the grounds that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to establish
a constitutional right to affirmative protection by the government). Professor Owen Fiss argues
that the state should be responsible not just for refraining from violating an individual's right to
freedom of speech, but also for protecting it. See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH 27-49 (1996); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 32-46 (1996).
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can prevent a crisis. Both of these safeguards, of course, exist in the
United States.
Under the second model of society, the state - represented by the
executive and legislative branches - is viewed as a realization of na-
tional aspirations. The attitude toward the state is one of respect and
admiration rather than one of suspicion. I think that this was the ap-
proach in several Continental countries before World War II. In this
model, there is minimal tension between the judiciary and other
branches: the judiciary acts as a public institution representing the
state, and sees its purpose as allowing the state to achieve national
goals and aspirations.
Under the third model of society, the state is perceived both as a
source of good and a source of evil. The state is feared as a source of
harm to the individual, but it is also supported as a source of protec-
tion for the individual. In this model, the rights of the individual in-
clude not just the negative right against state intervention, but also the
positive right (status positivus) to protection of essential freedoms and
provision of vital services.382 I think that Australia 383 and Canada 3
84
can be included in this group. These countries obtained independence
from England through a democratic process, rather than revolution,
and thus experienced continued and extensive absorption of traditional
English principles. 385  These principles underlie the Canadian Char-
ter's recognition not merely of the duty of the state not to harm the
freedom of the individual, but also of the duty of the state to protect
the individual.386 Another example of this model may be Israel. For
many, the establishment of the state was the realization of a longstand-
ing dream - hence the attitude of respect and admiration for the
state. But the state is also seen as the source of power and restriction
of freedom - hence the suspicion of it. This tension is reflected in the
fact that people trust the state somewhat, but not fully. The Israeli
Bill of Rights provides, in part, that "[t]here shall be no violation of the
382 See William W. Black, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Positive Obligations, in
LAW, POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 298 (William Kaplan & Donald McRae eds.,
1993) (arguing that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms imposes not only negative re-
strictions on government, but positive duties as well); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Con-
stitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court has sometimes
interpreted negatively phrased constitutional provisions as imposing positive governmental du-
ties).
383 See MELISSA CASTAN & SARAH JOSEPH, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY VIEW 24 (2001).
384 See Brian Dickson, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Dawn of a New Era?, 2
REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 2-3 (1994); McLachlin, The Role of the Court, supra note i, at 52.
385 See Dickson, supra note 384, at 15-16.
386 See McKinney v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of Guelph, [1990] 76 D.L.R. 545, 624 (ex-
pressing skepticism of the proposition that "the government could not be found to be in breach of
the Charter for failing to act').
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life, body or dignity of any person as such. '387  This provision, which
limits state action, reflects a conception of the state as a threat to the
individual. However, another provision states that "[e]very person is
entitled to protection of his life, person and dignity. '388 Here, the state
is conceived as a force that protects the individual. Thus, for example,
in one opinion I derived from this provision the right to the minimum
goods and services necessary to maintain human existence. 389 In socie-
ties reflecting this third model, the intensity of the tension between the
judiciary and the other branches depends on the balance between acts
of the state that are viewed as harming the individual and those that
are viewed as protecting him.
3. The Separation of Powers. - Substantive democracy is based
on the separation of powers. 390 It is "the backbone of [the] constitu-
tional system."'391 When a single branch creates the statutes, adminis-
ters them, and adjudicates disputes arising from them, arbitrary gov-
ernment results, freedom suffers, and real democracy does not exist.
Indeed, as I have written:
[T]he separation of powers is not a value in itself. It is not designed to en-
sure efficiency. The purpose of separation of powers is to strengthen free-
dom and prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one govern-
mental actor in a manner likely to harm the freedom of the individual.
392
The principle of separation of powers does not mean that a branch
may overstep its authority without the other branches intervening.
Nor does it mean that, within the framework of its authority, any
branch may act unlawfully. As Meir Shamgar, my predecessor as
President of the Israeli Supreme Court, wrote:
Separation of powers does not precisely mean creation of a barrier that
decisively prevents any connection or contact between the branches.
Rather, it finds expression mainly in the existence of a balance among the
branches' powers - in theory and in practice - that makes possible in-
dependence in the context of definite reciprocal supervision.
393
387 BASIc LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY § 2 (1992).
388 Id. § 3.
389 See C.A. 4905/98, Gamzu v. Yeshiahu, 55(3) PD. 360, 375-76 ("Human dignity includes
... protection of the minimum of human existence. A homeless person with no place to stay suf-
fers a blow to human dignity. A person who does not have enough to eat suffers a blow to human
dignity. A person without access to basic medical treatment suffers a blow to human dignity. A
person reduced to living under humiliating physical conditions suffers a blow to human dignity.").
390 See supra pp. 66-04. See generally I TRIBE, supra note 195, §§ 2-1 through 2-1o (discussing
the separation of powers).
391 Cooper v. Canada, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, 867.
392 H.C. 3267/97, Rubinstein v. Minister of Def., 52(5) P.D. 481, 512; accord Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
393 H.C. 3o6/8I, Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Comm., 35(4) P.D. 118, 141.
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I have expressed similar views:
An enlightened democracy is a regime of separation of powers. This sepa-
ration does not mean that every branch is an authority unto itself, not tak-
ing the other branches into account. Such a perspective would profoundly
harm the foundations of democracy itself, since it means a dictatorship of
every branch within its own sphere. On the contrary, the separation of
powers means reciprocal checks and balances among the various branches
- not walls among the branches, but bridges that balance and control. 394
The separation of powers means that every branch is independent
within its sphere, so long as it operates lawfully. The judiciary ulti-
mately decides whether an action is lawful. In my opinion, the role of
the judiciary is to adjudicate disputes, and in doing so to give a bind-
ing interpretation of the constitution and statutes. In the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.
' 395
This assignment of tasks reflects the partnership between the draft-
ers and interpreters of the constitution and statutes. As I have argued
above, the former is the senior partner, while the latter is the junior
partner. Since the power of all branches of government is enshrined in
the constitution and statutes, courts make binding determinations
about the extent of power and the legality of the actions of each
branch of government: "the examination of the legality of any act -
whether or not it is of a public nature - is the task of the judiciary,
and amounts to fulfilling its purpose in the system of separation of
powers. '396 Thus, when a court determines that a statute violates the
constitution, or that decisions (other than statutes) of the legislature
depart from the applicable statutes or regulations, the court is not ex-
ceeding its role within the separation of powers. On the contrary, by
defending the constitution, statutes, and regulations, the court is restor-
ing the constitutional balance that underlies the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers - a balance that was undermined when the unlawful
decision was made.397  This result gives expression to the modern
meaning of the separation of powers, which is concerned with checks
and balances among the branches of the state. This perception of the
separation of powers has practical implications for the extent of judi-
cial review of the legislature and of the executive as well as the means
available to the judge in fulfilling his or her judicial role.
My view of the separation of powers is by no means universally ac-
cepted, however. Indeed, a central factor impacting the degree of ten-
394 H.C. 73/85, "Kach" Faction v. Chairman of Knesset, 39(3) P.D. 141, 158.
395 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 703-O5 (1974).
396 H.C. gio/86, Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) P.D. 441, 463.
397 See supra pp. 66-04.
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sion between the judiciary and the other branches of the state is the
way the principle of separation of powers is perceived. We all speak
of separation of powers, but there is substantial variety in the content
hidden behind this label. In conversations with judges and law pro-
fessors in the United States, I have found that despite the common
rhetoric of separation of powers, much of the American legal commu-
nity conceives of this principle very differently than I. Here, I do not
refer to potential differences in the concept of separation of powers
that may exist between a presidential democracy like that of the
United States and a parliamentary democracy like that of the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Israel. Instead, I refer to differences
in the concept of the role of the judiciary within the separation of
powers and the relationship of the judiciary to the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches.
For example, it appears that the accepted approach in the United
States is that if the Supreme Court were to void a presidential pardon
because it was given for improper motives, the Court would violate
the principle of separation of powers; if the Court were to void a Sen-
ate impeachment proceeding because it had defects, 398 the Court
would violate the principle of separation of powers;399 if the Court
were to order the President to dismiss a Secretary of State who was
facing criminal proceedings, the Court would violate the principle of
separation of powers. In contrast, I would say the Court actions de-
scribed in these examples conform to the principle of separation of
powers. Indeed, under my approach, separation of powers means that
every branch may act independently only as long as it acts lawfully
within its jurisdiction. When a branch of state acts unlawfully -
whether it exceeds its authority or exercises its authority for unlawful
reasons - it is the role of the judiciary, as part of the principle of
separation of powers, to ensure that the unlawful action is voided. As
I wrote in one case, "separation of powers is not the absolutism of each
branch in its own sphere. Such absolutism harms the freedom whose
realization is the basis for the separation of powers. ' '40 0  For this rea-
son, I do not see any difference between a case in which the executive
or legislature acts contrary to the constitution 40 1 and a case in which
these branches act contrary to any other legal norm. Under my ap-
398 But see Nixon v. United States, 5o6 U.S. 224, 253-54 (I993) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that judicial review may be warranted if the Senate impeached a person
"upon a coin toss").
399 See i TRIBE, supra note 195, § 2-7, at 152-53 (noting that impeachments are generally con-
sidered beyond the reach of American judicial review).
400 H.C. 5364/94, Velner v. Chairman of Israeli Labor Party, 49(I) P.D. 758, 790.
401 Such was the case in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (I969), in which the Supreme
Court held that Congress had unlawfully refused to seat an elected congressman who satisfied the
criteria for House membership contained in Article I, Section 2. Id. at 489.
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proach, the principle of the rule of law always binds the branches of
the state, irrespective of the source of the legal norm.
If we wish to avoid invalidating executive or legislative acts that
are contrary to law, we should do so not by insisting that the judici-
ary's behavior violates the separation of powers, but by changing legal
norms themselves, so that the acts in question are no longer unlawful.
If the presidential pardon power allows the president to grant pardons
based on considerations such as a family relationship or monetary
payment, then there is no basis for judicial disqualification of pardons
of this type. The reason is not that judicial review would violate the
principle of separation of powers. Rather, the reason is simply that the
action is lawful, so the claim should be dismissed on the merits. The
same is true of the other examples that I have given above. I have dif-
ficulty with the view that, in situations like these, the principle of
separation of powers is an obstacle to judicial review. Rather, under
my approach, it is precisely this principle that is the source of judicial
review. As I have written:
[I]n my view, a court in a democracy has the task of protecting the rule of
law. This means, in part, that it must enforce the law against the
branches of the State and that it must ensure that the State acts according
to law; this view of the judicial role conflicts with neither the principle of
separation of powers nor the role of the court within the framework of
that principle. On the contrary, this approach draws its strength from the
principle and rules of separation of powers. The modern meaning of this
principle is checks and balances ... among the various branches. ...
These checks and balances mean, in part, that within the framework
of a dispute brought before the court, the court must ensure that all the
branches of the state - the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary -
act within the framework of the law. In doing so, the court does not un-
dermine the principle of separation of powers but rather actualizes it ....
In my opinion, the principle of separation of powers does not mean
that a problem of a public nature is resolved by the legislature and the ex-
ecutive, and not by the judiciary. The principle of the separation of pow-
ers means that the legislature may - in the absence of constitutional re-
straints - establish the legal framework in which a problem of a public
nature will be regulated, and that the executive may resolve a public prob-
lem within the legal framework established for it. However, once this
framework is established, the court must decide - and this is its role as
among the branches of the State - whether the legal framework estab-
lished has been maintained in practice. Nothing in the principle of sepa-
ration of powers permits any of the branches to act contrary to the law.
Nor does anything in the principle of separation of powers require the ju-
diciary to refrain from becoming involved in actions of a public nature, in-
sofar as this involvement focuses on the legality of the action .... Indeed,
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the examination of the legality of any act - whether or not it is of a pub-
lic nature - is the task of the judiciary, and amounts to fulfilling its pur-
pose in the system .... 402
My view of the separation of powers would not increase the tension
between the judiciary and the other branches, of course, if they ac-
cepted it. But when the very meaning of separation of powers is a
source of dispute among the different branches, the tension among
them grows. What the judiciary does in accordance with its under-
standing of the separation of powers may be regarded by the other
branches not only as incorrect (which may sometimes be a natural and
appropriate criticism), but also as illegitimate.
4. The Rule of Law. - The principle of the rule of law governs,
among other things, the relationship between the judiciary and the
other branches of state. This principle - like the separation of powers
- is not intended to guarantee effective administration or even merely
to ensure the legality of administrative action. Rather, its purpose is to
protect the liberty of the individual.
The concept of the rule of law has numerous interpretations.
40 3
However, everyone agrees that the rule of law means, at a minimum,
rule by law. That is its formal aspect, whereby, as I have written:
[A]ll actors in the State, whether private individuals and corporations or
branches of government, must act according to the law, and violations of
the law must meet with the organized sanction of society. The rule of law,
in this sense, has a double meaning: the legality of government and en-
forcement of the law. This is a formal principle; we are concerned not
with the content of the law but with the need to enforce it, whatever its
content. The rule of law in this sense is connected not to the nature of the
regime but to the principle of public order.
404
In this sense, it can be said, as Justice Scalia aptly put it, that the rule
of law is a law of rules.
40 5
But this idea is an impoverished notion of the rule of law. In this
weak form, the rule of law exists even in a dictatorship. A friend once
told me that during World War II, several Jews were in prison in
Germany as a result of sentences received before the war broke out.
The Gestapo did not harm those Jews because the law mandated that
they not be exterminated in the death camps before finishing their
prison sentences, and this rule of law had to be maintained. But when
the prisoners finished serving their sentences, the Gestapo was waiting
402 H.C. go/86, Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) PD. 441, 462-63.
403 See CASS, supra note 59, at i ("[T]he rule of law still means very different things to different
people."); see generally Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An
Analytical Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467 (exploring both formal and substantive concepts of the
rule of law, as articulated by various scholars).
404 H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, 621 (Barak, J., dissenting).
405 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).
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for them at the gate. The prisoners were taken to the death camps
and murdered. The formal rule of law was observed.
In addition to this formal understanding of the rule of law, the rule
of law exists in a jurisprudential sense. According to this conception,
the rule of law includes certain minimum requirements without which
a legal system cannot exist, and which distinguish a legal system from
a gang whose leader imposes his will on everyone else.40 6 Professor
Lon Fuller calls these requirements, collectively, the "inner morality of
law. '40  Among philosophers, there is disagreement over these mini-
mum requirements. Fuller requires that the law be general; legal rules
must be publicized, clear, intelligible, and stable enough to enable a
subject to conform to them; the law must not be overly retroactive;
statutes should not conflict with one another; the law should not de-
mand the performance of acts beyond one's powers; the rules must be
administered as announced. 40 8 Other philosophers have offered differ-
ent lists of requirements.
40 9
Although this jurisprudential conception is important, and I am
prepared to regard it as an essential condition for the rule of law, I do
not believe that it is enough. It cannot - just as the formal rule of
law cannot - release people from the duty of complying with a cor-
rupt statute (lex corrupta). Why should we hold inviolable a piece of
legislation that gives the government - publicly, prospectively, and in
general - the power to deal a mortal blow to human rights? Haim H.
Cohn, a judge on the Supreme Court of Israel, rightly said:
[The rule of law] does not mean only that the ruling authorities in the
State act according to law: even totalitarian governments act according to
the laws of their countries. Are those not the laws that they themselves
enacted for their own purposes and according to their own scheme? Con-
sider the Nazis, who came to power lawfully and committed most of their
crimes by virtue of explicit legal authorizations that they took for this
purpose: no one would say that "rule of law" reigned in Nazi Germany,
and no one would dispute that what reigned there was the rule of
crime.
4 10
Indeed, it is not proper to identify the rule of law as merely the
principle of the legality of government, with jurisprudential require-
ments added in. Dworkin has rightly said that we must not be satis-
fied with the "rule-book conception" of the rule of law.411 It must be
406 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1oI-
20 (1996) (discussing the jurisprudential conception of the rule of law).
407 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41-94 (rev. ed. 1969).
408 See id. at 39.
409 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 236-39 (197I); Joseph Raz, The Rule of
Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAW Q. REV. 195, 198-202 (1977).
410 HAIM H. COHN, HA-MISHPAT [THE LAW] 143 (199).
411 DWORKIN, supra note 214, at ii.
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extended to the "right conception" of the rule of law. There is cer-
tainly no agreement as to the scope of this concept. In my opinion, it
means guaranteeing fundamental values of morality, justice, and hu-
man rights, with a proper balance between these and the other needs
of society.
According to my approach, the rule of law is not merely public or-
der: the rule of law is social justice based on public order. The law ex-
ists to ensure proper social life. Social life, however, is not a goal in
itself, but a means to allow the individual to live in dignity and de-
velop himself. What underlies this substantive perception of the rule
of law are the human being and human rights, with a proper balance
among the different rights and between human rights and the proper
needs of society. The substantive rule of law "is the rule of proper
law, which balances the needs of society and the individual. '412 This is
the rule of law that strikes a balance between society's need for politi-
cal independence, social equality, economic development, and internal
order on the one hand, and the needs of the individual, his personal
liberty, and his human dignity on the other. The judge must protect
this rich concept of the rule of law. This perception of the rule of law
has practical implications for the methods available to the judge in re-
alizing his role and for his relationship to the other branches of gov-
ernment.
5. Activism and Self-Restraint. - Supreme court judges in a de-
mocracy have a great deal of responsibility. Much is expected of them.
There is consensus about some of those expectations, while others are
disputed. The tools in their possession are limited. They are subject
to criticism, much of which revolves around terms like "activism" and
"self-restraint." Those who use these terms usually do not define them,
as there is disagreement over their definition.
4 13
A study by Professor Bradley Canon establishes six parameters for
evaluating judicial activism in constitutional law.414 These parameters
deal with the extent to which the judge is prepared to invalidate poli-
cies that have been determined by democratic procedures, the degree
to which the judge is prepared to change an existing judicial ruling,
the degree to which he is prepared to depart from the intention of the
authors of the constitution and the clear language of the text, the de-
gree to which the court determines policy and does not limit itself to
protecting the democratic process, the degree to which the court de-
termines policy or leaves its determination to the executive or to the
individual, and the degree to which the judicial decision supplants the
412 H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, 622 (Barak, J., dissenting).
413 See BARAK, supra note io, at 147.
414 See Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982).
[Vol. 116:16
HeinOnline  -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 126 2002-2003
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
considerations of the other branches regarding a given issue. Accord-
ing to Canon, a judge may be an activist according to one parameter
but self-restrained according to another. For each of the parameters,
Canon distinguishes among very active, not active, and somewhat ac-
tive. This, of course, is merely the beginning of the evaluation, since
the internal weight of the various parameters must also be considered.
This model indicates the complexity of the terms "activism" and
"self-restraint." It demonstrates the need to conduct a detailed analysis
before answering the question whether activism or self-restraint is de-
sirable. Moreover, the model indicates that this pair of terms - activ-
ism and self-restraint - refers to thought and action processes rather
than the quality of resolutions. A judge may extend or limit human
rights without any necessary correlation of activism or self-restraint.
Likewise, there is no point in attempting to correlate activism or self-
restraint with a "liberal" or "conservative" approach. 415 Furthermore,
we should not encourage judicial activism simply when we like the ac-
tivist result the court reaches but then demand judicial restraint when
the result is not to our liking. Support for or opposition to activism or
self-restraint must be about the relationship among the branches, not
the results of that relationship. This is the primary limitation of ana-
lyzing a court through the lens of activism or self-restraint: the analysis
fails to focus on the proper function of a court in a democracy. In my
opinion, we would do better to substitute the inquiry into whether a
court is active or self-restrained with an inquiry into whether the court
is fulfilling its role in a democracy.
In my opinion, we would do well not to talk about activism or self-
restraint. The terms are part of a social dialogue characterized by
empty slogans and superficial labels, and the damage they cause out-
weighs their benefits. If we want to examine this pair of concepts se-
riously with regard to a particular judge or a particular court, then we
should perform a detailed examination of various aspects of the judge
or court and the overall results he or it produces. I doubt whether the
outcome of such an examination would interest anyone. In any event,
I am not at all interested in whether my legal community thinks that I
am an activist or that I show self-restraint. Such opinions result from
thought processes and evaluations that, as Canon indicates, normally
take place without anything to guide them.
415 See Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism, 27 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV i, 5 (1997) ("[J]udicial activ-
ism is not confined to a particular ideological or social viewpoint. It may be liberal. But it may
also be conservative.").
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B. The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Legislature
r. Jurisdiction for Judicial Review. - (a) Jurisdiction for Review
of Statutes. - Most supreme courts in democracies exercise judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes. 416 Since the end of World
War II, most new constitutions have included express provisions about
judicial review, thereby ending the legal debate over its legitimacy.
Naturally, the debate about the wisdom of implementing this review
continues although "the worldwide debate does not usually occur
within the same terms as it does in the United States. '4 7 A number of
countries have constitutional provisions stating that there is no judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes.418 Even in these countries,
there is no room for argument as to the legitimacy of the absence of
judicial review. What remains is debate over the wisdom of the con-
stitutional provision. In several countries, including the United States
and Israel, there is no express provision in the constitution for judicial
review of legislation. Nonetheless, the courts in these two countries
have held that judicial review of legislation is implied by interpreta-
tion of the constitution. In the United States, this ruling was made in
1803.419 In Israel, it was made in 1995.420 In both countries, there are
still those who argue against the legitimacy of these rulings. I think
that in the United States, this argument is on the wane. But in Israel,
it is still alive and vibrant, particularly because some of the founders
of the Israeli Constitution are still alive and they do not hesitate to
state their opinions on the rulings of the Supreme Court. Imagine the
lively debate that would take place in the United States today over ju-
dicial review of the constitutionality of statutes if Madison, Jefferson,
and Hamilton were active participants.
The position of Israeli judges is therefore not easy, and they are
subject to tremendous tension. But they must fulfill their role. If our
legislature - which is also the constitutive authority that is competent
to change our Constitution - is not pleased with the existence of judi-
cial review, it may amend the Constitution. I hope that such amend-
ment will not occur. The likelihood that it will is small, since judicial
review enjoys the confidence of the public.
416 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (David
M. Beatty ed., 1994); C. Neal Tate & Torbj6m Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power:
The Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER i, i-io (C.
Neal Tate & Torbj6m Vallinder eds., I995); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutional-
ism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1997).
417 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 25, at 242.
418 See, e.g., GRW. NED. art. 120 ("The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall
not be reviewed by the courts.").
419 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
420 See C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill., 49(4) P.D. 221.
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(b) Jurisdiction for Review of Decisions That Are Not Legislation.
- Is a supreme court authorized to practice judicial review of legisla-
tive decisions that are not statutes in the formal sense? For example,
the legislature may make determinations of a quasi-judicial nature,
such as decisions regarding the impeachment of the President and fed-
eral judges in the United States or revoking the immunity of a member
of Parliament in Israel. Similarly, the legislature, or one of its organs,
may make administrative decisions. This practice occurs when the
speaker of the legislature or the chairman of a parliamentary commit-
tee makes decisions, subject to the rules of parliament, about the
agenda of the plenum or committee, or about the composition of the
various committees. Finally, the legislature may make decisions that
are not primary legislation. Thus, in Israel, a committee of Parliament
has the statutory power to determine the salaries of the members of
Parliament and of judges. Is a decision of the legislature (or of one of
its organs) that does not have the formal guise of a statute subject to
judicial review? In the absence of an express provision in the constitu-
tion - which most constitutions do not have - the answer is derived
from the view of the legal system and its judges toward the principle
of separation of powers. I have already shown that the American posi-
tion is very narrow in supporting a rigid separation of powers.421 The
approach of English law is also narrow. 422 But the approaches of the
constitutional courts in Germany423 and Spain 424 are different. These
courts regard themselves as competent to exercise judicial review of all
decisions of the legislature. Thus, for example, the German Constitu-
tional Court has exercised judicial review on the following questions:
Do parliamentary rules requiring two readings for statutes that ad-
dress certain issues violate the constitution? 42- Was the amount of
time set for deliberations of the plenum over a matter of great public
importance sufficient?426  Is the exclusion of members of a certain
party from one of the parliamentary committees unconstitutional?
427
Are parliamentary rules limiting the rights of an independent member
of parliament who left his party - such as restrictions on his right to
address the plenum and the time allotted to him and limitations on his
right to submit private bills - consistent with constitutional guaran-
421 See supra pp. 121-22.
422 See Rediffusion (H.K.) Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., [197o] A.C. 1136 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
H.K.); Harper v. Home Sec'y, i Ch. 238 (C.A. 1954); Bilston Corp. v. Wolverhampton Corp., 1
Ch. 391 0942); Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1884).
423 See KOMMERS, supra note 75.
424 See E.A. ALVAREZ, Los ACTOS PARLAMENTARIOS No NORMATIVOS V SU CONTROL
JURISDICCIONAL (1998).
425 See BVerfGE i, 144 (1952).
426 See BVerfGE 104 (1959).
427 See BVerfGE 70, 324 (1986).
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tees concerning the rights of a member of parliament?428  The Su-
preme Court of Israel has adopted a similar attitude,429 based on the
principle of separation of powers. Separation of powers does not mean
a "dictatorship of powers." The separation of powers means "mutual
checks and balances among the various powers - not walls between
the powers, but bridges of checks and balances."
430
This is the case with regard to judicial review of the decisions of
the Knesset (the Israeli legislature) that conflict with the constitution,
as well as those that conflict with statutes that it has enacted. Indeed,
our approach is that:
The legislative branch is not exempt from compliance with a statute.
Once the legislature has determined its content and given it life, without
exempting itself textually from its ambit, the legislature must honor the
statute like everyone else .... Once the provision has been dressed in the
garb of a statute, everyone, including the Knesset authorities, must honor
it. Its content and the scope of its application may be amended only in the
manner in which any other Knesset legislation is amended. Authority to
exercise judicial review of the actions of the Knesset is also apparent from
basic constitutional concepts, according to which judicial review of the
constitutionality of the acts of each branch is a basic condition for the rule
of law, and in respect of which the separation of powers does not find ex-
pression in blocking the road to judicial review.
43 1
We have adopted a similar approach with regard to the Knesset's
secondary legislation and its quasi-judicial 432 and administrative deci-
sions.4 3
3
2. Judicial Discretion in Reviewing Decisions That Are Not Legis-
lation. - Jurisdiction and discretion are distinct. This distinction
raises the question whether the scope of judicial review of nonstatu-
tory legislative decisions is the same as the scope of judicial review of
the decisions of other branches of the state. The answer of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court is yes, 434 but this is not the answer of the
Supreme Court of Israel. We distinguished between these two types of
428 See BVerfGE 80, 188 (1989).
429 See David Kretzmer, Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 95
(1988); Meir Shamgar, Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions by the High Court of Justice, 28 ISR.
L. REV. 43 (1994).
430 H.C. 73/85, Kach Faction v. Speaker of Knesset, 39(3) P.D. i41.
431 H.C. 325/85, Miari v. Speaker of Knesset, 39(3) P.D. I22, 127-28.
432 See, e.g., H.C. 5151/95, Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 49(5) P.D. 245; H.C. 1843/93, Pinhasi v.
Knesset, 48(4) P.D. 492; H.C. 1848/93, Pinhasi v. Knesset, 49(I) RD. 661; H.C. 62o/85, Miari v.
Speaker of Knesset, 41(4) P.D. 169; H.C. 3o6/8i, Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Comm., 35(4) PD. 118.
433 See H.C. 9o7o/oo, Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law & Justice Comm., 55(4) P.D.
8oo, 806.
434 See KOMMERS, supra note 75.
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actions by the Knesset,435 holding that when the Knesset carries out a
quasi-judicial action, full judicial review is appropriate. Therefore we
have on several occasions voided a decision of the Knesset to revoke or
not to revoke the immunity of a member of the Knesset.436 In both
cases, we interpreted statutory provisions dealing with the scope of
legislative immunity, determining the parameters that the members of
the Knesset must consider and evaluating whether those parameters
were met in practice. Naturally, in light of the broad scope of consid-
erations the legislature may take into account, only in a few cases will
the court determine that the Knesset exercised its discretion unlaw-
fully. The number of cases is small, however, not because decisions of
the Knesset are institutionally non-justiciable, but because they are
usually lawful. As I wrote in one of my opinions:
The special status of the Knesset is taken into account in formulating the
substantive law that applies to its quasi-judicial activity. This special
status does not need to come into play once again, to curtail the scope of
judicial review. Judicial review is intended to ensure a minimal threshold
required to preserve the validity of a quasi-judicial decision. Self-restraint
in exercising judicial discretion in the course of judicial review of quasi-
judicial decisions means undermining the elementary fairness of the par-
liamentary process. There is no justification for this.
4 3 7
The Supreme Court has adopted a different approach with regard
to Knesset decisions of an administrative nature. 438 On one hand, the
court considered the rule of law in the legislature. The rule of law im-
plies that every organ of the Knesset must observe the rules that apply
to the Knesset's internal operations. As long as the Knesset does not
change them, its rules bind it as does any other legal norm. On the
other hand, the court considered the Knesset's need to decide its inter-
nal management on its own, and decided that the Knesset is best
equipped to resolve these matters. In balancing these two considera-
tions, the Supreme Court held that it will exercise discretion, and will
review the legality of an act of the Knesset or one of its organs in mat-
ters of internal management only if the Court decides that intervention
is necessary to prevent substantial harm to the fabric of democratic life
and the foundations of the regime's structure. I said in this case that:
The proper balance between the need to ensure the "rule of law in the leg-
islature" and the need to respect the exclusivity of the Knesset in its deci-
sions on internal matters will be ensured if we adopt a criterion that takes
into account the degree of alleged harm to the texture of parliamentary
435 See H.C. 1956/91, Shammai v. Chairman of Knesset, 45(4) P.D. 313, 316 (expressing institu-
tional non-justiciability).
436 See Pinhasi, 49(I) P.D. at 492; H.C. 761/86, Miari v. Chairman of Knesset, 42(4) P.D. 868.
437 Pinhasi, 49(l) P.D. at 702.
438 See H.C. 652/81, Sarid v. Chairman of Knesset, 36(2) P.D. 197 (translated in ZAMIR &
ZYSBLAT, supra note 305, at 318).
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life, as well as the degree to which that harm affects the structural founda-
tions of our constitutional regime.... In adopting the aforementioned cri-
terion, which considers the extent of harm and the interest harmed, we
wish to establish a flexible test inherently amenable to precise definition,
whose content and scope will be determined by the court according to the
needs of time and place.
43 9
Critics on both sides have attacked the Israeli Supreme Court's ap-
proach on this issue. One side argues that self-restraint is insufficient.
According to this view, all intraparliamentary decisions should be (in-
stitutionally) non-justiciable. 440  The other side argues that self-
restraint is inappropriate, claiming that an intraparliamentary decision
is the same as any other unlawful decision by a state institution.
44 1
This clash of opinions was presented to us in one case. We rejected
the conflicting viewpoints. This is what I wrote in the judgment:
[S]elf-restraint ... is proper. It should not be made too broad and it
should not be made too narrow. It expresses a proper balance between
the principle of the "rule of law in the legislature" . . . and the uniqueness
and status of the Knesset. This balance gives proper weight to the fact
that at the end of the day, at issue are the internal affairs of the Knesset
and not actions with legislative effect (statutes, secondary legislation). It
reflects a recognition that the Knesset - like every institution - requires
basic rules that regularize its various activities, and, by extension, recogni-
tion of the importance of autonomy in implementing these rules. This
self-restraint properly expresses "the great caution obligatory in every ju-
dicial decision that has implications for the interrelationship between the
main branches of the state and that determines their form." . . . It aptly
expresses the "relationship of mutual respect between the legislature and
the judiciary." This self-restraint constitutes a "kind of golden path
... between full judicial activism and full self-restraint." . . . On one hand
self-restraint ensures a situation in which "the court will not turn itself
into part of the political struggle, for which the Knesset is the central and
national arena," by means of the court's distancing itself from "the every-
day affairs of internal management." . . . On the other hand, the restric-
tions on self-restraint protect the principle of the rule of law and the su-
premacy of the constitution.
44 2
Using this framework, we considered and invalidated decisions by
the Speaker of the Knesset preventing the tabling of a racist draft bill
in the plenum 443 and establishing a rule that only a multimember
439 Id. at 204.
440 See Kretzmer, supra note 429, at 97-99.
441 See Ariel Bendour, The Administration of Justice in the High Court of Justice, I7
MISHPATIM 592 (1987).
442 H.C. 907o/oo, Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law & Justice Comm., 55(4) P.D. 8oo,
813.
443 See H.C. 742/84, Kahana v. Chairman of Knesset, 39(4) P.D. 85.
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party could propose a vote of no confidence in the government. 444 We
thought that both of these decisions materially undermined the fabric
of our democratic life. In contrast, we have dismissed many petitions
challenging decisions by the Speaker of the Knesset and of committee
chairpersons setting the time for deliberations on various draft bills.
44
1
We thought that these decisions related merely to the day-to-day inter-
nal management of parliament and that it was therefore not proper to
exercise judicial review of them.
Is the balance we have struck proper? Viewed in terms of theoreti-
cal consistency, the German approach is the proper one. All branches
of state are subject to judicial review in all of their acts, even decisions
of internal management. The propriety of the self-restraint displayed
by the court in Israel is not self-evident:
It allows an illegal act of the Knesset to stand, without its validity being
undermined by reason of its illegality. This self-restraint therefore allows
the Knesset to violate its own law. It is not easy to see what justifies the
court's self-restraint, which effectively allows an illegal act to stand.
44 6
Despite this difficulty, the Supreme Court has chosen to maintain the
delicate balance that I have discussed. Only time will tell whether we
are justified in doing so.
3. The Dialogue Between the Judiciary and the Legislature. - In
addition to the constant tension, there is also a constant dialogue be-
tween the judiciary and the legislature. This dialogue does not take
place at meetings between judges and legislators; it takes place when
each branch carries out its constitutional role. The main role of the
legislature is to enact statutes. These statutes are subject to judicial
review of their constitutionality and judicial interpretation of their
meaning. If the judiciary determines that a statute is unconstitutional,
the matter returns to the legislature. In many such cases, the legisla-
ture may enact a new statute that achieves the same fundamental pur-
pose as the voided statute while adopting more proportionate means.
If the legislature does not want to do this, it can - in legal systems
that permit this (such as Canada and Israel) - enact a conflicting or-
dinary statute by using an override. 447 It can also - again, if this is
possible in the relevant legal system - amend the constitution and
then reenact the statute. This new statute is also subject to judicial
review, and the process can continue. This process is a proper dia-
444 See H.C. 73/85, Kach Faction v. Chairman of Knesset, 39(3) P.D. 141.
445 For a list of the judgments, see Livnat, 55(4) P.D. at 814.
446 Id. at 8io.
447 For a discussion of the legislature's override power under Section 33 of Canada's Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, see Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 83-84 (1997).
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logue between the branches. 448  In this dialogue, the legislature usually
enjoys considerable latitude.
A similar dialogue occurs when the judiciary interprets a statute in
a way that is unacceptable to the legislature. The legislature may en-
act a new statute or amend the original one to better achieve its aim.
The cycle of interpretation and amendment can then repeat. Such
amendment does not constitute a forbidden intervention of the legisla-
ture into the judicial sphere, provided that the new legislation does not
retroactively apply to the original case decided by the court. The new
statute does not "interpret" the older statute. The new statute creates
a fresh normative reality reflecting the wish of the legislature. Enact-
ing a new statute is the right and the power of the legislature. 449  It
does not constitute disrespect of the judiciary.410  On the contrary, it is
a "healthy practice '45 1 that properly expresses the dialogue between
the branches that are partners in the legislative enterprise. Thus, the
Supreme Court of Israel has written:
[I]n enacting a statute that aims to change the court's ruling, the legisla-
ture reveals understanding of judicial interpretive activity, considers it on
the merits, and responds to it on the basis of its advantages and draw-
backs. This is the unending "dialogue" between a legislature and a judge,
between one branch of the State and another.
45 2
This dialogue provides several benefits for democracy. First, the
dialogue - particularly the fact that the legislature has the power to
respond to and effectively modify judicial rulings45 3 - expresses the
448 For various discussions of how this "dialogue" works in the Canadian system, see Vriend v.
Alberta, [i98] i S.C.R. 493, 565-67; Hogg & Bushell, supra note 447, at 79-81; Kent Roach, Con-
stitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures,
80 CAN. B. REV. 481, 517-30 (2001).
449 For a discussion of this legislative prerogative in the American system, see James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which notes that
Congress may change statutory interpretations "when it believes that this Court's interpretation of
a statute embodies a policy that Congress is against." Id. at 233-34; see also Regina v. Mills,
[I999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (Can.).
450 See Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Su-
preme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 198 n.198 (iggi) ("Congress understands that it is not constitu-
tional blasphemy to criticize the Court or to seek to overturn a decision by subsequent legisla-
tion.'); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 387-89 (I99I) (suggesting that congressional overrides can occur when con-
gressional preferences change, when the Court misinterprets congressional preferences, or when
the Court has signaled that congressional action is needed). But see Abner J. Mikva & Jeff
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 731 (I99I) (noting that
"[ujnfortunately, the overruling dialogue between Congress and the Court is not always based on
such a healthy relationship").
451 William 0. Douglas, Legal Institutions in America, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
TOMORROW 274, 292 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., i959).
452 H.C. 5364/94, Velner v. Chairman of Israeli Labor Party, 49(0) P.D. 758, 791 (Barak, J., dis-
senting).
453 See Vriend, [1998] i S.C.R. at 566.
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complex democratic accountability of the judiciary. Second, judicial-
legislative dialogue enriches public debate by placing issues on the
public and legislative agenda that would otherwise remain within the
confines of the executive branch in the absence of judicial adjudica-
tion. For example, the Israeli Supreme Court has held that under the
doctrine of non-delegation, the Defense Minister may not grant reli-
gious seminary students an exemption from the military draft without
specific legislative authorization.4 14 This judicial ruling put the issue
before both the Knesset and the general public, who then struggled
with the difficult dilemmas it raised.
Naturally, judges should examine the content of a new statute.
Sometimes the statute may undermine the principles of (substantive)
democracy. In such a case, review of a new statute should focus not
on the fact that it changes the previous ruling of the court, but on the
fact that it undermines democracy. Moreover, everything is a question
of degree. If the interpretation of a statute is met with an immediate
and hasty response from the legislature in the form of new legislation,
uncertainty about the law will result, and the public will lose confi-
dence in the legislative branch. This is not the case, however, when
the change in legislation after a judicial ruling reflects a thorough and
deliberate examination of the ruling and an objective expression of the
will of the legislature.
A case concerning the proper mechanics for the judicial-legislative
dialogue arose before the Israeli Supreme Court in 1994. 45s Two large
political parties in Israel signed a "coalition agreement" that when any
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decision changed the status
quo in matters of religion and state, the two parties would vote for a
change to the statute that would restore the status quo. The legality of
this agreement was attacked in the Supreme Court.45 6 Although all
the justices strongly criticized the agreement, the majority thought that
the agreement should not be voided as contrary to public policy.
My minority opinion argued that such an agreement undermined
public confidence in judges, in part because it drained the Court of its
role as a judicial institution. I also argued that the agreement violated
the separation of powers because of a prior agreement to bring about a
change in the judicial interpretation of legislation:
It dissolves the partnership between the branches in the legislative enter-
prise. It erects a wall between the legislature and the judiciary. It creates
a rift between the legislature and the judiciary. It requires the legislature
to change the judicial interpretation without considering it on its merits,
without examining its benefits and shortcomings and without even looking
454 See H.C. 3267/97, Rubinstein v. Minister of Def., 52(5) P.D. 481.
455 See Velner.
456 See id. at 758 (Barak, J., dissenting).
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at it. Even if the judicial interpretation is called for by the fabric of the
system's structure, even if it follows naturally and rationally from a vari-
ety of principles and values, even if it serves most of the interests and val-
ues that deserve protection, and even if it is firmly linked to the totality of
the system's arrangements - none of this justifies even one quick glance
at the decision and its logic, the ruling and its reasoning. The legislative
eye does not read the decision. The legislative ear does not take it in. The
legislative heart does not feel it.
45 7
Thus I argued that the coalition agreement was void because it un-
dermined the fabric of democratic life, which is contrary to public pol-
icy.4
5 8
4. The Importance of the Legislature. - The foundation of democ-
racy is a legislature elected freely and periodically by the people.
Without majority rule, as reflected in the power of the legislature,
there is no democracy. As judges and legal scholars, we often forget
this fundamental principle. Common law legal thought focuses mainly
on the judiciary and neglects the legislature. Jeremy Waldron has
rightly said that "legislation and legislatures have a bad name in legal
and political philosophy, a name sufficiently disreputable to cast doubt
on their credentials as respectable sources of law. '45 9 In contrast, my
conception of the role of a judge in a democracy recognizes the central
role of the legislature. Undermining the legislature undermines de-
mocracy. My conceptions of the rule of law and of the separation of
powers do not undermine the legislature. Rather, they ensure that all
branches of state act within the framework of the constitution and
statutes. Only thus can we maintain public confidence in the legisla-
ture; only thus can we preserve the dignity of legislation. Purposive
interpretation, which I have discussed, is also intended to protect the
status of the legislature. Indeed, in interpreting legislation, purposive
interpretation considers the legislature's subjective intent. I regard it
as an internal inconsistency in Waldron's approach that he wishes to
guarantee the status and importance of the legislature 460 but is not
prepared to interpret its legislation according to its own intent.461 My
conception of the partnership between the judge and the legislature is
intended to emphasize the importance of the legislature and its senior
position with regard to legislation. Justice McLachlin rightly said that
in democracies, "the elected legislators, the executive and the courts all
have their role to play. Each must play that role in a spirit of pro-
457 Id. at 791-92.
458 Section 30 of Israel's Contract Law provides that "[a] contract the making, contents or ob-
ject of which is or are illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy is void." The Contracts (Gen-
eral Part) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 117 (1972-1973).
459 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION I (1999).
460 See id. at 2.
461 See id. at 26-28.
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found respect for the other. We are not adversaries. We are all in the
justice business, together.
'462
Because of the democratic importance of the legislature, I regard
with concern the growing tendency of legislatures to delegate their leg-
islative powers to the executive. I am aware of the practical consid-
erations that underlie this tendency. Nonetheless, it seems to me that
the status of the legislature should be preserved at all costs. Thus, we
must ensure that the legislature prescribes all fundamental legal ar-
rangements by statute, and that the administrative agency has only the
power to implement the legislative will. The principle of separation of
powers requires this relationship. It implies that the legislature "lay[s]
down the general policy and standards that animate the law, leaving
the agency to refine those standards, 'fill in the blanks,' or apply the
standards to particular cases. '463 The German Constitutional Court
has discussed this requirement of the separation of powers principle,
stating that "[i]f [a statute] does not adequately define executive pow-
ers, then the executive branch will no longer implement the law and
act within legislative guidelines but will substitute its own decisions
for those of the legislature. This violates the principle of the separa-
tion of powers.
'464
The rule of law also "requires the legislature to establish the pri-
mary arrangements and principled standards, whereas the administra-
tion has authority to actualize these primary arrangements by estab-
lishing secondary arrangements and modes of implementation. '46 As
the German Constitutional Court has explained:
The basic tenets of the rule of law require that an empowering statute
adequately limit and define executive authorization to issue burdensome
administrative orders according to content, subject matter, purpose, and
scope ... so that official action [will] be comprehensible and to a certain
extent predictable for the citizen.
46 6
Indeed, the principle of democracy demands that:
[T]he substantive decisions regarding the policy of the State and the needs
of society must be made by its popularly elected representatives. [The leg-
islature] is elected by the people to enact its laws, and it therefore enjoys
social legitimacy in this activity .... The legislature may not refer the
critical and difficult decisions to the executive without giving it guid-
ance.
4 67
462 McLachlin, supra note 131, at 36 (1999).
463 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (198o) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring).
464 8 BVerfGE 274, 325 (1958), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 138.
465 H.C. 3267/97, Rubinstein v. Minister of Def., 52(5) P.D. 481, 507.
466 8 BverfGE, at 325.
467 Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 5o8-io.
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In legislative decisions that restrict human rights, the legislature
must determine the primary arrangements of the restrictions. Only in
this way will it be possible, in a democracy, to protect human rights
properly. Even a regime whose constitution protects human rights
may restrict them under certain conditions, one of which is that when
the restriction is made by statute, the statute must set out the princi-
pled, basic criteria for the restriction.
Naturally, the dividing line between primary arrangements, which
must be established by the legislature, and secondary arrangements,
which may be established in secondary legislation, is not clearly de-
fined. The realities of life sometimes necessitate a compromise in this
respect. It is difficult, in a modern democracy, to maintain fully this
principled approach to primary arrangements. The legislature can be
given some space to maneuver. Although a reasonably high level of
abstraction may be acceptable for criteria and policy guidelines, the es-
sential distinction between the roles of primary and secondary legisla-
tion must remain. Primary legislation must determine the general plan
and the criteria for making decisions that are critically important to
the life of the individual. From the statute itself - according to its
accepted interpretation - it must be possible to deduce the zone in
which the executive may act, and the primary directions that should
guide the executive in its actions.
Other countries have adopted this principled approach. United
States law accepts the doctrine of non-delegation, though this doctrine
has been clouded and infrequently applied.468 The German Constitu-
tional Court more actively applies the doctrine in limiting the legisla-
ture's ability to delegate power to executive officers or other institu-
tional actors. 469 In Israel, use of the doctrine began only recently.470
If we wish to preserve the proper status of the legislature in a democ-
racy, we must ensure that the legislature makes critical lawmaking de-
cisions and establishes criteria for other important decisions in its
legislation.
C. The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Executive
i. The Scope of Judicial Review with Regard to the Executive and
Its Chief Officers. - The executive derives its powers from the consti-
tution and statutes. Therefore, it must act within the framework of
the constitution and statutes. If it exceeds the authority given it, or if
it exercises that authority unlawfully, the judiciary must exercise the
power of review given to it by the constitution and statutes. The judi-
468 See I TRIBE, supra note 195, § 5-i9, at 977-78.
469 See CURRIE, supra note 75, at 132-33; KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 145.
470 See Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 502.
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ciary should use this power to determine the consequences of the ex-
ecutive's actions. Justice Nolan rightly said that "the proper constitu-
tional relationship of the executive with the courts is that the courts
will respect all acts of the executive within its lawful province, and
that the executive will respect all decisions of the court as to what its
lawful province is." 471 In this activity, the judiciary does not confront
the countermajoritarian argument, because in such cases, as long as no
constitutional problem arises, the legislature has the power, if it so
wishes, to change the outcome reached by the judiciary by amending
the statute. Indeed, when the judiciary reviews executive acts, it oper-
ates within the framework of its classic role in the separation of pow-
ers and in accordance with its role of maintaining the rule of law. In
this respect, there is no difference between the chief executive and any
one of its many ordinary employees. Every person who has authority
must exercise it lawfully, and if authority has been exercised unlaw-
fully, it must be subject to judicial review. Therefore, if the president
of the state grants a pardon, his action is subject to judicial review.
There is nothing in the nature of this act or in the status of the person
committing it to prevent this review. The court must examine the cri-
teria used by the president and evaluate whether he acted lawfully.
This is how the Supreme Court of Israel acted with regard to a peti-
tion in which the legality of the President's pretrial pardon of the head
of the General Security Service and several members of the Service
was considered. 472 With regard to the claim that there should be no
judicial interference with the President's pardons, I responded:
We are one branch of the state, and our role is to ensure that the other
branches act within the framework of the law, in order to preserve the
rule of law in the state. The branches of the state are lofty, but the law is
higher than all of us. We would not fulfill our judicial role if, in the con-
text of lawfully submitted petitions, we did not review the actions of the
other branches as they appear from the petitions before US.
4 7 3
With regard to the merits of the case, the court decided, by a majority
opinion from which I dissented, that the President had the power to
give a pardon before trial and that this power had been lawfully exer-
cised.
The Supreme Court of Israel adopted a similar approach when it
considered the cases of a cabinet minister indicted for bribery4 74 and a
deputy minister indicted for making false entries in corporate docu-
471 M. v. Home Office, i Q.B. 270, 314-15 (Eng. C.A. 1992).
472 H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) PD. 5o5.
473 Id. at 585-86 (Barak, J., dissenting)
474 H.C. 2533/97, Movement for Quality Gov't v. Gov't of Israel, 51(3) PD. 46.
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ments and for fraud 47 5 who both refused to resign their positions de-
spite these serious charges. The petition before us challenged the
Prime Minister's decision not to dismiss the cabinet minister and dep-
uty minister. We decided in both cases that the Prime Minister unlaw-
fully failed to exercise his power of dismissal and ordered him to dis-
miss them.476  They resigned before the power of dismissal was
exercised. In the petition referring to the deputy minister, I said:
[T]he Government, the Prime Minister, and all other ministers are public
trustees. They have nothing of their own. All that they have, they have
for the good of the public....
From this fiduciary duty derives the law - a general law that applies
to every governmental authority, including a government, a prime minis-
ter, and other ministers - that discretion granted to a public authority
must be exercised fairly and honestly, making reasonable use of relevant
considerations alone....
The fiduciary duty of the Prime Minister, the Government and each of
the ministers imposes a duty to consider whether to terminate the tenure
of a deputy minister who has been indicted....
Neither the Prime Minister, nor the Government, nor any of its minis-
tries may say: "the law has given us power to terminate the tenure of a
deputy minister; if we wish, we may terminate it, and if we wish, we may
refrain from doing so. The discretion is ours, and we will exercise it as we
see fit." Every power given to a branch of state must be exercised fairly
and reasonably. Every power has limits. We do not recognize "absolute"
discretion, bereft of any limits or restrictions.
477
In that case, it was argued that we should distinguish between an
"ordinary" civil servant and an elected public official, on the ground
that an elected public official holds office because of the public's con-
fidence in him, as expressed through a democratic electoral process,
and that this same process empowers the public to remove him from
office. I replied to this argument by saying:
The judgment of the voter is no substitute for the judgment of the law.
Indeed, the very fact that a person is an elected public official requires
him to adhere to a stricter, more ethical standard of behavior than an "or-
475 H.C. 4267/93, Amitai - Citizens for Proper Admin. & Integrity v. Prime Minister of Isr.,
47(5) P.D. 441.
476 In Amitai, I said that:
We again pointed out to the parties that ideally, they themselves should draw the conclu-
sions called for by the state of affairs, without judicial decision. We did not say this be-
cause we think that the dispute before us is "non-justiciable." We said it because we
think that in this justiciable matter, the executive office holders should, first and fore-
most, craft for themselves the norms for proper behavior by themselves.
Id. at 474.
477 Id. at 461-62.
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dinary" civil servant. Whoever is elected by the people must set an exam-
ple for the people, be faithful to the people, and deserve the trust that the
people have shown him. Therefore, when the executive holds the power
to terminate [a public official's tenure], it must exercise it when the official
undermines the confidence of the public in the government, whether the
official is elected (such as a member of Knesset serving as a deputy minis-
ter) or is a civil servant (such as an employee of the State whom a minister
has the power to dismiss).
4 78
Similarly, in another case, we invalidated the appointment of the
director-general of a government ministry because he had admitted to
very serious offenses for which he had been pardoned (as part of a pre-
trial pardon that the President gave to the members of the General Se-
curity Service).4 19 We balanced the accomplishments of the candidate
and the pardon that he had received (ten years before the appoint-
ment) against the offenses to which he had confessed. We determined
that in this case, his criminal past was decisive. In particular, we em-
phasized that the director-general of a ministry exercises disciplinary
powers over the employees of his ministry. Giving such an important
public office to this man would undermine public confidence in the
civil service. 48 0  His defenders argued that once the government de-
cided upon the appointment, there was no basis for judicial interven-
tion. The government, it was argued, had balanced the various con-
siderations, and after it had decided to make the appointment, the
Court should not have intervened and supplanted the government's
discretion with its own discretion. We rejected this argument by con-
cluding that the appointment amounted to an unreasonable action in
the extreme. We said that "the lofty status of the Government, as the
State's executive authority ... cannot give it powers that the law does
not give. Every state authority that makes an unreasonable decision is
subject to the court's intervention, and the Government is no excep-
tion to this rule. '48 I At the end of the opinion I added:
[T]his is the strength of a democracy that respects the rule of law. This is
the formal rule of law, under which all state authorities, including the
Government itself, are subject to the law. No authority is above the law;
no authority may act unreasonably. This is also the substantive rule of
law, under which a balance must be struck among the values, principles,
and interests of the democratic society, while empowering the State to ex-
ercise discretion that appropriately balances the proper considerations.
4 82
2. Judicial Review of the Attorney General's Decisions. - The At-
torney General in Israel - who is a civil servant and not a political
478 Id. at 470.
479 H.C. 6 16 3/92, Eisenberg v. Minister of Housing, 47(2) P.D. 229.
480 Id. at 266.
481 Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
482 Id.
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appointee - has extensive powers to issue indictments. Are these
powers subject to judicial review? 483 The Supreme Court of Israel has
said that they are.48 4 The Attorney General does not have a special
status; he is not immune from judicial review. He, like every other
civil servant, must exercise his discretion lawfully. He must act ac-
cording to relevant considerations, without discrimination, fairly, and
reasonably. If he deviates from this mandate, the Court will exercise
judicial review over the legality of his actions. But the Court will not
consider the wisdom of those actions or set itself up as a super Attor-
ney General. 48 5 The Court will treat the Attorney General like every
other civil servant whose actions are subject to judicial review. It fol-
lows that:
[T]he key question is not the extent of the court's intervention, but the va-
lidity of the Attorney General's decision. The real question is not the
grounds for the court's intervention, but the grounds that invalidate the
decision .... The question is not the court's discretion, but the discretion
of the Attorney General. Indeed, the extent of the court's intervention
maps onto the extent of the illegality of the Attorney General's deci-
sion....
In a country ruled by law, where the rule of law governs, there is no
justification for using special criteria to assess the validity of the discretion
of the person who heads the public prosecution service. Note that this
conclusion does not mean replacing the discretion of the Attorney General
with the discretion of the court. This conclusion does not mean invalidat-
ing a "wrong" decision of the Attorney General - that is, one in which he
chooses an undesirable but lawful decision. This conclusion means only
that all governmental actors are equal in the eyes of the law.
4 86
The Court has acted in accordance with this principle. We have
invalidated the Attorney General's exercise of discretion when he de-
clined, for lack of public interest, to indict bankers in charge of several
of Israel's banks. According to the findings of a State Commission of
Inquiry - findings that the Attorney General accepted - these bank-
ers acted contrary to the law, caused serious damage to many inves-
tors, and caused serious pecuniary loss to the state.48 7  In a similar
vein, we held that the Attorney General exercised his discretion unlaw-
483 See generally ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
484 The main judgment is in H.C. 935/89, Ganor v. Attorney General, 44(2) P.D. 485, translated
in ZAMIR AND ZYSBLAT, supra note 305, at 334.
485 For this reason petitions against the Attorney General have been dismissed on several occa-
sions in circumstances where the judges thought that, had they been acting as Attorney General,
they would have decided otherwise. See, e.g., H.C. 6209/01, Bar-Lev v. Attorney Gen. (not yet
reported).
486 Ganor, 44(2) P.D. at 527-28 (citation omitted).
487 See id.
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fully when he decided not to file a disciplinary claim against the Chief
Police Commissioner who unlawfully received gifts of small monetary
value, not for acts related to his position, but from persons who came
into contact with him as a result of his position as a policeman. 48 In a
much greater number of cases, though, we dismissed petitions against
the Attorney General after holding that he had acted reasonably.
48 9
In these rulings, we determined a proper legal regime for the be-
havior of the Attorney General. The head of the public prosecution
service has significant power. Power without responsibility becomes
arbitrariness. We prevented this arbitrariness. By doing so we also
protected the office of the Attorney General against all those who
wished to reduce its powers. One of the defenses against critics of
these powers is that they are not absolute because they are subject to
judicial review. It is no surprise that Israel has had no Watergate,
since an Attorney General who participates in illegal activity would
very quickly have to explain his actions and justify his decisions before
the Supreme Court. Every Attorney General, including myself during
my tenure in that position, knows this, and it helps him protect the
constitution and democracy.
3. Judicial Interpretation and Executive Interpretation. - Since
the Chevron490 decision, United States case law has provided that
when certain conditions exist, such as when the intention of the legisla-
ture regarding the jurisdiction of the executive is unclear and its lan-
guage is ambiguous, the court must defer to the executive's interpreta-
tion, provided that this interpretation is reasonable.491 I accept that,
in interpreting a statute dealing with the powers of a government au-
thority that has expertise in a field pertaining to the statute, some
weight should be attached to this authority's understanding of the
statute. This weight increases as the statute becomes more technical
or professional. I do not, however, accept that the judiciary should de-
fer to the executive's interpretation simply because this interpretation
is reasonable. In my view, the constitutional role of interpreting every
legal text - whether it is the constitution itself or a statute - belongs
to the Court: "The question that the court must ask itself is not
whether the executive's interpretation is reasonable. The question that
the court must ask itself is what is the correct interpretation of the
state power. '49 2 The responsibility of the judge, within the framework
488 See H.C. 7074/93, Suissa v. Attorney Gen., 48(2) P.D. 749.
489 See H.C. 2534/97, Yahav v. State Attorney, 51(3) P.D. i; H.C. 6781/96, Olmert v. Attorney
Gen., 50(4) P.D. 793; H.C. 4162/93, Federman v. Attorney Gen., 47(5) P.D. 309; H.C. 223/88,
Sheftel v. Attorney Gen., 43(4) P.D. 356.
490 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
491 See I TRIBE, supra note 195, § 5-I9, at 993-94.
492 H.C. 693/91, Efrant v. Dir. of Population Register, 47(I) P.D. 749, 761-62.
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of the separation of powers, is to give the proper interpretation to the
constitution and statutes. The judge cannot escape this responsibility.
Interpreting a statute is different from implementing or executing
it. A court's interpretation of a statute gives it a meaning that estab-
lishes the scope of executive authority. In implementing a statute, the
executive branch uses this authority. Using interpretation to deter-
mine the scope of authority is the job of the court. There is no defer-
ence here. In contrast, when there is more than one way to implement
a statute, the executive branch has the constitutional authority to
choose how to implement it. A judge must defer to the choices made
by the executive authority. The court will not interfere with a lawful
and reasonable implementation by the executive, even if it would not
have implemented the statute in the same way. For this very reason,
though, the court must intervene in a lawful and reasonable interpre-
tation by the executive if the court's own interpretation differs. The
"professional" implementer of the statute is the executive; the "profes-
sional" interpreter of the statute is the judiciary. In the constitutional
structure of a democratic state, the responsibility for interpreting stat-
utes lies with the judiciary, and it must ensure that its interpretation
- and not merely a reasonable interpretation of the executive - be
given to the statute: "A court will not be allowed to abandon its duty
- and its authority - in favor of the statutory interpretation of ex-
perts or the competent public body. The court is the 'expert' in statu-
tory interpretation . . . . ,,493 I expressed this idea in one of my opin-
ions:
[W]hen a judge faces two lawful interpretive solutions, he need not sup-
press his view of the proper interpretation because of the public authority.
The court must form its own opinion regarding which of the lawful inter-
pretations is proper. In doing so, it must take into consideration all the
circumstances of the matter. One of the "circumstances" in this regard is
the viewpoint of the public authority with regard to the proper interpreta-
tion. This approach is vital to an orderly regime. It does not ignore the
professionalism and responsibility of the other branch. At the same time,
it does not ignore the professionalism and responsibility of the judiciary.
Indeed, the court's interpretation of any given statute integrates, in this
way, into the court's interpretation of the entire body of legislation. A
statute does not stand alone. Nor is it interpreted only by the public au-
thority that implements it. All of the statutes constitute one system, in
which they mesh together in legislative harmony. When one interprets
one statute, one interprets all statutes. The overall responsibility for unit-
ing the systems lies with the court, and within the court system, the re-
493 H.C. 3648/97, Stamka v. Minister of Interior, 53(2) P.D. 728, 744.
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sponsibility is with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may not es-
cape this responsibility.
4 94
This approach is also accepted by the courts of other nations, includ-
ing those of the United Kingdom 495 and Canada.
496
4. Zone of Reasonableness. - Although the court should not defer
to the reasonable interpretation of the executive if the court's own in-
terpretation differs, the court must defer to the executive's implemen-
tation of a statute as long as the means of implementation falls within
a range or "zone" of reasonableness. The court must refrain from im-
posing its own preferences regarding implementation onto the society
in which it operates.
The key test here is reasonableness. Put simply, the executive must
act reasonably, for an unreasonable act is an unlawful act. In many
cases, the test of reasonableness allows for only one possibility, which
the executive must choose. Sometimes, however, the reasonableness
test allows for several possibilities, thereby creating a "zone of reason-
ableness." The executive has freedom of choice within this range. The
principle of separation of powers requires the executive, rather than
the judiciary, to choose one possibility within this zone. But the prin-
ciple of separation of powers requires the court, rather than the execu-
tive, to determine the limits of the zone of reasonableness.
The zone of reasonableness sets the boundaries for determining the
scope of judicial review of the executive's implementation. Nonethe-
less, the concept of reasonableness is notoriously vague. Most people
use the term in a circular manner without giving it any real content.
The only way to further the discussion about the substance of reason-
ableness is to recognize that reasonableness is neither a physical nor a
metaphysical concept, but a normative one. Reasonableness means
that one identifies the relevant considerations and then balances them
according to their weight. 497 Indeed, reasonableness is an evaluative
process, not a descriptive process. It is not a concept that is defined by
deductive logic. It is not merely rationality. A decision is reasonable if
it was made by weighing the necessary considerations, including fun-
494 H.C. 399/85, Kahana v. Broad. Auth. Mgmt. Bd., 4i(3) RD. 255, 305-06.
495 See Black-Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, [i975] All E.R.
81o, 828 ("[Ilt is the function of the courts to say what the application of the words [of a piece of
legislation] used for particular cases or individuals is to be .... [I]t would be a degradation of that
process if the courts were to be merely a reflecting mirror of what some other interpretation
agency might say.").
496 See Southam Inc. v. Dir. of Investigation & Research, [i997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 751-52.
497 See Manuel Atienza, On the Reasonable in Law, 3 RATIO JURIS 248 (I99O); MacCormick,
supra note 250, at 131.
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damental values in general and human rights in particular.498 Nothing
is reasonable "in itself. '499
When I engage in judicial review of executive activity, the criterion
of reasonableness and the "zone of reasonableness" play a central role.
These factors are particularly important when the relevant balance is
between the needs of the public and the rights of the individual500 or
in matters dealing with government ethics and proper administration.
For example, our Court used the principle of reasonableness to hold
that a minister and deputy minister indicted for serious offenses were
obliged to resign;50' indeed, it would have been unreasonable not to
dismiss them. Similarly, we held that a person with a significant
criminal past cannot be appointed as director-general of a government
ministry.50 2 The principle of reasonableness has also guided us in de-
ciding to review the legality of the Attorney General's use of prosecu-
torial discretion5 0 3 in holding that the army should not promote offi-
cers who had committed sexual harassment50 4 and in restricting a
transitional or "lame duck" government's scope of power to negotiate a
peace agreement.5 0
5
This last ruling was met with criticism in Israel.5 0 6 Those same in-
dividuals who supported the use of the reasonableness test in the con-
text of human rights strongly criticized its use in the government ethics
context. I understand this criticism, but I disagree. It is appropriate
to use the reasonableness test in reviewing executive actions, including
issues of government ethics. Naturally, in countries where there is
self-restraint in government, there may be no need to develop the prin-
ciple of reasonableness in government ethics. But in countries where
this self-restraint is lacking - and the concept of "it is not done" is in-
sufficiently developed - it is proper to extend the principle of reason-
ableness to all government actions. I do not see any possibility of re-
stricting reasonableness to one field. If the principle of reasonableness
should be applied in protecting the freedom of the individual, it should
also be applied to other kinds of protections involving government ac-
tivity. Consistent application of this principle can strengthen public
498 See Jeffrey Jowell, Courts and the Administration in Britain: Standards, Principles and
Rights, 22 ISR. L. REV. 409, 419 (1988); Jeffrey Jowell & Anthony Lester, Beyond Wednesbury:
Substantive Principles of Administrative Law, 1987 PUB. L. 368, 370-71.
499 H.C. 935/89, Ganor v. Attorney Gen., 12(2) PD. 485, 514.
500 See Jowell & Lester, supra note 498, at 373.
501 See supra pp. 66-41.
502 See supra p. 66.
503 See supra pp. 66-43.
504 See H.C. 1284/99, Anonymous v. Army Chief of Staff, 62(2) P.D. 57.
505 See H.C. 5167/00, Weiss v. Prime Minister, 455(2) P.D. 55.
506 See Ruth Gavison, Public Involvment of the Supreme Court: A Critical View, in JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM: FOR AND AGAINST - THE ROLE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI
SOCIETY 79 (Ruth Gavison, Mordechai Kremnitzer & Yoav Dolan eds., 2000).
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confidence in the government, which is fundamental to government's
operation.
I should reemphasize that the reasonableness test requires the
evaluator not to consider how he himself would act in the role of the
civil servant but how the "reasonable civil servant" would act. Acting
as the reasonable civil servant, I do not impose my subjective perspec-
tive on the government but instead recognize that there can be multi-
ple reasonable ways to achieve a given goal. As with all of my judicial
activity, when applying the reasonableness test, I give weight to the
various considerations and balance them.
In recent years, the concept of proportionality has developed along
with the concept of reasonableness. Proportionality first spread in
Continental law, and then entered the common-law systems. Propor-
tionality first impacted constitutional law through holdings that a law
limiting a constitutional human right must be proportional;50 7 it then
spread into administrative law.508 The path is open for it to penetrate
other fields of law.
To determine proportionality, a judge employs three cumulative
sub-tests:50 9 First, an action is proportionate if it is appropriate for
achieving the goal. The means must fit the goal. The means must be
appropriate for achieving the goal. The means must lead, rationally,
to the realization of the goal. Thus, for example, a statute establishing
a presumption that anyone possessing illegal narcotics is a drug dealer
is disproportionate, because there is no rational connection between
possessing a small amount of a "recreational" drug and dealing
drugs. 510 Second, an action is proportionate if there are no other
means appropriate for achieving the goal that would undermine the
principles that we want to protect (such as human rights) to a lesser
degree. Thus, for example, some consider the death penalty dispropor-
tionate because life imprisonment, a less extreme action with respect to
human rights, can also achieve the purposes of punishment.511 Third,
507 The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted the principle of proportionality in its interpreta-
tion of the Limitation Clause. See CAN. CONST. pt. I, § i; see also The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103, 1O5; HOGG, supra note 103, at 889. In view of the great similarity between the Conti-
nental test and the Canadian test, we may assume that the former influenced the latter. The
United Kingdom ultimately adopted a similar test. See Regina (Daly) v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, 2 W.L.R. 1622 (2001).
508 See CURRIE, supra note 75, at 309; JORGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 677 (1992); MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW
PERSPECTIVE 165 (2oos); Grdinne de Bdrca, Proportionality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness:
The Influence of European Legal Concepts on UK Law, 3 EUR. PUB. L. 561 (997). See generally
NICHOLAS EMILOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW (2996);
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999).
509 See Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 138-39.
510 Id. at Io6.
511 See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391, 437 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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an act is disproportionate if the harm to a protected value is too dras-
tic in relation to the benefit of achieving the goal. Suppose, for exam-
ple, a foreign worker commits a minor offense. Proportionality de-
mands that the government not deport this worker because he would
be separated from his wife who lives in that country and from his
children who were born there. 512  Therefore, like its partner the rea-
sonableness test, proportionality serves as a powerful tool for a judge
to realize his role in a democracy.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM
A. Terrorism and Democracy
Terrorism plagues many countries. The United States realized its
devastating power on September ii, 2001. Other countries, such as
Israel, have suffered from terrorism for a long time.s 13 While terror-
ism poses difficult questions for every country, it poses especially chal-
lenging questions for democratic countries, because not every effective
means is a legal means. I discussed this in one case, in which our
Court held that violent interrogation of a suspected terrorist is not
lawful, even if doing so may save human life by preventing impending
terrorist acts:
We are aware that this decision does not make it easier to deal with
that reality. This is the fate of democracy, as not all means are acceptable
to it, and not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Some-
times, a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back. None-
theless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition
of individual liberties constitute an important component of its under-
standing of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.
5 14
Terrorism creates much tension between the essential components
of democracy. One pillar of democracy - the rule of the people
through its elected representatives - may encourage taking all steps
effective in fighting terrorism, even if they are harmful to human
rights. The other pillar of democracy - human rights - may encour-
age protecting the rights of every individual, including the terrorists,
even at the cost of undermining the fight against terrorism. Struggling
with this tension is primarily the task of the legislature and the execu-
tive, which are accountable to the people. But true democratic ac-
countability cannot be satisfied by the judgment of the people alone.
512 See SINGH, supra note 508, at 166-67.
513 For a comparison of the American experience and the Israeli experience, see WILLIAM J.
BRENNAN, JR., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Time of Security Cri-
ses, i8 ISR. YEARBOOK HUM. RTS. ii (1988).
514 H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845.
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The legislature must also justify its decisions to judges, who are re-
sponsible for protecting the principles of democracy.
We, the judges in modern democracies, are responsible for protect-
ing democracy both from terrorism and from the means the state
wants to use to fight terrorism. Of course, matters of daily life con-
stantly test judges' ability to protect democracy, but judges meet their
supreme test in situations of war and terrorism. The protection of
every individual's human rights is a much more formidable duty in
times of war and terrorism than in times of peace and security. If we
fail in our role in times of war and terrorism, we will be unable to ful-
fill our role in times of peace and security. It is a myth to think that
we can maintain a sharp distinction between the status of human
rights during a period of war and the status of human rights during a
period of peace. It is self-deception to believe that a judicial ruling
will be valid only during wartime and that things will change in
peacetime. The line between war and peace is thin - what one per-
son calls peace, another calls war. In any case, it is impossible to
maintain this distinction over the long term. Since its founding, Israel
has faced a security threat. As a Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court,
how should I view my role in protecting human rights given this situa-
tion? I must take human rights seriously during times of both peace
and conflict. I must not make do with the mistaken belief that, at the
end of the conflict, I can turn back the clock.
Furthermore, a mistake by the judiciary in times of war and terror-
ism is worse than a mistake of the legislature and the executive in
times of war and terrorism. The reason is that the judiciary's mistakes
will remain with the democracy when the threat of terrorism passes,
and will be entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet for the
development of new and problematic laws. This is not so with a mis-
take of the other branches, which can be erased through legislation or
executive action and usually forgotten. In his dissent in Korematsu v.
United States,51 Justice Jackson expressed this distinction well:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this or-
der is a far more subtle blow to liberty .... A military order, however un-
constitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency...
But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con-
forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward
a plausible claim of an urgent need .... A military commander may over-
step the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review
515 323 U.S. 214 (944).
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and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitu-
tion. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates
will be in its own image.
5 16
Indeed, we judges must act coherently and consistently. A wrong
decision in a time of war and terrorism plots a point that will cause
the judicial graph to deviate after the crisis passes. This is not the
case with the other branches of state, whose actions during a time of
war and terrorism may amount to an episode that does not affect deci-
sions made during times of peace and security.
Moreover, democracy ensures us, as judges, independence and im-
partiality. Because of our unaccountability, it strengthens us against
the fluctuations of public opinion. The real test of this independence
and impartiality comes in situations of war and terrorism. The signifi-
cance of our unaccountability becomes clear in these situations, when
public opinion is more likely to be unanimous. Precisely in these
times, we judges must hold fast to fundamental principles and values;
we must embrace our supreme responsibility to protect democracy and
the constitution. Lord Atkins's remarks on the subject of administra-
tive detention during World War II aptly describe these duties of a
judge. In a minority opinion in November 1941, he wrote:
In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has al-
ways been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for
which . .. we are now fighting, that the judges... stand between the sub-
ject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive,
alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.5 17
Admittedly, the struggle against terrorism turns our democracy into
a "defensive democracy" or a "fighting democracy." Nonetheless, this
defense and this fight must not deprive our regime of its democratic
character. Defensive democracy: yes; uncontrolled democracy: no.
The judges in the highest court of the modern democracy must act in
this spirit. We have tried to do so in Israel, and I will now discuss
several fundamental views that have guided us in these efforts.
B. In Battle, the Laws Are Not Silent
There is a well-known saying that when the cannons speak, the
Muses are silent. Cicero expressed a similar idea when he said that
"inter arma silent leges" (in battle, the laws are silent).51 8 These state-
ments are regrettable; I hope they do not reflect our democracies to-
516 Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
517 Liversidge v. Anderson, 3 All E.R. 338, 361 (194) (Atkins, L.J., minority opinion).
518 See CICERO, PRO MILONE i6 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 5th ed. 1972).
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day.519 I know they do not reflect the way things should be. Every
battle a country wages - against terrorism or any other enemy - is
done according to rules and laws. There is always law - domestic or
international - according to which the state must act. And the law
needs Muses, never more urgently than when the cannons speak. We
need laws most in times of war. As Harold Koh said, referring to the
September ii, 2OO attacks:
In the days since, I have been struck by how many Americans - and how
many lawyers - seem to have concluded that, somehow, the destruction
of four planes and three buildings has taken us back to a state of nature in
which there are no laws or rules. In fact, over the years, we have devel-
oped an elaborate system of domestic and international laws, institutions,
regimes, and decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be
consulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a time like this.
5 20
During the Gulf War, Iraq fired missiles at Israel. Israel feared
chemical and biological warfare as well, so the government distributed
gas masks. A suit was brought against the military commander, argu-
ing that he distributed gas masks unequally in the West Bank. We ac-
cepted the petitioner's argument. In my opinion, I wrote:
When the cannons speak, the Muses are silent. But even when the can-
nons speak, the military commander must uphold the law. The power of
society to stand up against its enemies is based on its recognition that it is
fighting for values that deserve protection. The rule of law is one of these
values.
5 2 1
This opinion sparked criticism; some argued that the Supreme
Court had improperly interfered with in Israel's struggle against Iraq.
I believe that this criticism is unjustified. We did not intervene in
military considerations, for which the expertise and responsibility lie
with the executive. Rather, we intervened in considerations of equal-
ity, for which the expertise and responsibility rest with the judiciary.
Indeed, the struggle against terrorism is not conducted outside the law,
but within the law, using tools that the law makes available to a de-
mocratic state. Terrorism does not justify the neglect of accepted legal
norms. This is how we distinguish ourselves from the terrorists them-
selves. They act against the law, by violating and trampling it, while
in its war against terrorism, a democratic state acts within the frame-
work of the law and according to the law. Justice Haim Cohen ex-
pressed this idea well more than twenty years ago, when he said:
What distinguishes the war of the State from the war of its enemies is that
the State fights while upholding the law, whereas its enemies fight while
519 But cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 224 (1998) (arguing that Cicero's approach reflects reality).
520 Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23 (2002).
521 H.C. 168/9i, Morcos v. Minister of Def., 45(0) PD. 467, 470-71.
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violating the law. The moral strength and objective justness of the Gov-
ernment's war depend entirely on upholding the laws of the State: by con-
ceding this strength and this justness, the Government serves the purposes
of the enemy. Moral weapons are no less important than any other
weapon, and perhaps more important. There is no weapon more moral
than the rule of law. Everyone who ought to know should be aware that
the rule of law in Israel will never succumb to the state's enemies.
52 2
Indeed, the war against terrorism is the war of a law-abiding na-
tion and its law-abiding citizens against lawbreakers. It is, therefore,
not merely a war of the state against its enemies; it is also a war of the
Law against its enemies. My recent opinion in the case involving the
alleged food shortage among the besieged Palestinians in the Church of
the Nativity in Bethlehem addressed this role of the rule of law as a
primary actor in matters of terrorism. We considered the petition and
applied the relevant rules of international law. In doing so, I said:
Israel is in a difficult war against rampant terrorism. It is acting on the
basis of its right to self-defense .... This armed conflict is not under-
taken in a normative vacuum. It is undertaken according to the rules of
international law, which establish the principles and rules for armed con-
flicts. The saying that "when the cannons speak, the Muses are silent" is
incorrect.... The reason underlying this approach is not merely prag-
matic, the result of political and normative reality. The reason underlying
this approach is much deeper. It is an expression of the difference be-
tween a democratic State fighting for its survival and the battle of terror-
ists rising up against it. The State is fighting for the law and for the law's
protection. The terrorists are fighting against and in defiance of the law.
The armed conflict against terrorism is an armed conflict of the law
against those who seek to destroy it .... But in additon, the State of Israel
is a State whose values are Jewish and democratic. Here we have estab-
lished a State that preserves law, that achieves its national goals and the
vision of generations, and that does so while recognizing and realizing
human rights in general and human dignity in particular. Between these
two there are harmony and accord, not conflict and estrangement.
5 23
Therefore, as Justice Michael Cheshin has written: "[W]e will not fal-
ter in our efforts for the rule of law. We have sworn by our oath to
dispense justice, to be the servant of the law, and we will be faithful to
our oath and to ourselves. Even when the trumpets of war sound, the
rule of law will make its voice heard.
'524
Discussing democracy's war on terrorism, Justice Kirby has rightly
pointed out that it must be waged while "[k]eeping proportion. Adher-
ing to the ways of democracy. Upholding constitutionalism and the
522 H.C. 320/80, Kwasama v. Minister of Def., 5(3) P.D. 113, 132.
523 H.C. 345 1/02, Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria, 56(3) P.D. 30, 34-35.
524 H.C. 173o/96, Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria, 5o(l) P.D. 353, 369.
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rule of law. Defending, even under assault, and even for the feared
and hated, the legal rights of suspects.
'52 5
C. The Balance Between National Security and Freedom of the
Individual
Democratic nations should conduct the struggle against terrorism
with a proper balance between two conflicting values and principles.
On one hand, we must consider the values and principles relating to
the security of the state and its citizens. Human rights are not a stage
for national destruction; they cannot justify undermining national se-
curity in every case and in all circumstances. Similarly, a constitution
is not a prescription for national suicide.' 2 6 But on the other hand, we
must consider the values and principles relating to human dignity and
freedom. National security cannot justify undermining human rights
in every case and under all circumstances. National security does not
grant an unlimited license to harm the individual.
Democratic nations must find a balance between these conflicting
values and principles. Neither side can rule alone. In a case that dealt
with the legality of administrative detention, I said:
There is no avoiding - in a democracy aspiring to freedom and security
- a balance between freedom and dignity on the one hand, and security
on the other. Human rights must not become a tool for denying security
to the public and the State. A balance is required - a sensitive and diffi-
cult balance - between the freedom and dignity of the individual, and
national security and public security.5
27
This synthesis between national security and individual freedom
reflects the rich and fertile character of the principle of rule of law in
particular, and of democracy in general. It is within the framework of
this approach that the courts in Israel have made their decisions con-
cerning the state's armed conflict against the terrorism that plagues it.
Our Supreme Court - which in Israel serves as the court of first in-
stance for complaints against the executive branch - opens its doors
to anyone with a complaint about the activities of a public authority.
Even if the terrorist activities occur outside Israel or the terrorists are
being detained outside Israel, we recognize our authority to hear the
issue. We have not used the Act of State doctrine or non-justiciability
under these circumstances. We consider these issues on their merits.
Nor do we require injury in fact as a standing requirement; we recog-
nize the standing of anyone to challenge the act. In the context of ter-
rorism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on petitions concerning
525 Kirby, supra note 77, at 32.
526 See C.A. 2/84, Neiman v. Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm. for Eleventh Knesset, 39(2)
P.D. 225, 310; cf Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 0949) (Jackon, J., dissenting).
527 Cr.A. 7048/97, Anonymous v. Minister of Def., 54(i) P.D. 72 1, 741.
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the power of the state to arrest suspected terrorists and the conditions
of their confinement. It has ruled on petitions concerning the rights of
suspected terrorists to legal representation and the means by which
they may be interrogated. These hearings sometimes take place just
hours after the alleged incident about which the suspected terrorist
complains. When necessary, the Court issues a preliminary injunction
preventing the state from continuing the interrogation until the Court
can determine that it is being conducted legally. In one case, the state
sought to deport 400 suspected terrorists to Lebanon. Human rights
organizations petitioned us. I was the Justice on call at the time. Late
that night, I issued an interim order enjoining the deportation. At the
time, the deportees were in automobiles en route to Lebanon. The or-
der immediately halted the deportation. Only after a hearing held in
our Court throughout the night that included comprehensive argumen-
tation, including testimony by the Army's Chief of Staff, did we in-
validate the deportation order.5 28 We ruled that the state breached its
obligation to grant the deportees the right to a hearing before deport-
ing them, and we ordered a post factum right to a hearing.
In all these decisions - and there have been hundreds of this kind
- we have recognized the power of the state to protect its security and
the security of its citizens on the one hand; on the other hand, we have
emphasized that the rights of every individual must be preserved, in-
cluding the rights of the individual suspected of being a terrorist. The
balancing point between the conflicting values and principles is not
constant, but rather differs from case to case and from issue to issue.
The damage to national security caused by a given terrorist act and
the nation's response to that act affect the way the freedom and dig-
nity of the individual are protected. Thus, for example, when the re-
sponse to terrorism was the destruction of the terrorists' homes, we
discussed the need to act proportionately. We concluded that only
when human life has been lost is it permissible to destroy the buildings
where the terrorists lived, and even then the goal of the destruction
may not be collective punishment (which is forbidden in an area under
military occupation).5 29 Such destruction may be used only for preven-
tive purposes, and even then the owner of the building to be destroyed
has a right to a prior hearing unless such a hearing would interfere
with current military activity.5 30 Obviously, there is no right to a
528 See H.C. 5973/92, Ass'n for Civil Rights in Isr. v. Minister of Def., 47(I) PD. 267.
529 See H.C. 5510/92, Turkeman v. Minister of Def., 48(1) P.D. 217. Harsh criticism has been
leveled at this opinion and others like it. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF
JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES i6o-6i
(2002).
530 See H.C. 6696/02, Adal Sado Amar v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, http://www.
court.gov.il.
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hearing in the middle of a military operation. But when the time and
place permit - and there is no danger of interference with security
forces that are fighting terrorism - this right should be honored as
much as possible.
5 3 1
When it was necessary to use administrative detention against ter-
rorists, we interpreted the relevant legislation to determine that the
purpose of administrative detention laws is twofold: "On one hand,
protecting national security; on the other hand, protecting the dignity
and freedom of every person. '532 We added that "protection of na-
tional security is a social interest that every State strives to satisfy.
Within this framework, democratic freedom-loving countries recognize
the 'institution' of administrative detention. '533  We also concluded
that "defending and protecting ... freedom and dignity extend even to
the freedom and dignity of someone whom the state wishes to confine
in administrative detention. 5 34 Against this background, we held:
[I]t is possible to allow - in a democratic state that aspires to freedom
and security - the administrative detention of a person who is regarded
personally as a danger to national security. But this possibility should not
be extended to the detention of a person who is not regarded personally as




The war against terrorism also requires the interrogation of terror-
ists, which must be conducted according to the ordinary rules of inter-
rogation. Physical force must not be used in these interrogations; spe-
cifically, the persons being interrogated must not be tortured.
5 36
Any balance that is struck between security and freedom will im-
pose certain limitations on both. A proper balance will not be
achieved when human rights are fully protected, as if there were no
terrorism. Similarly, a proper balance will not be achieved when na-
tional security is afforded full protection, as if there were no human
rights. The balance and compromise are the price of democracy. Only
a strong, safe, and stable democracy may afford and protect human
rights, and only a democracy built on the foundations of human rights
can have security. It follows that the balance between security and
freedom does not reflect the lack of a clear position. On the contrary,
the proper balance is the result of a clear position that recognizes both
the need for security and the need for human rights. I discussed this
in a difficult case addressing whether the state may forcibly relocate
residents of an occupied territory who pose a threat to state security:
531 See id.
532 Anonymous, 54() P.D. at 740.
533 Id.
534 Id.
535 Id. at 741.
536 H.C. 5 100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) PD. 817, 835.
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"A delicate and sensitive balance is necessary. That is the price of
democracy. It is expensive but worthwhile. It strengthens the state.
It gives it a reason to its fight.
'5 37
When a court rules on the balance between security and freedom
during times of terrorist threats, it often encounters complaints from
all sides. The supporters of human rights argue that the court gives
too much protection to security and too little to human rights. The
supporters of security argue the converse. Frequently, those making
these arguments only read the judicial conclusions without considering
the judicial reasoning that seeks to reach a proper balance among the
conflicting values and principles. None of this should intimidate the
judge; he must rule according to his best understanding and con-
science.
538
D. The Scope of Judicial Intervention
Judicial review of the war against terrorism by its nature raises
questions regarding the timing and scope of judicial intervention.
There is no theoretical difference between applying judicial review be-
fore or after the war on terrorism. In practice, however, as Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist has correctly noted, the timing of judicial intervention
affects its content. As he stated, "courts are more prone to uphold
wartime claims of civil liberties after the war is over. 5 39 In light of
this recognition, Chief Justice Rehnquist goes on to ask whether it
would be better to abstain from judicial adjudication during war-
fareA40 The answer, from my point of view - and, I am sure, that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist - is clear: I will adjudicate a question when
it is presented to me. I will not defer it until the war on terror is over,
because the fate of a human being may hang in the balance. The pro-
tection of human rights would be bankrupt if, during armed conflict,
courts - consciously or unconsciously - decided to review the execu-
tive branch's behavior only after the period of emergency has ended.
Furthermore, the decision should not rest on issuing general declara-
tions about the balance of human rights and the need for security.
Rather, the judicial ruling must impart guidance and direction in the
specific case before it. As Justice Brennan correctly noted: "abstract
principles announcing the applicability of civil liberties during times of
war and crisis are ineffectual when a war or other crisis comes along
unless the principles are fleshed out by a detailed jurisprudence ex-
537 H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, http://www.court.gov.il.
538 See H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) PD. 505, 585 (Barak, J., dissenting).
539 REHNQUIST, supra note 519, at 222.
540 Id.
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plaining how those civil liberties will be sustained against particular-
ized national security concerns.
'541
From a judicial review perspective, the situation in Israel is unique.
Petitions from suspected terrorists reach the Supreme Court - which
has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters - in real time. The judi-
cial adjudication may take place not only during combat, but also of-
ten while the events being reviewed are still taking place. For exam-
ple, the question whether the General Security Service may use
extraordinary methods of interrogation (including what has been clas-
sified as torture) did not come before us in the context of a criminal
case in which we had to rule, ex post, on the admissibility of a sus-
pected terrorist's confession. 42 Rather, the question arose at the be-
ginning of his interrogation. The suspect's lawyer came before us at
the start of the interrogation and claimed, on the basis of past experi-
ence, that the General Security Service would torture his client. When
we summoned the state's representative hours later, he confirmed the
lawyer's allegation but nonetheless argued that the interrogation was
legal. We had to make a decision in real time. How must we, as Su-
preme Court justices in a democracy, approach such an issue?
I believe that the court should not adopt a position on the efficient
security measures for fighting against terrorism: "this court will not
take any stance on the manner of conducting the combat. '543 For ex-
ample, in a petition filed by citizens who were in the precincts of the
Church of the Nativity when it was besieged by the Army - a peti-
tion that was filed while negotiations were being held between the
Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding a solu-
tion to the problem - I wrote that "this court is not conducting the
negotiations and is not taking part in them. The national responsibil-
ity in this affair lies with the executive and those acting on its be-
half. '5 44  Indeed, the efficiency of security measures is within the
power of the other branches of government. As long as these branches
are acting within the framework of the "zone of reasonableness,
'"5 4 5
there is no basis for judicial intervention. Often the executive will ar-
gue that "security considerations" led to a government action and re-
quest that the court be satisfied with this argument. Such a request
should not be granted. "Security considerations" are not magic words.
The court must insist on learning the specific security considerations
that prompted the government's actions. The court must also be per-
suaded that these considerations actually motivated the government's
541 BRENNAN, supra note 513, at ig.
542 See H.C. 4054/95, Pub. Comm'n Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel, 43(4) P.D. 817.
543 H.C. 3114/02, Barakeh v. Minister of Def., 56(3) P.D. ii, i6.
544 H.C. 3451/02, Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria, 56(3) P.D. 30, 36.
545 See supra pp. 66-46.
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actions and were not merely pretextual. Finally, the court must be
convinced that the security measures adopted were the available
measures least damaging to human rights. Indeed, in several of the
many security measure cases that the Supreme Court has heard, senior
army commanders and heads of the security services testified. Only if
we were convinced, in the total balance, that the security consideration
was the dominant one, and that the security measure was proportion-
ate to the terrorist act, did we dismiss the challenge against the ac-
tion.146 We should be neither na'ive nor cynical. We should analyze
objectively the evidence before us. In a case dealing with review, un-
der the Geneva Convention, of the state's decision to assign the resi-
dence of Arabs from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, I noted that:
In exercising judicial review ... we do not make ourselves into security
experts. We do not replace the military commander's security considera-
tions with our own. We take no position on the way security issues are
handled. Our job is to maintain boundaries, and to guarantee the exis-
tence of conditions that restrict the military commander's discretion
... because of the important security aspects in which the commander's
decision is grounded. We do not, however, replace the commander's dis-
cretion with our own. We insist upon the legality of the military com-
mander's exercise of discretion and that it fall into the range of reason-
ableness, determined by the relevant legal norms applicable to the
issue.
547
Is it proper for judges to review the legality of the war on terror-
ism? Many, on both extremes of the political spectrum, argue that the
courts should not become involved in these matters. On one side, crit-
ics argue that judicial review undermines security; on the other side,
critics argue that judicial review gives undeserved legitimacy to gov-
ernment actions against terrorism. Both arguments are unacceptable.
Judicial review of the legality of the war on terrorism may make this
war harder in the short term, but it also fortifies and strengthens the
people in the long term. The rule of law is a central element in na-
tional security. As I wrote in the case of the pretrial pardon given to
the heads of the General Security Service:
There is no security without law. The rule of law is a component of na-
tional security. Security requires us to find proper tools for interrogation.
Otherwise, the General Security Service will be unable to fulfill its mis-
sion. The strength of the Service lies in the public's confidence in it. Its
546 In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, No. UKHL4 7 , 2001 WL
1135176 (H.L. Oct. II, 2001) (U.K.), Lord Hoffman noted that "the judicial arm of government
[needs] to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for
terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security." I hope the mean-
ing of these comments is limited to the general principle that a court determines not the means of
fighting terrorism but rather the lawfulness of the means employed.
547 H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, http://www.court.gov.il.
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strength lies in the court's confidence in it. If security considerations tip
the scales, neither the public nor the court will have confidence in the Se-
curity Service and the lawfulness of its interrogations. Without this confi-
dence, the branches of the state cannot function. This is true of public
confidence in the courts, and it true of public confidence in the other
branches of state.
5 4 8
I concluded my opinion in that case with the following historical anal-
ogy:
It is said that there was a dispute between King James I and Justice Coke.
The question was whether the king could take matters in the province of
the judiciary into his own hands and decide them himself. At first, Justice
Coke tried to persuade the king that judging required expertise that the
king did not have. The king was not convinced. Then Justice Coke rose
and said: "Quod rex non debet sub homine, sed sub deo et lege." The king
is not subject to man, but subject to God and the law. Let it be so.
5 4 9
The security considerations entertained by the branches of the state
are subject to "God and the law." In the final analysis, this subservi-
ence strengthens democracy. It makes the struggle against terrorism
worthwhile. To the extent that the legitimacy of the court means that
the acts of the state are lawful, the court fulfills an important role.
Public confidence in the branches of the state is vital for democracy.
Both when the state wins and when it loses, the rule of law and de-
mocracy benefit. The main effect of the judicial decision occurs not in
the individual instance that comes before it but by determining the
general norms according to which governmental authorities act and es-
tablishing the deterrent effect that these norms will have. The test of
the rule of law arises not merely in the few cases brought before the
court, but also in the many potential cases that are not brought before
it, since governmental authorities are aware of the court's rulings and
act accordingly. The argument that judicial review necessarily vali-
dates the governmental action does not take into account the nature of
judicial review. In hearing a case, the court does not examine the wis-
dom of the war against terrorism, but only the legality of the acts
taken in furtherance of the war. The court does not ask itself if it
would have adopted the same security measures if it were responsible
for security. Instead, the court asks if a reasonable person responsible
for security would be prudent to adopt the security measures that were
adopted. Thus, the court does not express agreement or disagreement
with the means adopted, but rather fulfills its role of reviewing the
constitutionality and legality of the executive acts.
Naturally, one must not go from one extreme to the other. One
must recognize that the court will not solve the problem of terrorism.
548 H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 55, 622 (citation omitted).
549 Id. at 623.
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It is a problem to be addressed by the other branches of government.
The court's role is to ensure the constitutionality and legality of the
fight against terrorism. It must ensure that the war against terrorism
is conducted within the framework of the law. This is the court's con-
tribution to democracy's struggle to survive. In my opinion, it is an
important contribution, one that aptly reflects the judicial role in a
democracy. Realizing this rule during a fight against terrorism is diffi-
cult. We cannot and would not want to escape from this difficulty, as
I noted in one case:
The decision has been laid before us, and we must stand by it. We are
obligated to preserve the legality of the regime even in difficult decisions.
Even when the artillery booms and the Muses are silent, law exists and
acts and decides what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is legal
and what is illegal. And when law exists, courts also exist to adjudicate
what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is legal and what is illegal.
Some of the public will applaud our decision; others will oppose it. Per-
haps neither side will have read our reasoning. We have done our part,
however. That is our role and our obligations as judges.
550
VII. WHAT OF THE FUTURE?
What does the future hold for the role of a supreme court in a de-
mocracy? It is, of course, impossible to foretell the future. But we can
make several suppositions. Will the pendulum of history return us to
the status and role of supreme courts before the human rights revolu-
tion? Can we expect a counterrevolution? Personally, I do not foresee
such a drastic change in the perception of the nature of constitutional
democracy and the status of human rights in a democracy. If we deal
with the phenomenon of terrorism properly, even it will not be able to
undermine the proper perceptions of human rights and the judicial
role. It is possible to contend with terrorism within the framework of
constitutional democracy. Terrorism will have triumphed if it alters
the nature of constitutional democracy in the direction of undermining
human rights.
I hope that in the future we will have a better understanding of the
tools with which the court fulfills its role. Jurisprudence and case law
must provide the courts with an acceptable doctrine for the interpreta-
tion of constitutions and statutes. It is a badge of shame for us all that
such a doctrine has not yet been established. I also hope that juris-
prudence will provide us with a better understanding of the tool of
"balancing" and aid us in determining the "weight" of competing val-
550 H.C. 2161/96, Rabbi Said Sharif v. Military Commander, 50(4) PD. 485, 491.
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ues. I am convinced that with globalization, comparative law will
play an increasingly prominent role.55'
Will we develop new tools for the court to fulfill its role? I hope
that the answer will be yes. The concept of reasonableness has fur-
thered the ability of the courts to ensure the freedom of the individual
and the integrity of the government. Proportionality has now joined
reasonableness. Presumably, new concepts will join these two in the
future and perhaps even replace them.
What does the future hold for the relationship among the branches
of the state? I assume that the criticisms of unaccountability will con-
tinue. Since these arguments will not succeed in weakening the judi-
cial commitment to realizing its role, they are likely to be directed to-
ward the method of choosing judges. The pressure to politicize
supreme court appointments in democracies is likely to increase. s s2 I
hope that the various democracies will stand up to this pressure, and
take affirmative measures to reduce the politicization of the appoint-
ment of judges where it exists. I am critical of the system in a number
of U.S. states where judges are chosen through general elections. I am
also critical of the high political profile of appointing federal judges.
As for Israel, I am satisfied with its system of the appointment of
judges, under which the duty to appoint judges is entrusted to a con-
stitutional body of which most members reflect nonpolitical considera-
tions.5 5
3
We must distance ourselves from the erroneous view that regards
judges as the representatives of the people and as accountable to the
people much like the legislature is. Judges are not the representatives
of the people, and it would be a tragedy if they became so. The prin-
ciple of representation that applies to the legislature (and directly or
indirectly to the executive) does not apply to the judiciary. It is suffi-
cient that the judiciary reflects the different values that are accepted in
551 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 174-93 (2000)
(arguing that comparative studies should be central to a cosmopolitan discipline at the end of the
twentieth century).
552 See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN To REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).
553 See BASIC LAW: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE § 4 (1984). The President of the State -
who is not the head of the executive but rather the symbol of state sovereignty - appoints all
judges. The President is obliged to act according to the recommendation of the Judicial Ap-
pointments Committee. This Committee has nine members: two cabinet ministers, two members
of the Knesset (one from the majority and one from the opposition), two lawyers appointed by the
Israeli Bar Association, and three Supreme Court judges consisting of the Supreme Court Presi-
dent and two judges chosen by their peers for three-year appointments. Thus, a professional, not
political, majority controls the committee. The political coalition in power is prevented from con-
trolling court appointments. A similar arrangement exists in South Africa. See S. AFR. CONST.
ch. 8, § 174(3).
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society, and it should have an accountability that reflects its independ-
ence and its special role in a democracy.
One development that is particularly difficult to predict relates to
international jurisdiction. In various fields - human rights, in par-
ticular - the state is losing its judicial exclusivity as international
courts grow and strengthen. This phenomenon should weaken argu-
ments accusing national judges of unaccountability since the interna-
tional judge is even less accountable. This interplay between national
and international courts can also affect the scope of institutional non-
justiciability. What point is there in recognizing institutional non-
justiciability at the national level if it is clear that the international
court (for example, the International Criminal Court recently estab-
lished at the Hague) S54 will recognize the institutional justiciability of
the same matter? Whatever the case, the growth of international tri-
bunals will add a new dimension to the role of the national judge.
I regard myself as a judge who is sensitive to his role in a democ-
racy. I take seriously the tasks imposed upon me - bridging the gap
between law and society and protecting the constitution and democ-
racy. Despite frequent criticism (and it frequently descends to per-
sonal attacks and threats of violence), I have continued on this path
for many years. I hope that by doing so, I am serving my legal system
properly. Indeed, as judges in our countries' highest courts, we must
continue on our paths according to our consciences. We, as judges,
have a North Star that guides us: the fundamental values and princi-
ples of constitutional democracy. A heavy responsibility rests on our
shoulders. But even in hard times, we must remain true to ourselves.
I discussed this duty in an opinion considering whether extraordinary
methods of interrogation may be used on a terrorist in a "ticking
bomb" situation:
Deciding these applications has been difficult for us. 'Rue, from the legal
perspective, the road before us is smooth. We are, however, part of Israeli
society. We know its problems and we live its history. We are not in an
ivory tower. We live the life of this country. We are aware of the harsh
reality of terrorism in which we are, at times, immersed. The fear that
our ruling will prevent us from properly dealing with terrorists troubles
us. But we are judges. We demand that others act according to the law.
This is also the demand that we make of ourselves. When we sit at trial,
we stand on trial.
55 5
554 On the International Criminal Court, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT. THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS (Roy S.
Lee ed., 1999); SHABTAI ROSANNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
210 (2002).
555 H.C. 4054/95, Pub. Comm'n Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel, 43(4) PD. 817, 845.
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